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This thesis provides an analysis of the impact of pervasive online surveillance 
on the relationship between the digital citizen and corporations, the state, and 
politics in order to argue that the United Kingdom is emerging as a surveillance 
state in which individual’s relationship with society is remade to their 
detriment. Original contributions to knowledge are as follows: 1) locating the 
business model of corporations such as Google and Facebook, identified as 
surveillance capitalism by Shoshanna Zuboff, in a surveillance studies context 
and connecting it with Antoinette Rouvroy’s algorithmic governmentality so as 
to discuss its rationality and technology of power; 2) identifying the emergence 
of a new role for the digital citizen in this business model as a produsumer, 
characterised by the production of surplus-value generating behavioural data 
through both production and consumption of digital content; 3) recognising 
state online surveillance regimes as a digital panopticon involving a new 
technology of power of algorithmic panoptic uncertainty; 4) assessing the 
implications of the forthcoming General Data Protection Regulation and the 
proposed ePrivacy Regulation for voter surveillance and microtargeting 
practices undertaken by political organisations; and 5) showing how the 
communications data retention and disclosure framework in Parts 3 and 4 of 
the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is incompatible with EU law in light of recent 
decisions of the CJEU. This thesis does not seek to provide solutions or 
regulatory recommendations in response to the issues raised, but bring 
together literature, highlight problems, and propose new concepts in order to 
establish a basis for further research. In doing so, this thesis adopts a 
governmentality framework and takes an interdisciplinary approach to address 
the changing relationship between the citizen and society in the era of big data 
and online surveillance.  
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Chapter 1 | Introduction 
 
 
This thesis contends that the United Kingdom is emerging as a surveillance 
state, characterised by the ubiquitous use of data-producing ICT and the 
prevalence of internet-enabled surveillance, within which the digital citizen is 
amenable to various new forms of control based on online surveillance, 
primarily through social media, search, and other popular internet services but 
also encompassing data gathering from other sources, which overlap, interact, 
and together remake the individual’s relationship with society to their 
detriment. The ever-increasing use and importance of the internet within 
society means that its impact on the relationship between the digital citizen and 
society is a crucial topic for discussion in the contemporary world. As a result, 
there is a rich and critical literature on both the interface between technology 
and society1 and on surveillance which relies on ICT2, the internet3, and big 
data4. But no comprehensive analysis has yet been undertaken which looks at 
the role in the increasing impact of the internet on society of the particular 
forms and instances of surveillance-based control discussed in this thesis and 
which focuses on their interactions and points of overlap and on what they 
together mean for the digital citizen. 
 
Focusing primarily on the UK (with reference to other countries where 
relevant) and taking an interdisciplinary approach, drawing on concepts and 
resources from law, legal theory, political philosophy, surveillance studies, 
computer science, and from various social sciences, this thesis adopts a 
governmentality framework to identify, examine, and contextualise for the first 
time these forms of surveillance-based control to which the individual as a 
digital citizen in the UK is subject in the contemporary digital world5. 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., Morozov, 2013 
2 See, e.g., Bennett et al., 2012 
3 See, e.g., Fuchs et al., 2012 
4 See, e.g., Andrejevic and Gates, 2014 
5 Analyses of internet-enabled surveillance which adopt elements of governmentality have been put 
forward (see, e.g., Reigeluth, 2014; Klauser and Albrechtslund, 2014; and Birchall, 2016), but none 
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Governmentality considers power in its constituent parts, involving rationalities 
(the goals to be achieved through exercises of power), technologies (the 
strategies and techniques adopted to translate those rationalities into reality), 
and subjects (those whose behaviour is to be altered in the way desired), and 
thus facilitates an understanding of why and how power is exercised and of the 
effect that it has on those over whom it is being exercised6. Adopting a 
governmentality framework therefore permits an analysis of the relationships 
created and shaped by the power interactions represented by these 
surveillance-based forms control in which they have an identifiable place and an 
identifiable function as technologies used to translate rationalities into reality 
by effecting a change in the behaviour of the digital citizen. In this 
governmentality-based analysis, the methodological approach taken is that of 
bringing together and building on the body of existing research so as to identify 
connections and put forward new theoretical concepts as a basis for future 
research of both an empirical and theoretical nature.  
 
As such, this thesis introduces new concepts where necessary to account for the 
phenomena being discussed and makes several original contributions to 
knowledge. This thesis for the first time connects the surveillance capitalism 
identified by Shoshanna Zuboff with Antoinette Rouvroy’s concept of 
algorithmic governmentality7 and proposes the concept of the ‘produsumer’ to 
account for the digital citizen’s role in this8. This thesis also identifies for the 
first time the governmentality of the digital panopticon as a form of 
surveillance-based control undertaken by state security and intelligence 
agencies and involving a new technology of power of algorithmic panoptic 
uncertainty9, and establishes the incompatibility with EU law of the UK’s 
communications data retention and disclosure framework under the 
                                                          
has yet sought to adopt a governmentality framework with which to analyse the forms of 
surveillance discussed here as interrelated and overlapping forms of control so as to provide an 
account of what they mean for the digital citizen. 
6 See Chapter 2.2 for a fuller discussion of governmentality 
7 See Chapter 3.1.2 
8 See Chapter 3.2.1 
9 See Chapter 4.1.2 
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Investigatory Powers Act 201610. And this thesis for the first time locates the 
voter surveillance and microtargeting practices undertaken by political 
organisations in a governmentality framework and contextualises them 
alongside surveillance capitalism11 and, also for the first time, assesses the effect 
of the forthcoming General Data Protection Regulation and proposed ePrivacy 
Regulation on these practices12. 
 
In order to understand and critically discuss new technologies and their impact 
on society it is important to examine them and their development in the context 
of society. In the west, this means locating them within the neo-liberalised 
societies that have developed since the 1970s, each of which have their own 
particular characteristics but which have all followed a similar general trend (as 
our focus in this thesis is primarily on the UK, we will discuss neo-liberalism as 
it has developed the UK with reference to other countries where relevant). In 
the UK, the neo-liberal ideal of the active, self-managing consumer-citizen when 
combined with the internet gave birth to the neo-liberalised digital citizen13, 
who is amenable to control through various forms of surveillance that would 
have been impossible in the pre-digital era. These involve new roles for the 
individual, and allow the digital citizen to be commodified as a data profile to be 
bought and sold on the advertising market, undermine the sovereignty of the 
individual that in theory underpins neo-liberalism, erode constitutional norms 
that may be thought fundamental in a democratic society, and challenge legal 
frameworks for privacy and data protection. Through a governmentality 
analysis we will identify the techniques for the exercise of power that underpin 
this, explain how they operate, and locate them within the new forms of control 
that come together to form the emerging surveillance state. In doing so, we will 
determine that, in the UK at least, the internet, while promising to empower the 
digital citizen, has in fact facilitated a transfer of power away from the digital 
citizen to corporations, the state, and the political establishment. 
                                                          
10 See Chapter 6.3 
11 Chapter 5.1.2 
12 See Chapter 6.2 
13 Note that neo-liberal citizenship and neo-liberal digital citizenship may have evolved differently in 
other countries 
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This chapter will give a broad overview of the argument put forward in this 
thesis, and will introduce key terms and concepts that we will repeatedly return 
to. We will first discuss the digital revolution that has transformed society over 
the last few decades, and the resulting emergence of the digital citizen. We will 
then see how the data produced by the digital citizen as they go about their lives 
in the digital world is gathered in big data systems and made sense and use of 
by algorithms, which play a key role in the forms of control we seek to analyse. 
Finally, we will identify these as forms of surveillance that facilitate the control 
of the digital citizen by corporations, the state, and political organisations. In 
doing so, we will set out the structure of the thesis and will provide a starting 
point for our analysis.  
 
We begin with the internet revolution. 
 
 
1.1 | The Internet Revolution  
 
The predecessor of what we now know as the internet was the ARPANET, which 
started with a single link between computers at UCLA and the Stanford 
Research Institute in October 196914. The ARPANET was where core 
technologies of the internet - such as TCP/IP, the communications protocol that 
underpins all internet traffic – were first implemented and tested. By December 
1969 the network had doubled in size to four nodes. Two years later there were 
15 nodes, by 1977 there were over 100, and by 1981 there were 213 nodes on 
the ARPANET15. At this time it was still primarily an academic research 
network, and commercial uses were prohibited (a 1982 MIT guide to the 
ARPANET, for example, stated that “Sending electronic mail over the ARPANet for 
commercial profit or political purposes is both anti-social and illegal”16). The 
ARPANET would form the core of the internet, which came into being when 
ARPANET adopted TCP/IP in January 1983 as its sole protocol, replacing the 
                                                          
14 For a detailed history of the development of the ARPANET and the internet see Leiner et al, 1997 
15 Weber, 2003, p.94 
16 Stacy, 1982 
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earlier NCP protocol that it had been tested alongside, and enabled connections 
from other networks so as to form a network of networks17 (the term ‘internet’ 
began as shorthand for ‘internetwork’, used initially to describe the network of 
networks). With the adoption of TCP/IP, the ARPANET became a sub-network 
of the new internet, and since any other network that also used TCP/IP could 
connect to the internet it opened to use for non-research, commercial purposes. 
In 1990 the ARPANET was closed, while the internet lived on18. 
 
Also in 1990, Tim Berners-Lee, a British researcher working at CERN in 
Switzerland, which had connected to the internet in the late 1980s, released the 
first version of what he called the World Wide Web19. This was a system for 
connecting text files to each other through links embedded within, making use 
of HTML (‘Hypertext Markup Language’) to embed links and format pages (what 
we now know as webpages, which have since grown beyond containing only 
text). The first web server was hosted on his office desktop PC, and Berners-Lee 
released the World Wide Web on a royalty-free basis20. With the development of 
the web, the key features of the internet as we know it today were largely in 
place. The internet and the World Wide Web are often thought of as being the 
same thing, but in fact the web is one service of several that run on the internet, 
with others including email, instant messaging, FTP, and Usenet. In 1993 the 
first graphical web browser, Mosaic, which later became Netscape, was 
released, sparking the growth of the web as the primary way by which people 
use the internet21. 
 
In 1994 Amazon, then an online bookstore, was founded, growing over the next 
two decades to become a dominant player in many forms of retail, more 
valuable than Walmart22, and the eighth biggest employer in the United States23. 
In 1996 the US Congress passed the Communications Decency Act, section 230 
                                                          
17 Leiner et al, 1997 
18 Weber, 2003, p.94 
19 World Wide Web Foundation; Connolly, 2000 
20 World Wide Web Foundation 
21 Connolly, 2000 
22 Cheng, 2016 
23 Fortune, Biggest Employers 
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of which established that websites are not responsible for the content that is 
posted on their pages24. This allowed the then nascent Web to flourish, and to 
this day remains the foundation upon which the ability of websites to publish 
content posted by users without prior review rests25. In 1998 Sergey Brin and 
Larry Page launched Google, improving on earlier search engines, which often 
ranked search results alphabetically or chronologically, in that it ranked results 
by importance based on “the number and quality of links to a page”26, allowing 
for users to more easily access the sites that they were actually looking for. 
Early websites were primarily static resources, where information was 
provided to users without much interaction on their part. As the Web expanded, 
new developments in HTML and other mark-up languages and technologies 
such as PhP, CSS, JavaScript, and Ajax allowed websites to be increasingly 
dynamic, host user-generated content, and facilitate interaction between users. 
This shift from ‘Web 1.0’ to ‘Web 2.0’27 facilitated the emergence of social 
networking sites. Early examples included Friends Reunited, LiveJournal, 
Myspace, and Bebo, but they were all eventually superseded. FaceMash, which 
was developed by Mark Zuckerberg in his Harvard dorm room for Harvard 
students to rate the attractiveness of their peers, became TheFacebook in 
February 2004 when Zuckerberg switched focus to social networking. 
Facebook, which dropped the definitive article in 2005, originally only allowed 
students at Harvard to join, then students at any Ivy League college, then any US 
college, and then students at any university in selected countries around the 
world, including the UK28. Facebook began to allow the general public to sign up 
in 2006. It now has over two billion users, located in almost every country on 
the planet, and is by far the most popular social networking site in the world29. 
 
A year after Facebook opened to the public, Apple’s first iPhone was released. 
Google followed with the release of the first Android smartphone a year later. 
While earlier mobile phones had internet capabilities, their small screens and 
                                                          
24 Communications Decency Act of 1996 s.230 
25 Goldman, 2017 
26 Google, Facts about Google and Competition 
27 Cormode and Balachander, 2008 
28 Philips, 2007 
29 Constine, 2017 
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lack of touch interface greatly limited their usability. With the advent of 
touchscreens, the internet truly came into people’s day-to-day lives. No longer 
would you need to have access to a computer to use the internet in a meaningful 
way, it could be carried in your pocket and accessed at your fingertips. 
Smartphone use grew rapidly, with 52% of British adults owning a smartphone 
in 2012, increasing to 85% as of 201730. As access to the internet has spread 
(90% of British households now have an internet connection31), so too has the 
importance of online services in modern life. Online banking, shopping, and 
social networking are obvious examples, but more generally the internet has 
taken a central place in modern society.  
 
This digital transformation of society has given birth to the digital citizen. As 
this thesis seeks to examine the forms of control that people are subject to on 
the internet, we should establish what we mean when we speak of digital 
citizens. Various definitions have been proposed, though none are authoritative. 
For Katz, who coined the term, ‘digital citizen’ was a general description of the 
kind of people who used the internet32. For Mossberger et al, digital citizens are 
“those who use the internet regularly and effectively – that is, on a daily basis”33. 
Hintz et al describe ‘digital citizenship’ as “the (self-)enactment of people’s role in 
society through the use of digital technologies”. For our purposes a digital citizen 
is, broadly speaking, any individual who in the course of their daily lives 
partakes in some way in the modern internet-connected world. The digital 
citizen, for example, uses email, owns a smartphone, has an account with one or 
more social networking sites, shops online, uses online banking, and so on. 
While almost all British adults are now digital citizens (80% of British adults 
now use the internet daily, 73% now access the internet ‘on the go’ using a 
mobile phone, 77% have bought something online34, 97% have used search 
engines, and 76% use social media35), any given digital citizen may be more or 
less involved in this online world. They may be, say, a young person whose 
                                                          
30 Deloitte, 2017, p.12 
31 Office for National Statistics, 2017 
32 Katz, 1997 
33 Mossberger et al, 2008, p.1 
34 Office for National Statistics, 2017 
35 Ofcom, 2017, pp.5-6 
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social life is built around social media and smartphones, or they may be an older 
person who uses email and Facebook to connect with relatives and friends. The 
key factor is that they take part in the modern internet-connected world in 
some way and are therefore susceptible to the forms of control that exist 
therein. When discussing the digital citizen and digital citizenship in this thesis, 
then, we are not discussing citizenship in and of itself– we are discussing the 
ways in which digital citizens (i.e. those who use the internet in the course of 
their daily lives) interact with the online world. 
 
The digital revolution has taken place at the same time as a revolution in 
American, British, and other western societies informed by neo-liberal social, 
economic, and political thought. As a result, and perhaps reflecting the fact that 
new technologies may be conditioned by the societies in which they grow36, the 
role of the digital citizen in relation to the new digital world has developed 
along largely neo-liberal lines. In this, key aspects of the role of the individual in 
society envisaged in neo-liberal theory have become embedded in 
contemporary digital citizenship in these countries. Generally-speaking, 
although the particular characteristics vary country-to-country, these prioritise 
an active citizen interacting with a small state, which in digital citizenship in the 
UK has meant the use of e-government services; they promote the consumer-
citizen engaged in perpetual choice-making in pursuit of their own self-interest, 
which in the UK has produced a digital citizen actively engaged in the 
marketised arena of individualist forms of online consumer politics; and they 
mandate individualist self-management and personal responsibility, which in 
the UK has resulted in a digital citizen tasked with managing both their physical 
body with digital tools and their digital self through privacy self-management 
and identity performance. 
 
Crucially, as the digital citizen takes part in the digital world everything they do 
produces data about them and their lives37. This data is not only central to the 
operation of many online services and powers the digital revolution, but it is 
                                                          
36 Barber, 2003 
37 For a discussion of what is meant by ‘data’, see Kitchin, 2014, pp.1- 9 
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also central to the forms of control to which the digital citizen is subject online. 
Smartphones, for example, contain within them an array of sensors and apps 
that feed data back to corporate databases and allow the everyday lives of their 
owners to be watched, tracked, and analysed. We will now look at how 
algorithms are harnessed to make sense and use of this data. 
 
 
1.2 | Big Data and Algorithmic Control 
 
In the digital world almost everything that we do produces data. The volume, 
variety, and value of this data, as well as the velocity at which it is produced, has 
led to it being called ‘big data’. These ‘four v’s’ are big data’s four key 
characteristics38. Volume refers to the high volume of data produced by 
individuals and internet-connected devices and is perhaps the key characteristic 
of big data; velocity refers to the high velocity with which data is produced by 
individuals and devices; variety refers to the high variety in data produced by 
individuals and devices; and veracity refers to the quality of data and the fact 
that data may be unreliable. A fifth characteristic value, referring to the need to 
collect useful data, is proposed by some. These together give big data a unique 
character, with very large amounts of information of many different varieties 
being produced rapidly that can be inputted to algorithms and analysed. And 
the storage of big data in ever-expanding databases and analysis using 
increasingly powerful computers and algorithms can give new insights into 
individuals and their behaviour, giving birth to new business models and new 
forms of control. 
 
Big data systems do not exist in isolation but operate in concert with other 
systems, apparatuses, and institutions. They form the central part of ‘data 
assemblages’39, complex socio-technical systems with multiple entwined 
                                                          
38 Bent et al, 2017, p.457; see also Kitchin, 2014, pp.67-79, where 7 characteristics of big data are 
discussed 
39 Kitchin and Lauriault, 2014 
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components which exist to produce data40. These assemblages interact with 
each other and with a set of contingent and contextual apparatuses and 
influences which together make and remake assemblages across time and 
place41. As a result, data assemblages are not constructed and do not operate in 
a neutral, impartial way. They reflect the assumptions, practices, and priorities 
of those who conceive of, design, and operate them. And as these assumptions, 
practices, and priorities change and adapt over time, data assemblages exist in a 
constantly shifting state of being. For illustration, Kitchin and Lauriault give us 
the example of a census: 
 
“the data assemblage of a census consists of a large amalgam of 
apparatuses and elements that shape how it is formulated, 
administered, processed, communicated, and how its findings are 
employed. A census is underpinned by a realist system of thought; it 
has a diverse set of accompanying forms of supporting 
documentation; its questions are negotiated by many stakeholders; 
its costs are a source of contention; its administering and reporting 
is shaped by legal frameworks and regulations; it is delivered 
through a diverse set of practices, undertaken by many workers, 
using a range of materials and infrastructures; and its data feed 
into all kinds of uses and secondary markets”42 
 
To make sense and use of big data, data assemblages use algorithms. Indeed, 
such is the fundamental role of algorithms in ICT that Gillespie describes 
computers as ‘algorithm machines’43. Algorithms are not a modern invention, or 
unique to big data, and their use in various forms and for various purposes 
stretches back millennia. But when put to use in big data they are its true 
genius, and transform raw data into something useful. Algorithms may be 
described rather prosaically as “decision-making parts of code”44, but there is 
                                                          
40 Kitchin and Lauriault, 2014; see also Kitchin, 2014, p.24 
41 Kitchin and Lauriault, 2014 
42 Kitchin and Lauriault, 2014 
43 Gillespie, 2014 
44 Beer, 2017, p.3 
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more to them than that. While they are indeed increasingly used to make 
consequential decisions45, such a description limited only to function overlooks 
the context in which they exist and the purpose for which decisions are being 
made. In fact, any given algorithm exists because somebody somewhere has a 
goal that they wish to attain through algorithmic mediation, whether that’s 
ranking search results or delivering targeted advertising, reflecting the fact that 
the data assemblages of which they form part are themselves highly contextual 
and contingent on the priorities and aspirations of those who construct them. 
An algorithm is a set of pre-determined steps to produce a desired outcome. As 
Beer says, “Algorithms are inevitably modelled on visions of the social world, and 
with outcomes in mind, outcomes influenced by commercial or other interests and 
agendas”46. Algorithms therefore have a normative power that is lost when they 
are reduced to a purely functional description. Kitchin points out algorithms are 
often created to produce outcomes that are not neutral, and that their design 
and implementation is framed by “systems of thought and forms of knowledge, 
modes of political economy, organisational and institutional cultures and politics, 
governmentalities and legalities, subjectivities and communities”47. As such, a 
critical discussion of the role of algorithms in contemporary society must 
consider their context and the purposes for which they are designed and 
implemented48. 
 
Hill proposes a definition of ‘algorithm’ as follows: “a finite, abstract, effective, 
compound control structure, imperatively given, accomplishing a given purpose 
under given provisions”49. Hill says that algorithms are finite in that they allow a 
representation to be articulated in finite time and space; abstract in that they 
are general and can be applied beyond a single specific instance of a task; 
effective in that they are precisely determined and certain to produce the result; 
provide control in that in terms of code they supply content that brings about 
some kind of change from one state to another, whether that’s a change in a 
                                                          
45 Diakopoulos, 2013, p.2 
46 Beer, 2017, p.4 
47 Kitchin, 2017, p.18 
48 Kitchin, 2017 
49 Hill, 2016, p.47 
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variable or a subsequent action; are structured in that they consist of smaller 
units or steps to be carried out; are imperative in that they give directions or 
orders; and accomplish a given purpose under given provisions in that they 
seek to a achieve a certain goal in a certain context50. This is a definition that 
intrinsically recognises both the functional and the normative nature of the 
algorithm and allows us to discuss algorithms both in terms of what they do and 
the purpose for which they do it. 
 
And the normative power of algorithms is central to their use in systems for 
algorithmic control. Lazzarato describes governance as “the ensemble of 
techniques and procedures put into place to direct the conduct of men and to take 
account of the probabilities of their action and their relations”51. Algorithms are 
tools of governance, enforcing norms, directing conduct, and accounting for the 
probabilities of users’ actions and their relations. We can therefore speak of 
algorithmic governance, or what some call ‘algocracy’52, as being centred on this 
kind of exercise of power through both the functional and the normative nature 
of the algorithm. And Yeung has described ‘algorithmic regulation’ to mean 
regulatory governance systems that employ algorithmic decision making53, 
involving attempts by any entity to computationally generate knowledge from 
data in order to regulate behaviour in pursuit of some pre-specified goal. This 
could be a public transport authority seeking to regulate vehicle movement to 
optimise traffic flow, a social media company seeking to regulate the behaviour 
of its users to make it more profitable, or an individual seeking to regulate their 
own behaviour using a fitness tracker54: 
 
“I refer to algorithmic regulation as decision-making systems that 
regulate a domain of activity in order to manage risk or alter 
behaviour through continual computational generation of 
knowledge from data emitted and directly collected (in real time on 
                                                          
50 Hill, 2016, pp.44-46 
51 Lazzarato, 2009, p.114 
52 See, e.g., Danaher, 2016 
53 Yeung, 2017b 
54 Yeung, 2017b, p.6 
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a continuous basis) from numerous dynamic components pertaining 
to the regulated environment in order to identify and, if necessary, 
automatically refine (or prompt refinement of) the system’s 
operations to attain a pre-specified goal”55 
 
While automated management systems are not new, algorithmic regulation as 
set out by Yeung describes a more recently-emergent form of control facilitated 
by predictive analysis of big datasets through machine learning and the 
automatic use of the insights gained through this analysis in systems for 
influencing behaviour56. Algorithmic regulation systems are qualitatively 
different from earlier systems in one or both of two ways, each of which involve 
significant differences in the degree of automation. The first difference results 
from the ability of machine learning systems to draw inferences and make 
predictions from big datasets and so generate new information without being 
specifically programmed to do so57. Previous systems, including those which 
involved sophisticated statistical modelling, generally-speaking lacked these 
abilities (in particular, earlier statistical modelling systems lacked the ability to 
‘learn’ and react to changing circumstances automatically without being 
specifically programmed, with models instead being constructed by human 
statisticians). The second difference between algorithmic regulation systems 
and previous forms of automated management results from the ability of 
machine learning systems to automatically use the information which they have 
generated in influencing behaviour without further human intervention. 
Previous systems, such as that developed for use by the Fire Department of New 
York in the 1970s58, were generally used to inform human decision-making in 
management, rather than to automatically influence behaviour (and while some 
earlier systems, such as those used in traffic management, were used to 
                                                          
55 Yeung, 2017b, p.6 
56 Generally-speaking, where the term ‘algorithm’ occurs in the remainder of this thesis it is being 
used in reference to machine learning algorithms. 
57 The ability of machine learning systems to automate the process of building and training a model 
without specific programming or human intervention is one of their key distinguishing features. 
58 See Flood, 2011 
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influence behaviour59, this was less automated and they were not based on 
machine learning but instead involved statistical modelling). 
 
Algorithmic regulation has the potential to have a significant effect on the world 
that we inhabit60. For example, Beer talks about the ‘social power of 
algorithms’61, “the capacity of the algorithm to create, maintain or cement norms 
and notions of abnormality”62. And Just and Latzer show how algorithms are 
involved in constructing social reality on social media and other online 
services63. Pointing out that social order is based on a shared social reality, and 
that “the realities shaped by automated algorithmic selections codetermine 
individuals’ coordination and cooperation on and beyond the Internet”64, they 
question what impact the increasingly personalised nature of the algorithmic 
production of social space online has on this shared social reality65. They 
contend that this high degree of personalisation, ultimately based on showing 
the individual what they want to see, results in different individual realities and 
amplifies audience fragmentation and individualization66, leading to isolation of 
like-minded individuals in echo-chambers where people only have their existing 
opinions and prejudices confirmed67. As these online social spaces are 
predominantly owned and operated by corporations, and as the ultimate goal of 
personalising online space in this way is to induce in the user behaviour desired 
by those corporations, they have a major role in the construction of social 
reality online which can be directed to suit corporate ends. In a similar way, 
algorithms have had an impact on many other aspects of contemporary society 
– as Kitchin notes, with the rise of ‘algorithm machines’, new forms of 
algorithmic control are reshaping numerous social and economic systems68. 
 
                                                          
59 See, for example, Light, 2005 
60 See, for example, Kitchin, 2017 
61 Beer, 2017 
62 Beer, 2017, p.7 
63 Just and Latzer, 2017 
64 Just and Latzer, 2017, p.247 
65 Just and Latzer, 2017pp.246-247 
66 Just and Latzer, 2017, p.248 
67 Just and Latzer, 2017, p.249 
68 Kitchin, 2017, pp.14-16 
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Despite the prominent role of algorithms in the modern world, Diakopoulos 
points out that we lack clarity about how algorithms exercise their power69. As 
Danaher says, while we may know the inputs and the outputs we often cannot 
see, or could not understand, the decision-making process of an algorithm 
itself70. Burrell sets out three distinct forms of this ‘algorithmic opacity’71. The 
first is intentional opacity, where an algorithm is concealed out of concern for 
the protection of intellectual property (the precise nature of algorithms is often 
a closely guarded secret). The second is illiterate opacity, where an algorithm 
can only be understood by those with the technical ability to read and write 
code (which remains a specialist skill). And the third is intrinsic opacity, where 
the ways that an algorithm makes a decision are difficult for humans to 
understand (known as the ‘interoperability problem’72). While more than one of 
these may combine in the same algorithm – it is possible, for example, for an 
algorithm to be intentionally opaque and for it to be the case that even if it 
wasn’t intentionally opaque then it would still be illiterately or intrinsically 
opaque - the end result of any one of these forms of opacity is that those subject 
to the control of the algorithm usually cannot see how it operates, or what goal 
it is operating in pursuit of. Algorithmic opacity means that, as Pasquale puts it, 
while authority is increasingly algorithmic, the “values and prerogatives that the 
encoded rules enact are hidden within black boxes”73. Thus in algocracy decisions 
that were once made by humans are made automatically by algorithms in 
pursuit of human goals but invisible and therefore unknowable to those subject 
to their control. 
 
The functional and normative nature of algorithms is taken up in many uses. 
Algorithms, for example, determine the sequencing of traffic lights in intelligent 
traffic control systems. They are at the heart of the cryptography that underpins 
modern secure banking, shopping, and communication. It is an algorithm that 
decides which email is spam and which should go to your inbox. Indeed, the 
                                                          
69 Diakopoulos, 2013, p.2 
70 Dahaner, 2016 
71 Burrell, 2016; see also Danaher, 2016 
72 Lepri et al, 2007, p.12 
73 Pasquale, 2015, p.8 
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ways that algorithms are put to use in pursuit of human goals in contemporary 
society are far too numerous to count. But for our purposes we are interested in 
how they are used both functionally and normatively in big data systems where 
the primary source of the data is the life of the digital citizen. In this context, 
algorithms are crucial components of big data surveillance systems which seek 
to exert some form of influence over the digital citizen in pursuit of the goals of 
corporations as they seek profit, of the state as it seeks security, and of political 




1.3 | Surveillance and Power 
 
Data collection has always been about power. The survey that became the 
Domesday Book was instituted so as to help cement the power of the Norman 
ruling class and facilitate revenue collection in the decades after the conquest of 
106674. In order to govern the kingdom, the King needed to know who was in 
the kingdom, who owned which parts of the kingdom, and who owed what to 
the Crown. In 1603, the English cartographer Richard Bartlett was dispatched to 
Donegal so that he could map its terrain and its people as the English Crown 
attempted to extend its control over Ireland. The locals, understanding the 
nature of his endeavour and not wanting their country to be known to the 
English, removed his head from his body75. The Victorians were enthusiastic 
data collectors76, measuring and quantifying everything within reach. In the 
present day, data is collected about us from the moment we are born. Medical 
staff note the date and time, our birth weight goes into medical records, and our 
name goes onto a birth certificate and into the register of births. As we grow we 
are measured and compared to growth charts by which we are held to a 
standardised norm and deviations from that norm are identified and sought to 
be corrected. The collection of data about people, their lives, and their 
                                                          
74 Taylor, 1975 
75 Montano, 2011, p.59; Farrell, 2017, p.31 
76 Goldman, 1991; Mahon, 2009 
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behaviours are practices by which people are measured, quantified, and 
recorded for the purposes of government. And we can understand this to be a 
form of surveillance within the definition put forward by David Lyon: 
 
“[surveillance is] any collection and processing of personal data, 
whether identifiable or not, for the purposes of influencing or 
managing those whose data have been garnered”77 
 
Systematic surveillance has long been used for control. Marx wrote in the 1860s 
of the surveillance of workers in factories by other workers elevated above 
them in hierarchy for the purpose of watching over them in order to impose the 
control desired by their employers78. Foucault, adopting the metaphor of the 
panopticon, wrote in the 1970s and 80s of surveillance as being a feature of the 
disciplinary forms of power in western society79. And in the 90s both Deleuze80 
and Gill81 wrote extensively of surveillance in neo-liberal capitalism arising in 
the offline world, rather than the online world, but involving the gathering and 
analysis of data beyond the relatively simple surveillance of employee 
undertaken by employer (or by another employee acting on their behalf). 
 
Surveillance undertaken with the use of ICT is known as ‘dataveillance’, a term 
which was first used by Roger Clarke in 1988 to describe “the systematic use of 
personal data systems in the investigation or monitoring of the actions or 
communications of one or more persons”82. Early forms of neo-liberal 
dataveillance included credit reference services, which use data derived from an 
individual’s past behaviour to attempt to predict the likelihood of them repaying 
credit and to give an estimated guide to the creditworthiness of the individual 
and, therefore, the likelihood of a potential creditor profiting from the need to 
borrow. Gill shows how, particularly in the US, the individual became beholden 
to credit reference agencies, with ‘good’ credit becoming an essential 
                                                          
77 Lyon, 2001, p.2 
78 Marx, 1990, p.450 
79 Foucault, 1991 
80 Deleuze, 1992 
81 Gill, 1995 
82 Clarke, 1988 
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requirement for full participation in civil society83. This is indicative of how 
dataveillance has long been used to create and maintain a new ‘normal’ in the 
neo-liberal project of rule, rendering individuals and society amenable to neo-
liberal power structures and forms of government. The presence of 
dataveillance and dataveillance-based forms of control in modern societies is 
not a new feature.   
 
What is new in the increasingly digital world is the extent of surveillance that 
can now be undertaken, the exponentially greater quantity of data from 
multiple sources that can be fed into algorithms, the powerful algorithmic 
analysis that can be performed in order to render individuals knowable to a 
much greater degree, the precision of prediction and control, and the way that 
these are all brought together in new business models that seek to commodify 
as much of everyday life as possible in the pursuit of profit, in new ways for the 
state to pursue security concerns and exclude subversive or extremist ideas, 
and in new forms of voter surveillance and campaigning by political 
organisations. These new surveillance-based forms of control interact and 
overlap, blurring the distinctions between corporate, state, and political power, 
and together remake the relationship between the digital citizen, the state, and 
politics to the detriment of the digital citizen. 
 
In 2013 Mayer-Schoenberger and Cukier coined the term ‘datafication’84 for the 
process of transforming many aspects of everyday life into quantified data for 
use in ICT systems. According to van Dijck, “Datafication as a legitimate means 
to access, understand and monitor people’s behavior is becoming a leading 
principle, not just amongst techno-adepts, but also amongst scholars who see 
datafication as a revolutionary research opportunity to investigate human 
conduct”85. Facebook provides an archetypal example of datafication, and 
Bucher86 and Helmond and Gerlitz87 have all shown how by surveilling and 
                                                          
83 Gill, 1995 
84 Mayer-Schoenberger and Cukier, 2013, p.78 
85 van Dijck, 2014, p.198 
86 Bucher, 2012 
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recording the behaviour of its users Facebook has turned social interactions 
into data to be analysed. This big data describing the behaviour of Facebook’s 
two billion users in great detail can then be put to use by subjecting it to 
algorithmic analysis so as to identify patterns among and correlations between 
users, infer unknown information about those users, and predict their future 
behaviour. This allows that behaviour to be influenced so as to produce profit, 
by providing carefully targeted links and adverts designed to take the user’s 
attention and persuade them to click, purchase, or follow.  
 
This dataveillance system is made available to advertisers, who purchase access 
to users so as to make use of these analytical and predictive powers in order to 
more effectively target them with persuasive advertising. As van Dijck puts it, 
“The digital transformation of sociality spawned an industry that builds its 
prowess on the value of data and metadata”88. In this, the data produced by users 
as they go about their online lives and describing those lives in great detail – 
and therefore those users themselves - becomes a commodity to be exploited in 
the pursuit of profit. This reflects Arvidsson’s argument, put forward in 2005, 
before social media grew into a behemoth, that brands commodify our social 
lives89. This is a process that he described as the “branding of life”90. The 
commodification of life takes place not just on Facebook, as similar datafication 
and commodification can also be seen on many other online platforms.  
 
In recognition of the way that the data produced through this datafication is 
used, Degli Esposti has updated the definition of dataveillance in order to 
include attempts to control behaviour. She adds the element of seeking to 
control behaviour, which reflects Lyon’s classic definition of surveillance as 
involving the collection or processing of personal data for the purpose of 
influencing or regulating behaviour, to define dataveillance as “the systematic 
monitoring of people or groups, by means of digital information management 
systems, in order to regulate or govern their behaviour”91. This updated and 
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90 Arvidsson, 2005, p.251 
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extended definition of dataveillance, more in line with the common definition of 
surveillance and involving the gathering of data about people or groups for use 
in digital information management systems with the aim of regulating or 
governing behaviour, can therefore be characterised as surveillance which 
involves digital information management and data processing systems92. 
 
Dataveillance in this form is central to surveillance capitalism. This is the 
business model of the corporations that dominate the digital world, including 
Google and Facebook. In order to be dataveilled the digital citizen and their 
behaviour is first datafied. Next, this data is subjected to predictive algorithmic 
analysis so as to produce new information, both about the individual and about 
their behaviour. The information produced is then used to predict future 
behaviour and attempt to direct it in the way desired. Given the centrality of 
algorithmic analysis to this process, we can recognise dataveillance as a form of 
the algorithmic regulation described by Yeung. 
  
The unparalleled visibility and knowability of individuals produced by the 
algorithmic analysis of the big data created by and describing them through the 
process of datafication and the application of this algorithmically-generated 
information to powerful predictive models and techniques for influencing 
behaviour in such a way as to produce a desired action is unique to surveillance 
capitalism, and distinguishes surveillance undertaken in this way from previous 
forms of capitalist surveillance. While previously surveillance of employees or 
customers was used as one technique among many to establish and maintain an 
order that facilitated the pursuit of profit by other means, surveillance 
capitalism involves a new order in which pervasive dataveillance as a form of 
control is itself the defining feature of the order and the primary means by 
which control is exerted and profit is extracted. In this, the work of the digital 
citizen in producing behavioural data is exploited, the datafied digital citizen 
becomes a commodity to be bought and sold on the advertising market, and 
their agency as a social and economic is appropriated through the highly 
                                                          
92 This is the definition of ‘dataveillance’ to be used in this thesis. 
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personalised, responsive, and persuasive form of behavioural nudging known as 
hypernudge and directed so as to produce profit for corporation. 
 
The discussion of surveillance capitalism in this thesis will focus primarily on 
Google and Facebook. While this business model is used by a wide variety of 
corporations who provide services beyond those provided by these 
corporations (with Amazon, for example, also employing a variation on the 
theme), together they represent its progenitor (in the case of Google) and its 
foremost proponents (in the case of both Google and Facebook). However, the 
analysis of how surveillance capitalism operates and what it means for the 
digital citizen would generally-speaking apply equally to the other areas in 
which this business model is implemented (subject to sector- and 
implementation-specific modifications, where appropriate). 
 
Dataveillance is also undertaken in the programmes of the state’s security and 
intelligence agencies. The extent of this surveillance, primarily carried out by 
the National Security Agency (‘NSA’) in the US and Government 
Communications Headquarters (‘GCHQ’) in the UK, was made public by former 
NSA contractor Edward Snowden in 2013. As well as over 200 interceptors 
located on the internet backbone cables coming to and from the UK that enable 
the collection of all the data passing through them as well as the systematic 
weakening of encryption standards and installation of backdoors in otherwise 
secure networking equipment, this also involves the provision of data to the 
security and intelligence agencies from corporations involved in surveillance 
capitalism. As a result, the practices of surveillance capitalism and the extensive 
surveillance apparatus developed by these corporations forms a significant part 
of the state’s surveillance operations. As the data held by these corporations 
relates to almost every aspect of contemporary digital life, the state has access 
to huge amounts of information about the lives, preferences, and activities of its 
citizens. As a result, the surveillance operations employed by surveillance 
capitalism corporations and the state online surveillance regimes operated by 
GCHQ and the NSA are linked, and represent interrelated forms of control. The 
data collected by these agencies is funnelled into giant repositories, from where 
Introduction | Chapter 1 
  
 
Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 22 
  
it can be accessed and algorithmically analysed in order to allow for real-time 
surveillance of almost any digitally-connected individual in the country and 
around the world. The potentially all-seeing surveillance system operated by 
the NSA and GCHQ, the digital panopticon constructed through their extensive 
surveillance programmes and facilitated by the practices of surveillance 
capitalism, allows the state to extend its reach into the homes and lives of tens 
of millions of people. 
 
In the digital panopticon the state no longer needs to involve the populace in 
their own surveillance through a network of informers, but can rely on the 
interception of the data that they produce as they go about their online lives and 
on their access to the data that they willingly give up to surveillance capitalism 
corporations and which those corporations in turn pass on to the state. And 
predictive algorithmic analysis of big data allows security and intelligence 
agencies to infer otherwise unknown information about people, casting 
algorithms as the new informers in this new form of surveillance. Algorithmic 
opacity hides these processes in black boxes, invisible and unknowable to those 
subject to their control. In this, the individual is reduced to a pliant subject of 
state control, and that control moves to a pre-emptive basis by which everyone 
is under undue suspicion as a potential criminal, with potential evidence against 
them gathered, analysed, and stored. And the empirically demonstrated chilling 
effect of the digital panopticon on freedom of expression potentially excludes 
subversive ideas and undermines the cornerstone of democracy. 
 
And the growing use of surveillance by political parties and campaigns, often 
then making use of dataveillance systems constructed by corporations to reach 
voters directly, is becoming a feature of the political and electoral process in 
many countries. The ability of political organisations to surveil voters, subject 
them to similar predictive algorithmic analysis as that performed in surveillance 
capitalism, and access – at a price – the powerful behavioural modification tools 
developed by corporations like Facebook and Google brings new influences to 
politics. The asymmetries of access to data gathering, predictive analytics, and 
microtargeting tools between wealthy, established political parties and 
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candidates and those outside the mainstream potentially entrenches the 
political establishment and dramatically increases the influence of capital on the 
democratic process. Through this, the agency of the digital citizen as a political 
actor becomes directed to the pursuit of the goals of political organisations, and 
the online public sphere is degraded. 
 
These new forms of dataveillance-based control, involving big data and 
predictive analytics, challenge the existing ‘notice and consent’ model of privacy 
and data protection. In a world where it is impossible to know what information 
about any given individual may be predicted or inferred through the algorithmic 
analysis of big datasets, and where privacy notices are often long, confusing, and 
written in obfuscating legalese, it is increasingly difficult for individuals to be 
given effective notice, let alone give informed consent to the use of their data. 
The EU’s forthcoming General Data Protection Regulation, which seeks to 
provide a new baseline for data protection, goes some way towards addressing 
these deficiencies, but as it is itself fundamentally grounded in a notice and 
consent model it cannot resolve them all. However, privacy and data protection 
law may provide some recourse for the digital citizen. The voter surveillance 
and microtargeting operations carried out by political organisations will be 
subject to restrictions under the GDPR framework, with individuals given new 
rights over their data and new obligations placed on data controllers. And the 
existing ePrivacy Directive provides a way for aspects of the digital panopticon, 
in particular the communications data retention and disclosure provisions of 
the UK’s Investigatory Powers Act 2016, commonly known as the ’snooper’s 
charter’, to be challenged in law. 
 
Dataveillance is a form of surveillance which, like all other forms of surveillance, 
is fundamentally about power and control. Big data takes this to a new level, and 
the algorithm is central to the exercise of that power in the digital world. This 
thesis seeks to identify the forms of dataveillance-based power to which the 
digital citizen is subject online, based on big data, surveillance, and algorithmic 
and analysis and control, and the ways that they remake the relationship 
between the digital citizen and the emerging surveillance state. This new 
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surveillance state represents the instigation of a new relationship between 
corporations, the state, political organisations, and the digital citizen. 
Surveillance now reaches deep into our lives in a way that would have been 
possible in the pre-digital era. In this new relationship, the digital citizen 
becomes subject to overlapping and complementary forms of surveillance-
based control, blurring the lines between corporate, state, and political power. 
And the digital citizen is remade as an exploited commodity to be bought and 
sold in surveillance capitalism, a potential criminal in the digital panopticon, 
and politically manipulable subject of persuasive, microtargeted political 
advertising. Understanding these new forms of control and their effect on the 




1.4 | Thesis Overview 
 
This introduction has set out in broad terms the argument put forward in this 
thesis, which holds that the UK is emerging as a surveillance state, characterised 
by the ubiquitous use of data-producing ICT and the prevalence of internet-
enabled surveillance, within which the neo-liberalised digital citizen is 
amenable to the identified new forms of surveillance-based control that remake 
their relationship with corporations, the state, and politics to their detriment. 
Along the way we have introduced, defined, and contextualised key concepts 
that will inform our analysis and to which we will repeatedly return as our 
argument unfolds. The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows.  
 
In the next chapter, we will discuss the neo-liberalisation of western societies 
since the late 1970s, in particular the UK, in order to put the development of 
surveillance-based forms of online control in their social and political context, in 
which the individual is required to take on a new role as an active, self-
managing consumer-citizen engaged in a process of perpetual choice-making in 
a marketised public and is imbued personal responsibility for their lives 
regardless of any outside forces that they may encounter. And the emergence of 
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a neo-liberal form of digital citizenship in this mould will be identified. 
Governance and governmentality concepts will give us a language with which to 
discuss power and government in the newly differentiated polity of the neo-
liberal state, and to place techniques for the exercise of power through 
surveillance and the goals and values underpinning them into a theoretical 
framework in which they have an identifiable place and an identifiable function.  
 
In Chapter 3 we will encounter the business model behind the most successful 
of the new corporations that dominate the digital world, surveillance capitalism, 
and will identify this as a new form of capitalism, with a new logic of 
accumulation and new forms of labour that move beyond existing analyses. We 
will see how in surveillance capitalism the digital citizen takes on a new role as 
a source of behavioural data from which great profit is derived, and will see how 
they become commodified as a data profile to be bought and sold on the 
advertising market and how their agency as a social and economic actor 
becomes appropriated and turned against them in pursuit of corporate ends. 
But we will also see how new forms of everyday resistance have sprung up to 
resist the practices of surveillance capitalism, and how some of these are 
beginning to receive tentative recognition in law. 
 
Then, in Chapter 4, we will discuss how the ubiquity of IT in the modern world 
and the vast quantities of data gathered by surveillance capitalism corporations 
have been co-opted by the state in order to construct a digital panopticon and 
exert control over the individual as they move through the online world. We will 
discuss how mass online surveillance in this way undermines the presumption 
of innocence, casting the digital citizen as a potential criminal and the data 
gathered on them by the state as potential evidence. We will also discover how 
the chilling effect of the digital panopticon on freedom of expression reduces the 
willingness of the digital citizen to seek out and impart ideas and information 
that may be considered to be subversive, extreme, or outside the mainstream. In 
all we will see how the state can now surveil entire populations with an array of 
devices and minimum active involvement of the populace, reducing them to 
pliant subjects of the digital panopticon’s control. 
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In Chapter 5, we will examine how voter surveillance by political organisations 
and the advertising tools provided by surveillance capitalism corporations 
allow political parties and campaigns to seek to algorithmically engineer online 
public space. We will see that through this, voters can be microtargeted with 
personalised, precisely tailored, and highly persuasive political advertising, and 
that the imbalance of resources between established political organisations and 
others leads to an imbalance in access to data and to microtargeting tools which 
entrenches the position of the political establishment and amplifies the 
influence of capital in the democratic process. 
 
Finally, in Chapter 6, we will address the relationship between these 
surveillance-based forms of control and privacy and data protection law. In this, 
we will see how the practices of surveillance capitalism undermine the current 
‘notice and consent’ model, and will discuss the extent to which GDPR has the 
potential to address these issues. We will also assess whether the voter 
surveillance and microtargeting discussed in Chapter 5 is compatible with GDPR 
and with the proposed ePrivacy Regulation, and will set out the rights that 
voters have to challenge these practices and what obligations will be placed on 
political organisations as they surveil voters and the surveillance capitalism 
corporations that facilitate microtargeting. And we will finish by showing that 
the communications data retention and disclosure regime of the Investigatory 
Powers Act, commonly known as the snooper’s charter, is incompatible with the 
existing ePrivacy Directive in light of recent decisions of the CJEU. 
 
Now we move on to discuss the transformation in government and society 
driven by neo-liberal thought, identify the role of the individual within neo-
liberal society, introduce our governmentality framework, and establish the 
neo-liberal nature of contemporary digital citizenship in the UK. 
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In the first chapter we described the development of the internet and its impact 
on society in the last decades of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, 
and set out some key concepts in relation to data, surveillance, and algorithmic 
control. In this chapter we will see that at the same time there has been a 
revolution in government and society informed by the revival of a modified 
form of classical liberal economic thinking known as neo-liberalism. This 
prioritises the role of the free market and of the personally responsible 
individual actively engaged in civil society, and represents a significant shift 
away from the previously orthodox model of the welfare state. Barber argues 
that “technologies tend not to be determinative but rather are conditioned by 
what is going on in the society in which they grow”1, and it is in the context of 
increasingly neo-liberal Anglo-American societies that the platforms and 
services that dominate the internet have emerged. An analysis of how these 
platforms and services operate and the forms of control to which they subject 
the individual must take into account the socio-political context in which they 
exist, namely that of contemporary neo-liberal society.  
 
We will see that as the ever-increasing role of the internet within modern 
society and the concurrent neo-liberalisation of the state have combined they 
have created a new form of digital citizenship in this neo-liberal mould. In doing 
so, we will set some of the foundations for the broader argument put forward in 
this thesis. This holds that in the emerging surveillance state of the UK the neo-
liberalised digital citizen is amenable to new surveillance-based forms of 
control in pursuit of commercial, security, and political considerations that 
remake the relationship between the digital citizen and society to the detriment 
of the digital citizen in terms of their ability to be exploited for profit by private 
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corporations engaged in new forms of surveillance-based capitalism, in terms of 
how mass online surveillance by the state undermines some of the fundamental 
norms of democratic society, and terms of the how surveillance and big data 
techniques allow the online public sphere to be manipulated by political parties 
and campaigns, contributing to its decline.  
 
This chapter will explore neo-liberalism in theory and identify key themes that 
provide common ground across its sometimes disparate strands, including the 
sovereignty and personal responsibility of the individual, the prioritisation of 
the free market as the guarantor of individual liberty, and the pursuit of a 
smaller state focused on regulation rather than active economic intervention or 
provision of public services. We will then look at how neo-liberal policies have 
been implemented in the UK since the 1970s and what this means for the 
individual and their role within the state as an active consumer-citizen, which 
will be identified and described. Next, we will discuss how we can conceive of 
power, government, and the state. Governance concepts will describe the form 
of the neo-liberal state as a marketised state, a differentiated network of power 
relationships between many economic and political actors, and a 
governmentality framework will locate government as a power interaction 
between two or more of those actors in the pursuit of some goal and the state as 
an illusion created by the network of those power interactions. Finally, we will 
identify contemporary digital citizenship as fitting a neo-liberal mould, 
interacting with a smaller state facilitated by developments in e-government, 
operating as an active citizen engaged in consumer forms of politics, and taking 
individual responsibility for the self in an ongoing process of self-management. 
As indicated in Chapter 1 and as with the thesis as a whole, our focus is on how 
neo-liberalism has developed in the UK, although reference is made to other 
countries where relevant. 
 
In all, neo-liberalism will be placed in a broader theoretical context as an 
ideology that drives the exercise of power, a rationality of government that has 
transformed the state and remade the individual within that state as an active 
self-managing consumer-citizen, and in doing so has set the course for the 
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emergence of the neo-liberal model of the digital citizen. We will establish how 
we are to conceptualise power, government, and the state and will contextualise 
the emergence of this identifiably neo-liberal model of digital citizenship in 
order to provide definitions of and frameworks for these concepts which are 
central to our analysis. 
 
 
2.1 | Neo-liberal Concepts of the Citizen and the 
State 
 
In any discussion of neo-liberalism we must recognise that there are clear 
differences between neo-liberal theory and neo-liberal practice. Neo-liberalism 
in theory is a revival of classical liberalism which centres the individual as a 
sovereign actor and is concerned with providing for the liberty of the individual 
through the free market. It seeks to reform economies and governments in 
order to liberalise the economy and allow for the free operation of the market 
and so guarantee individual liberty. In practice it has generally been 
implemented by exploiting crises at any opportunity that arises and by framing 
reform as being in the best interests of the people. In actuality, neo-liberal 
reform often results in gains for economic elites at expense of others, and in 
practice doesn't account for imbalances of power and access to information and 
places responsibility with individuals for failings beyond their control. 
Ultimately, far from ensuring liberty through the free market, neo-liberalism in 
practice often leads to a reduction of the economic and political power of the 
individual.  
 
First we will set out the key points of neo-liberal theory, and we will then see 
how neo-liberal reform has been implemented in practice since the 1970s, 
before setting out the principles of neo-liberal citizenship and the role expected 
of the individual in the neo-liberal state. 
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2.1.1 | Central Themes of Neo-liberal Theory 
 
While the roots of neo-liberalism stretch back to the 1930s2, it wasn’t until the 
1970s that what we now call ‘neo-liberalism’ got its name. The term ‘neo-liberal’ 
as we would understand it today was first given to economic reforms advocated 
by Milton Friedman and implemented by the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet 
in the early 1970s, which promoted deregulation and free market economics. 
Neo-liberal thinking is often said to have originated in the 1950s and 1960s in 
places such as the Mont Pelerin Society and the University of Chicago’s 
Department of Economics – the economists advising Pinochet in Chile were 
called the ‘Chicago Boys’ as a result of having studied under Friedman and 
others in Chicago in the 1950s – as well as in the Austrian School of economic 
thought, and is in many ways a fusion of the economic thinking of Friedman 
with Friedrich Hayek’s socio-economic philosophy. The commonly held view is 
that neo-liberalism originated as a concerted effort by right wing economists 
and activists to counter leftist ideas and promote policies seeking to establish 
private property rights, free markets, and free trade worldwide, while 
supporting transnational capitalist interest and blocking attempts to consider 
alternatives3. Here we focus on this post-WW2 neo-liberalism. 
 
Neo-liberalism conceives of the citizen, the state, and the relationship between 
the two in a way that is fundamentally different from the model that previously 
dominated in the west. For several decades the post-war consensus in the UK 
provided for a Keynesian welfare state with a mixed economy, in which the 
formal state was an active economic actor and controlled key industries, 
influenced economic development, and provided public services and an 
extensive social security net for the poor. In this, the individual operated 
primarily as a recipient of public services and took on a largely passive role as 
the state took care of many of their needs. At its core, in contrast, neo-liberalism 
holds that the free market is the only mechanism by which the welfare and 
liberty of the individual can be guaranteed. According to Bockman: 
                                                          
2 Brennetot, 2015, pp.30-39 
3 Bockman, 2007 
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“Neo-liberalism is grounded in the assumption that governments 
cannot create economic growth or provide social welfare; rather, by 
trying to help, governments make the world worse for everyone, 
including the poor. Instead, private companies, private individuals, 
and, most importantly, unhindered markets are best able to 
generate economic growth and social welfare”4 
 
In pursuit of this, neo-liberalism in theory aims to cut back the formal state so 
that it provides only the most basic services and guarantees in order to allow 
the private sector, civil society, and the individual to inhabit the space formerly 
occupied by the state and to allow the market to operate freely.  
 
While it is difficult to come to a conclusive definition of neo-liberalism5 or to 
identify or describe a typical neo-liberal state6 – and key authorities on neo-
liberalism disagree on many aspects – we can identify common themes and 
fundamental ideas. The ‘Washington Consensus’ is a term coined in 1989 by 
economist John Williamson to describe ten key policies endorsed by major 
economic organisations including the World Bank, the IMF, and the US Treasury 
Department7. These ten policies have over time come to be seen to be a 
statement of neo-liberal thinking, and the phrase ‘Washington Consensus’ has 
come to describe neo-liberal policies generally8. These policies include the 
following: that in fiscal policy governments should avoid running up large 
deficits; that public spending should be redirected from subsidies; that the tax 
base should be broadened and tax rates should encourage innovation and 
efficiency; that interest rates should be market determined; that exchange rates 
should float; that trade should be liberalised; that investment should be 
liberalised; that state enterprise should be privatised; that the economy should 
                                                          
4 Bockman, 2013, p.14 
5 Boas and Gans-Morse, 2009 
6 Harvey, 2005, p.70 
7 Williamson, 1990 
8 Although Williamson contends that the characterisation as a set of neo-liberal policies is incorrect 
(Williamson, 2002) 
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be deregulated; and that property rights should be legally secured9. Hay 
identifies eight key themes of neo-liberalism10, elements of which echo 
Williamson: the efficiency of the market in allocating resources; the desirability 
of global free trade and free movement of capital; the desirability of a small, 
non-interventionist state; the state as a custodian of the free market; individual 
liberty; elimination of welfare that disincentives participation in the market; 
labour market flexibility; and the efficiency of the market in providing public 
goods. We can broadly identify the following key themes of neo-liberal thinking: 
  
1. Individual Sovereignty. Neo-liberalism is in theory constructed around 
the individual, who is characterised as a sovereign11, autonomous agent 
interacting with the wider state as active citizen12 and an emphasis on 
personal liberty and responsibility. Individual action, active self-
government, and promotion of self-interest are therefore central to neo-
liberal concepts of the role of the individual within the state13. Friedman 
and Hayek both believed that personal liberty is impossible without 
economic liberty14 and neo-liberal theory holds that the individual must 
take part in the market as an independent sovereign actor exercising 
their own political, social, and economic agency. As such, there is an 
emphasis in neo-liberal thought on personal freedom, with individuals as 
autonomous agents making decisions, pursuing preferences, and seeking 
to maximise the quality of their lives15. This emphasis on personal 
freedom is built on a Hayekian idea that societies are the aggregate of 
individuals striving for positive outcomes, or ‘utilities’, for themselves16 
and aims to open up ways for individuals to attain these ‘utilities’. In the 
UK this idea was famously elucidated by Margaret Thatcher when she 
was Prime Minister, stating in 1987 that “there's no such thing [as 
                                                          
9 Williamson, 1990  
10 Hay, 2007, p.97 
11 Feller and Spash, 2014 
12 Powell and Steel, 2012, p.2 
13 Harvey, 2005, p.68 
14 Hayek, 2001  
15 Rose and Miller, 1992, p.34  
16 Corbett and Walker, 2012, p.489 
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society]! There are individual men and women and there are families. And 
no government can do anything except through people, and people must 
look after themselves first”17.  
 
2. Prioritising the free market. As neo-liberalism puts forward a belief in 
the free market as the ultimate guarantor of individual liberty18, it calls 
for the prioritisation of the free market above virtually all else. Hayek 
writing in 1978 argued that “If Mrs. Thatcher said that free choice is to be 
exercised more in the market place than in the ballot box, she has merely 
uttered the truism that the first is indispensable for individual freedom, 
while the second is not: free choice can at least exist under a dictatorship 
that can limit itself but not under the government of an unlimited 
democracy which cannot”19. In Hayek’s view, personal freedom is 
impossible without economic liberty20. Friedman likewise wrote that 
“Historical evidence speaks with a single voice on the relation between 
political freedom and a free market. I know of no example in time or place 
of a society that has been marked by a large measure of political freedom, 
and that has not also used something comparable to a free market to 
organize the bulk of economic activity”21. Neo-liberal policies – in contrast 
to the Keynesian view, which promotes state intervention in the 
economy – prioritise laissez-faire economics and the restriction of 
welfare systems, which are characterised as providing a disincentive to 
the individual from operating fully in the market and, therefore, a barrier 
to personal liberty. However, Hayek did advocate for the provision of 
some basic social welfare in order to prevent absolute poverty and 
where necessary provide for the minimum of food, shelter, and clothing 
needed to preserve health, and argued that the state should provide a 
comprehensive system of social insurance to assist in dealing with 
sickness and accidental injury22. This acceptance of the need for some 
                                                          
17 Keay, 1987, pp. 28-30 
18 Hayek, 2001; Friedman, 1962 
19 Hayek, 1978 
20 Hayek, 2001 
21 Friedman, 1962, p.9 
22 Hayek, 2001, p.148 
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degree of government-provided social welfare is one of the features 
distinguishing neo-liberalism from classical liberalism. 
 
3. A small state with limited power. Neo-liberalism emphasises a 
reduction of the formal state to only that required to provide the most 
basic of public services (including, for example, the protection of private 
property, the maintenance of order, and some protection for the poor23). 
Neo-liberalism does not seek to abolish the state completely – it seeks 
instead to create a new form of state that promotes the free market and 
the power of capital. A central aspect of this is the idea that the formal 
state should retreat to leave as much as possible to the free market while 
maintaining a basic regulatory role. It is generally accepted in neo-liberal 
thought that the state should, for example, ensure legal equality and the 
rule of law, guarantee property rights, and protect contracts, which are 
all seen as prerequisites for the proper functioning of the market. Hayek 
argued that it may be necessary for the proper operation of the market 
that the state should set basic rules for production such as regulations 
for the safety of the worker24, and he accepted that there was a role for 
government in environmental protection and in preventing fraud25. As 
Carty argues, far from abolishing the state the end goal of neo-liberalism 
is to turn the nation-state into the market-state26. 
 
Neo-liberalism, then, can be distilled into these three central principles; the first 
and most of important of which being an emphasis on the personal 
responsibility and agency of the individual acting as a sovereign actor within the 
free market. Continual reform is a hallmark of the neo-liberal state, with 
reorganisation and institutional re-arrangement a central aspect of its attempts 
to neo-liberalise and maintain competitiveness in relation to other states 
operating in the global market27. This drive to reform has led to the gradual 
                                                          
23 Bockman, 2013, p.14 
24 Hayek, 2001, p.43 
25 Hayek, 2001, p.45 
26 Carty, 2008, p.170 
27 Harvey, 2005, p.64 
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eradication of older, non neo-liberal governing structures and practices and the 
development of the neo-liberal state.  
 
2.1.2 | The Entrenchment of Neo-liberalism 
 
While we can identify the central themes of neo-liberal thinking, we must also 
look at how neo-liberal reform operates in practice. In a process beginning in 
the late 1970s, the post-war consensus in the UK was overturned, bringing an 
end to the welfare state model of government, and neo-liberal policies and 
practices became the generally accepted norm in western society. This has been 
seen by some Marxist academics as a capitalist response to the economic crises 
that plagued the global economy in the 1970s28. With stagflation, a sharp rise in 
oil prices, debt crises, and fiscal crises, capitalism worldwide was under 
pressure, reducing profits and control over the economy at a time when socialist 
ideas enjoyed widespread popularity29. These crises led to the decline of the 
post-war consensus and ultimately the elections of Margaret Thatcher in the UK 
in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in the US in 1981. Both leaders set about 
deconstructing the formal state and implementing neo-liberal policies and 
practices, exploiting opportunities to re-engineer the state. As Burris argues, 
since then “[neo-liberalism’s] program for ‘rightizing’ government, and promoting 
efficiency and effectiveness through harnessing the power of the market within 
government and across society, has made huge inroads into reforming all manner 
of social services, ranging from health to housing to human security”30.  
 
We should note that while many policies implemented both in the UK and 
elsewhere since the 1970s can be broadly located within a neo-liberal reforming 
narrative, and while it is certainly the case that the general trend has been 
towards reform along neo-liberal lines, the reforming zeal has not always taken 
a direction that follows neo-liberal theory and has, at times, seemed at odds 
with its central tenets. As Harvey notes, it’s relatively straightforward to define 
the role of the state in neo-liberal theory, but in practice the process of neo-
                                                          
28 Bockman, 2013, p.14 
29 Bockman, 2013, p.14 
30 Burris et al, 2008, p.47 
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liberalisation has at times evolved away from the template provided by that 
theory31. Practice has often been opportunistic in nature rather than 
ideologically driven. We should therefore be careful to not assume that all 
reform is strictly neo-liberal in nature – governments at times implement 
policies that seemingly contravene neo-liberal thinking. But we can identify the 
general trend of neo-liberalization and the policies and practices that have 
contributed to this trend: framing reform as being in the best interests of the 
pubic and so prioritising the performance of the economy and the free market 
as the ultimate indicator of good government and guarantor of national welfare, 




Chomsky identifies neo-liberalism as the latest in a line of ‘bad ideas’ for 
economic development that not only fail to serve their expressed goals, but 
typically turn out to be very good ideas for those promoting them32. Citing 
previous ‘bad ideas’ from the Permanent Settlement imposed on India by the 
British Empire33 through to American economic experimentation in Brazil and 
Mexico in the post-WW2 period34, Chomsky argues that throughout modern 
history economic policies that have enriched the already wealthy and 
impoverished the already poor have been hailed as economic miracles while 
concealing their true cost35. In practice, neo-liberal reforms transformed Chile 
into South America’s strongest economy, with a decidedly pro-business climate, 
but were accompanied by authoritarianism and caused significant increases in 
unemployment and inequality. And, in the UK, Thatcher is often seen as leading 
a reforming government which brought a level of wealth and prosperity to some 
that has been described as an economic miracle36. Yet her policies also led to 
levels of unemployment unseen since the 1930s37, had serious negative effects 
                                                          
31 Harvey, 2005, p.64 
32 Chomsky, 1999, p.26  
33 Chomsky, 1999, p.26 
34 Chomsky, 1999, p.27 
35 Chomsky, 1999, pp.26-27 
36 Layard and Nickell, 1989; Healey, 2002 
37 Denman and McDonald, 1996 
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on the working class and arguably helped undermine the cohesiveness of British 
society as a whole38, and, alongside similar reforms in the US, set the 
foundations of economic deregulation that ultimately contributed to the global 
financial crisis two decades later39. And O’Mahony et al identify neo-liberalism 
as being responsible for the emergence of a ‘precariat’ in Britain characterised 
by acute socio-economic insecurity40. Even the IMF, long a champion of neo-
liberalism, has concluded of some neo-liberal policies implemented in the west 
that there are prominent costs in terms of increased inequality41. Whether we 
accept Chomsky’s characterisation of neo-liberalism as a ‘bad idea’ or conclude 
that it is in implementation where inequality arises, neo-liberalism in practice 
serves to enrich the wealthy at the expense of the poor. 
 
Despite this, in order for the proponents of neo-liberalism to succeed they must 
convince the people that reform is in the interest of society as a whole. Krugman 
says that bad ideas flourish because they are in the interest of the powerful42. 
But this is not itself enough. Gramsci argued that in order for capitalism to 
succeed its supporters must convince the rest of society that the interests of 
capitalism are the interests of society; that people must be convinced that the 
aims of those in charge align with the interests of the population as a whole43. 
And this can be seen in the neo-liberal reforming project – according to 
Chomsky, “At their most eloquent, proponents of neoliberalism sound as if they 
are doing poor people, the environment, and everybody else a tremendous service 
as they enact policies on behalf of the wealthy few”44. To this end, the free market 
and the performance of the national economy, rather than any other indicator of 
the well-being of the nation as a whole, has over time come to be framed as the 
ultimate measure of a government’s performance and the primary way by 
which leaders can demonstrate that they are governing in the best interests of 
the people.  
                                                          
38 Wilkinson and Pickett, 2013 
39 Kotz, 2009 
40 O’Mahony  et al, 2015, p.25 
41 Ostry et al, 2016 
42 Chomsky, 1999, p.25 
43 Kearney, 1994, p.183 – quoting Gramsci 
44 Chomsky, 1989, p.8 
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Stephen Gill’s ‘new constitutionalism’ is primarily concerned with describing 
this. He shows how neo-liberal reforms seek to ‘lock in’45 the power gains of 
capital, resulting in what he terms ‘disciplinary neo-liberalism’46. He 
characterises a new constitutionalist state as being one in which power is 
decentralised, or, as he puts it, “the subordination of the state to civil society”47. 
Gill argues that neo-liberalism has promoted the structural power of capital and 
subjected the state to market discipline to the extent that governments now 
seek to prove their credibility and the consistency of their policies according to 
the confidence that they inspire in financial markets48. This primacy of capital 
has been established over several decades and marks a fundamental 
reorganisation of the state and its relationship with the public. Whereas 
previously the priority of the state was directly providing for the welfare of its 
citizens, the priority of the state in a neo-liberal context is the free market and 
the power of capital. This ultimately reflects the Hayekian idea that the security, 
liberty, and welfare of the individual can only be guaranteed by a market free 
from governmental interference, with neo-liberal reform and the prioritisation 





Osborne and Gaebler described a process of ‘Reinventing Government’49, driven 
by neo-liberal ideas of a smaller state and involving shrinking the state by 
divesting it of the direct provision of various public services and the re-
configuring of related power structures. Out of this came the idea of 
‘modernised’ government, expressed in similar terms to those identified in the 
concepts of New Public Management identified by Hood50. These characterise 
modernised government as broadly seeking out a ‘marketisation’ of civil 
                                                          
45 Gill, 2000, p.6 
46 Gill, 2000 
47 Gill, 2000, p.6; this reflects in some ways Kotz’s argument that neo-liberalism is the domination of 
labour by capital (Kotz, 2015, p.43) 
48 Gill, 2000 
49 Osborne and Gaebler, 1992 
50 Hood, 1991 
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society51, reflecting Carty’s observation that neo-liberalism involves a shift from 
the nation state to the market state52. Hood sets out four administrative 
‘megatrends’53 characteristic of New Public Management that we can recognise 
as aspects of modernised government and neo-liberal concepts of the state: 1) 
attempts to reverse government growth by reducing staff and expenditure, 2) a 
shift towards privatization of public services, 3) the development of automation, 
particularly in relation to ICT, and 4) the development of a more international 
agenda. 
 
Klein argues that neo-liberal policies have been implemented through the 
deliberate application of a number of ‘shocks’ to economies in crisis54. 
According to Klein, crises are used as justification for implementing a range of 
economically liberalising (or, she says, exploitative55) reforms. In Klein’s view, 
economic crises are cynically exploited in order to implement neo-liberal 
policies. This idea was first described by Friedman in a 1975 letter to Pinochet, 
in which he advocating neo-liberal economic reform that he described as ‘shock 
treatment’56. In Friedman’s formulation, endorsed and promoted by Jeffrey 
Sachs57, this referred to the sudden introduction of neo-liberal policies, 
including trade liberalisation, privatisation, elimination of currency controls, 
and withdrawal of subsidies, with the intention of stabilising the economy and 
stimulating growth. And in much the same way as neo-liberal policies were 
adopted in response to challenges facing capitalism in the 1970s, subsequent 
crises have led to the adoption of increasingly neo-liberal policies and governing 
practices. This process of opportunistically introducing and entrenching neo-
liberalism through a series of shocks in response to crisis can also be seen in the 
countries of the former Eastern bloc after the fall of the USSR, where Sachs 
helped guide economic reform58. 
 
                                                          
51 Giritli Nygren, 2009, p.61 
52 Carty, 2008, p.170 
53 Hood, 1991, p.3 
54 Klein, 2007 
55 Klein, 2007 
56 Friedman and Friedman, 1998, p.592 
57 Passell, 1993 
58 Passell, 1993; Sachs, 2012; Harvey, 2005, p.71 
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In the UK, vast swathes of the public have been privatised since 1979. While by 
the late 1970s nationalised industries accounted for around 10% of the UK’s 
GDP59, through the 1980s and into the 1990s over 50 companies – spanning 
sectors central to the economic life of the country such as energy generation and 
supply, telecommunications, railways, water supply, steel production, coal 
production, car manufacturing, aerospace, airports, and shipbuilding – passed 
from public into private ownership60. Privatisation has continued into the 
twenty-first century, with probation services, air traffic control, English local 
bus services, and Royal Mail, among many others, either being privatised or 
part-privatised. Many still nominally public services have been contracted out to 
the private sector, and private finance initiatives have brought significant 
private ownership of public infrastructure. This has often been accompanied by 
efforts to actively involve the people in the privatisation of their own services by 
offering them the chance to purchase shares in the new corporations at their 
own expense in order to retain an interest in what was previously in public 
ownership, and often had been for decades. Bockman describes how 
privatisation has meant that, rather than having to generate profit from their 
own enterprise, the private sector has been able to profit from entities that had 
been created and built by the public61. 
 
Where industries and public services were privatised, the government shifted 
its role away from controlling aspects of the economy and directly providing 
services to overseeing the actions of private agents. This meant the replacement 
of the welfare state with one that has been characterised as a ‘regulatory 
state’62, concerned with ‘steering rather than rowing’63. This regulatory role – 
often carried out with a light touch and in the pursuit of ever-weaker regulation 
of the market – removed the formal state from direct involvement in many areas 
of the economy and left much of what had previously been the accepted role of 
                                                          
59 Osborne, 2013 
60 Osborne, 2013 
61 Bockman, 2014, p.14 
62 Majone, 1997; Glaesar and Shliefer, 2003  
63 Osborne and Gaebler, 1992 
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government largely to the private sector. What regulation remains is often weak 
and ineffective and has rarely been successful, as Burris notes:  
 
“the impact of such systems for regulation has often been poor … 
the most powerful corporate actors have been able to hijack weak 
systems of accountability in service of their own ends. Some speak of 
the diffusion of a global system of regulatory capitalism in which 
governance is operated in the interest of a corporatocracy that 
populates power positions in government and industry”64.  
 
This transfer of economic power and public services from the control of the 
democratic institutions of government to the private sector underlies the 
fundamentally anti-democratic nature of neo-liberalism. Cloaked in the 
language of improved services, better economic outcomes, and more choice for 
the individual, this shift has resulted in many aspects of what were previously 
considered the central role of the government moving beyond democratic 
control. Citizens are no longer to exercise the power of democracy to make their 
voices heard, but are now consumers who are to make choices as one agent 
among many within the free market. Ultimately, as a result of neo-liberal 
reform, it is that market and economic actors within rather than the 
democratically elected government that now holds power over many areas.  
 
2.1.3 | Neo-liberal Government and the Individual 
 
As we have seen, in the late twentieth century the previously accepted model of 
western society underwent a revolution informed by neo-liberal ideas of 
thinkers such as Hayek and Friedman65. We will now see how neo-liberalism 
requires that the citizen takes a much greater role in the management of their 
lives and in their own self-government within the neo-liberal state66. The 
welfare state expected the individual to be a citizen-subject67, acting primarily 
                                                          
64 Burris, 2008, p.36 
65 Hood, 1991; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Rhodes, 1997; Rose, 1999 
66 Miller and Rose, 1990 
67 Hewitt, 2001, p.258 
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as a recipient of government services (e.g. individuals visiting the local GP 
assigned to them, with services being provided directly by the state). But the 
marketised state of neo-liberalism requires them to be actively engaged citizen-
consumers68, taking on personal responsibility for their lives as sovereign 
actors69. This required a remaking of the citizen-state relationship on neo-
liberal foundations, in which citizens are actively engaging with government 
and civil society and making choices to interact with public services that, while 
still funded by the state70, may be provided by entities lying far beyond the state 
itself (e.g. individuals actively choosing which privately-operated but publicly-
funded GP to visit when they are ill). In theory, this allows the individual 
significant personal liberty, making choices for their own benefit and pursuing 
their individual wants and needs rather than the wants and needs of society in 
general. 
 
Powell and Steel argue that central to neo-liberal forms of modernised 
government is the self-managing consumer-citizen engaged in perpetual choice-
making71:  
 
“Neo-liberal governance emphasises enterprise as an individual and 
corporate strategy, supported by its concomitant discourse of 
marketisation and the role of consumers. The strategy increasingly 
relies on individuals to make their own arrangements with respect 
to welfare and support, accompanied by the rhetoric of choice, self-
management, responsibility and obligation72  
 
In this model, citizens are required to be actively engaged with civil society73, 
making choices from an array of options that may more closely resemble a 
consumer in a retail environment choosing between a range of similar products 
                                                          
68 Powell and Steel, 2012, p.2 
69 Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2001 
70 Clarke, 2004 
71 Powell and Steel, 2012, p.2 
72 Powell and Steel, 2012, p.2 
73 Miller and Rose, 1990 
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with differing features and specifications than the recipient of generic services 
provided the state. Giritli Nygren notes that Foucault, reflecting this, describes 
the development of neo-liberal government as a transition in the modern state 
from a civil society to a social market74. And, according to Powell and Steel, “neo-
liberalism is especially concerned with inculcating a new set of values and 
objectives orientated towards incorporating citizens as both players and partners 
in a marketized system”75. This form of active consumer-citizenship derives from 
the emphasis placed on a market free from government interference and the 
sovereignty and personal responsibility of the self-managing individual76. In 
some implementations of modernised services, such as the personalised health 
budgets that have been introduced in the NHS in England77, individuals are 
essentially to determine their own requirements so as to ‘pick and choose’ from 
a range of options to put together a personalised set of services – some of which 
are provided by the public sector, some by the private – that meet their needs 
but remain centrally funded by the state.  
 
Those encouraging citizen choice-making in this marketised arena often point to 
improved outcomes for service users and a reduction in the resources required 
to be provided by the state (indeed, large-scale trials of personal health budgets 
in England found that they led to generally positive experiences for patients and 
reduced costs for the NHS, while reducing the number of hospital stays and thus 
further freeing resources78). But equally it assumes – not always fairly or 
correctly – a capacity in each individual to self-manage to the extent required to 
be an active, engaged, and, above all, effective choice-making citizen. The 
marketised neo-liberal state places, for example, an onus on the individual to 
inform themselves about their options in order to be able to act in their best 
interest at all times. Being capable of self-informing renders the individual 
capable of effectively self-governing in a neo-liberal way. Ideally individuals are 
                                                          
74 Giritli Nygren, 2009, p.61, citing Burchell, 1992 and Barry et al, 1996 
75 Powell and Steel, 2012, p.4; see also Carty, 2008, p.170 
76 Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2001 
77 NHS Choices – Personal Health Budgets 
[http://www.nhs.uk/choiceintheNHS/Yourchoices/personal-health-budgets/Pages/about-personal-
health-budgets.aspx] 
78 Porter and Simpson, 2013, pp.18-20 
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capable of self-informing to the extent that, once the relevant information has 
been made available in some way, they can be left to avail themselves of it make 
their choices without the need for further direct intervention by the state other 
than providing funding.  
 
But emphasising personal responsibility also requires the citizen to actively 
self-manage in other ways in order to maintain their selves, maintain their 
relationships with other actors, and put themselves in the best possible position 
from which to exercise their agency. This means, for example, requiring active 
management of the self not just in terms of information gathering but also in 
terms of managing their health, their personal finances, and their privacy. This 
has been noted to be a recurring problem with neo-liberalism that ultimately 
leaves the individual responsible for failings that may be beyond their control79. 
In practice, all individuals are often assumed to have the same access to 
information and the same ability to exercise agency and thus there are 
presumed to be no imbalances of power80. As such, and regardless of any 
evidence to the contrary, the perceived success or failure of the individual in 
neo-liberalism is not attributed to any systemic, structural, or societal factor 
that may have disadvantaged, hindered, or benefited them, but is invariably 
attributed near-exclusively to the individual’s personal failings or lack of 
entrepreneurial spirit. It is seen as the fault solely of the individual if they suffer 
any detriment as a result of their inability to properly fulfil the role mandated to 
them by neo-liberalism81. 
 
This, then, is the role of the individual in the neo-liberal state: that of the active, 
self-managing consumer-citizen perpetually engaged in a process of choice-
making as they exercise their social, economic, and political agency as a 
sovereign actor striving for the best outcome for themselves in the marketised 
state and ultimately personally responsible for any failings.  
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81 Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2001; Bauman, 2007; pp.58-59; Bockman, 2013, p.15 
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2.2 | Conceptualising the State 
 
So far we have set out key points of neo-liberal theory and discussed the process 
of neo-liberalisation and how this has transformed both the state and the role of 
the individual. The changes that resulted from this shift in ideological 
foundation and the subsequent restructuring of the state involve a shift in 
government from a monolithic entity to a multi-stakeholder dispersed polity. 
This move towards a more dispersed system, described variously as 
“unstructured complexity”82 and as “a differentiated polity”83, has been 
characterised as a move from ‘government’ to ‘governance’84. Multi-level 
governance theories focus on dispersed power, and a network of actors and 
sites of power interacting to form a whole. We will discuss governance concepts 
of power and government before building on these with a governmentality 
framework that gives us the tools to describe and analyse the forms of control to 
which the active consumer-citizen is subject in the differentiated polity of the 
neo-liberal state. 
 
2.2.1 | Power and Government 
 
Rose describes the descriptive theme of governance as being concerned with 
outcomes of the interactions of a range of actors85. Rather than being concerned 
solely with direct interactions between the citizen and the state in which the 
state is the provider and the citizen the recipient of services, governance 
theories reflect the shift in governmental ideology and structure over the last 
few decades and consequently seek to view a wider range of interactions 
between citizens, the state, and private entities, as well as the relationships 
between these actors that underpin those interactions. Rose argues that as we 
move towards a more identifiably neo-liberal structure, “a new set of political 
rationalities, [and] governmental technologies…begin to take shape”86. The 
                                                          
82 Jessop, 2004 
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84 Stubbs, 2005, p.67; Kennett, 2010, p.20 
85 Rose, 1999, p.17 
86 Rose, 1999, p.136 
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underlying thought processes behind the shift towards modernised government 
and a marketised state are fundamentally different from those that informed the 
welfare state model of the citizen-subject. As the structure of the public changes, 
so rationalities and techniques are identified and adopted to justify, explain, and 
enable these transformations. Governance theories seek to explain these 
changes and describe a multi-level polity involving a range of actors in 
government and civil society as well as citizens all autonomously exercising 
agency within that polity. 
 
Central to understanding how different actors exercise agency within this multi-
level polity is identifying what power is and how it functions in society. Weber 
wrote that power could be identified as “the probability that a command with a 
given specific content will be obeyed by a group of persons”87. For Dyrberg, power 
consists of the “power to” and the “power over”88. Savoie likewise says that 
power is made up of two parts: “someone or some body to give a command and 
someone or some body with an obligation, a duty, or a desire to obey”89. Morriss 
argues that “power is neither a thing (a resource or vehicle) nor an event (an 
exercise of power): it is a capacity”90. Foucault, for his part, held that power 
“must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations 
immanent in the sphere in which they operate and that constitute their own 
organization”91. We might consider all of these, and determine that power is the 
capacity to perform a certain act or to bring about a change in behaviour, or the 
performance of certain behaviour, in another. We should therefore look at the 
exercise of power as an interaction between two or more actors with one having 
the capacity to bring about a change in behaviour, or the performance of a 
certain behaviour, by the other actors through that interaction. In terms of how 
power functions in neo-liberal societies, Rose says that “power is not so much a 
matter of imposing constraints upon citizens as of ‘making up’ citizens capable of 
bearing a kind of regulated freedom…most individuals are not merely the subjects 
                                                          
87 Weber, 1978, p.55 
88 Dyrberg,  1997, p.135 
89 Savoie, 2010, p.4 
90 Morriss, 1987, p.19  
91 Morriss, 1987, p.37, quoting Foucault, 2004b 
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of power but play a part in its operations”92. Individuals are not merely 
subservient to the rule of the state but are actively involved in the continual 
cycling of power through the system. In the neo-liberal state, individuals are 
social, political, and economic actors – not just in any public role or office but in 
exercising their own agency – and they operate within power structures 
alongside and in interaction with others. This multi-dimensional system of 
power relations, with individuals autonomously exercising agency in a system 
where power can be held by any actor who may exercise that power to influence 
the behaviour of any other, contrasts sharply with the concept of the citizen of 
the welfare state, where the individual acted largely as a “thrifty, industrious, 
and socially responsible”93 citizen in adherence to the rules set by the state in 
return for the government taking care of their needs.  
 
The decisions made by and actions of these autonomous agents are ultimately a 
product of external influences, beliefs held, outcomes desired, and 
rationalisations undertaken. If we are to properly understand the interactions 
between such agents – whether they are individuals, policy makers in 
government, or those running private corporations – we must seek to 
understand as far as possible their motivations94. To this end, Foucault 
identified the existence of what he called ‘rationalities’95. These are ways of 
“ways of rendering reality thinkable in such a way that it was amenable to 
calculation and programming”96 – of thinking about, or rationalising, power 
structures, their extent, and the exercise of power97. They necessarily reflect the 
conceptions held by these actors and their determination of their place in the 
system and that of others: 
 
“One isn’t assessing things in terms of an absolute against which 
they could be evaluated as constituting more or less perfect forms of 
                                                          
92 Rose and Miller, 1992, p.3 
93 Rose and Miller, 1992, p.24 
94 Bevir and Rodes, 2003, p. 18  
95 Miller and Rose, 2008, p.19 
96 Miller and Rose, 2008, p.15 
97 Rose, 1999, p.26 
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rationality, but rather examining how forms of rationality inscribe 
themselves in practices or systems of practices, and what role they 
play within them, because it’s true that ‘practices’ don’t exist  
without a certain regime of rationality”98 
 
And if we want to understand power interactions then once we have identified 
the rationalities at play within power structures we must attempt to identify 
how the actors within those structures seek to exercise their power. Foucault 
theorised that in exercising power there are two kinds of ‘technique’. The first 
are the technologies of the self99 – the ways that actors come to control their 
own behaviour based on a range of beliefs and desires in an attempt to attain 
the ‘utilities’ identified by Hayek. The second are the technologies of coercion100, 
or the ways that actors seek to influence the behaviour of others in order to 
bring about in them behaviour that the influencing actor has determined to be 
desirable (the techniques and strategies “imbued with aspirations for the 
shaping of conduct in the hope of producing certain desired effects and averting 
certain undesired events”101). The ‘contact point’ between these two 
technologies of power, where the desires and actions of one actor are driven by 
the power of another, Foucault called “government”102. Government involves, as 
Foucault argued, the “conduct of conduct”103. 
 
As Dean notes, in this analysis government “involves some sort of attempt to 
deliberate on and to direct human conduct”104. It therefore requires deliberation 
(which we can see as rationalising the actual or potential behaviour and 
position of the actors within the power structure – coming to a particular 
rationality) and direction (which we can see as the techniques used to affect the 
behaviour of another actor within the power structure in order to align it with 
the decided upon rationality – the employment of a particular technology of 
                                                          
98 Lemke, 2000, p.7 quoting Foucault, 1991, p.79 
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power). Inherent in this idea of deliberating on and directing conduct is a power 
relationship in which government is a type of power interaction – one actor 
conducting the conduct of another. Savoie observes that power is to politics as 
energy is to physics – it is the fundamental concept and it takes many forms105. 
We may extend this to say that power is to government as energy is to physics. 
The contact point where government occurs is an interaction between one actor 
and another. In this interaction power is the fundamental concept, and just like 
energy it takes many forms. Indeed, Jessop characterised government as 
“strategic codification of power relations”106, reflecting this link between 
government and power. We can now say what government consists of (a power 
interaction) and where it is located (at a contact point between the technologies 
of power of two or more actors). In understanding how power is exercised we 
are thus primarily concerned with understanding government. If we are to 
contextualise and understand the forms of power to which the individual is 
subject in the digital world then we must understand government, and to do 
that we must look to these interactions where the power of one actor meets that 
of another – at the ‘contact point’ of government-type power interactions – and 
to the rationalities that underpin them. 
 
2.2.2 | Governmentality and the State 
 
Government, as we have seen, is at its core a power relationship, and can 
involve any combination of actors. Where governance theories are concerned 
with what ‘what’ and the ‘why’ of modern government, governmentality 
theories, originating with Foucault in the late 1970s, provide a framework 
which seeks to explain the ‘why’ and the ‘how’. The term ‘governmentality’ is 
used somewhat inconsistently by Foucault107, but it is not concerned with the 
state itself, or with its formal political structures. We can recognise 
governmentality as being concerned with the exercise of government-type 
power, and “the ensemble constituted by the institutions, procedures, analyses, 
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and reflections, the calculations and tactics”108 that allow for the exercise of this 
power.  
 
In order to perform government, Rose argues109, strategies and practices are 
continually developed to link the governing with what they wish to govern. 
Beyond governance, which concerns the power interactions between actors, 
governmentality is fundamentally about these strategies and practices driving 
and enabling the exercise of power by those actors – the rationalities and 
technologies of power that underpin and inform the power interactions. Gordon 
argues that governmentality entails a way of “thinking about the nature of the 
practice of government … capable of making some form of that activity thinkable 
and practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it is 
practiced”110. Looking at power through the lens of governmentality allows us, 
according to Shore and Wright, to see “how policies work as instruments of 
governance, as ideological vehicles, and as agents for constructing subjectivities 
and organizing people within systems of power and authority”111. Focusing on 
governmentality – what Foucault termed the “art of government”112 – means that 
we can conceptualise how power operates and thus locate techniques for the 
exercise of power within a theoretical framework in which they have an 
identifiable place, and an identifiable function.  
 
Foucault creates governmentality by linking the two concepts of ‘governing’ 
(exercising power) and ‘mentality’ (the political ‘rationality’, or set of norms, 
driving and explaining exercises of power), demonstrating the reciprocal nature 
of power and knowledge113. A particular governmentality involves a variety of 
technologies of power capable of making a certain space or subject governable 
and facilitating the ‘conduct of conduct’, or the exercise of government-type 
power, in pursuit of a particular goal. It is these technologies that transform 
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ideas and policies into the government-type power interactions that implement 
them and allow government to be exercised in the manner desired. As discussed 
previously, it is impossible to talk about power or the technologies involved in 
its exercise without talking about the underlying rationality. When we talk 
about a power interaction we must talk about the thought processes and 
accepted norms that drive and enable its performance. In governmentality, 
according to Dean, “government entails any attempt to shape with some degree of 
deliberation aspects of … behaviour according to particular sets of norms and for 
a variety of ends”114. In investigating the exercise of power through 
governmentality we can also investigate the rationalities behind it.  
 
The process by which rationalities are turned by technologies of power into 
government-type power interactions is known as ‘translation’. Rationalities, 
focusing on the general, are translated into government by the strategies and 
programmes by which society is rendered governable115. As Miller and Rose put 
it, if rationalities seek to render reality into the domain of thought, technologies 
of power seek to translate thought into the domain of reality116. Without 
translation government cannot occur – government is a type of power 
interaction, and without some process that enables the exercise of government-
type power there cannot be that interaction regardless of what rationalities are 
identified. As Rose contends117, government cannot simply involve a centrally 
issued order being executed locally. Clearly there must be a process that links 
ideas and implementation. It was Rose, borrowing from sociology118, who called 
this link between the calculations and the practicalities of government 
‘translation’. In his view, “in the dynamics of translation, alignments are forged 
between the objectives of authorities wishing to govern and the personal projects 
of those organisations, groups and individuals who are the subjects of 
governance”119. Translation enables government of the governed – the 
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influencing of the behaviour of an actor or set of actors in a desired way. A 
‘governmentality’, then, is the combination of rationalities and technologies that 
are adopted and employed in order to facilitate government-type power 
interactions through this process of translation. 
 
Care must be taken to avoid the mistake of beginning a governmentality 
analysis with traditional concepts of the state. Indeed, for Foucault the 
importance of the state itself was greatly exaggerated. He argued that the state 
is nothing more than a result of multiple exercises of power120 – a “mythical 
abstraction”121 in the study of government. Following from the idea that policies 
must be turned into government-type power interactions in order to have any 
effect, Foucault went so far as to say that “the state is nothing more than the 
mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities”122. If we are to 
understand the relationship between citizens (individual actors with agency 
within the power structure) and the state (an abstraction of the multitude of 
power interactions between actors within that structure) then we must seek to 
understand this ensemble. A governmentality analysis allows us to discuss 
power in a way which rejects a focus on the institutions of state themselves in 
favour of a wider view. Such an analysis reflects the idea that the state is a 
construct of numerous governmentalities acting together to create multiple 
government-type power interactions. Rather than focusing on the formal 
institutions of state that form the Government, in order to understand the true 
nature of the power structures that make up the state and the governmentalities 
that render actors within these structures governable we must focus on 
government more generally. To this end, we must from this point differentiate 
between ‘government’ and ‘the Government’ – that is to say, we must 
differentiate between the institutions of the state (Parliament, Cabinet, the 
courts, etc.) that make up ‘the Government’, and the wider concept of 
government (as any government-type power interaction). And just as we must 
differentiate between ‘government’ and ‘the Government’, we must also be 
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careful to differentiate between ‘the state’, meaning the complex of public, 
private, and individual power relations, and ‘the State’, meaning the formal 
institutional public state. 
 
We now can say what government is, where it is located, and what it involves. 
We can conceive of government as the ‘conduct of conduct’, located where 
technologies of coercion create a ‘contact point’ with technologies of the self to 
produce a desired outcome, and involving technologies of power that seek to 
translate rationalities into reality and so create a government-type power 
interaction. We can see that governmentalities are the building blocks of the 
network of power relationships that together form the illusion of the state, and 
that the components of these building blocks are rationalities and the 
technologies for translating those rationalities into reality. When we 
deconstruct the state to this extent we can examine these government-type 
power interactions in order to determine the rationalities employed by the 
actors involved. This allows us to determine the thought processes and norms 
that drive the exercise of power in these interactions. Identifying these 
rationalities and technologies through a governmentality analysis is therefore 
key to an understanding of the relationship between the citizen and the state 
created through the forms of surveillance-based control to which the digital 
citizen is subject as a result of the development of new forms of ICT. 
 
 
2.3 | Digital Citizenship in the Neo-Liberal Mould 
 
Here we seek to establish how the ways that the digital citizen may interact with 
the digital world can, in neo-liberal societies at least (and in the UK in 
particular), be seen to fit the neo-liberal mould of the active, self-managing 
consumer-citizen. As well as facilitating the re-engineering of the citizen-state 
relationship along active consumer-citizen lines through the provision of 
services online, contemporary digital citizenship in the UK involves changes in 
the way that individuals engage with democratic society, furthering the 
breakdown of traditional party politics into single issue consumer forms, and 
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also remakes the way that the individual takes responsibility for and manages 
the self. Digital citizenship in this way has developed in part as a result of the 
deliberate policies of successive Governments who wish to render the 
individual amenable to government according to neo-liberal rationalities, and in 
part as a consequence of the development and emergence of popular forms of 
ICT in the context of neo-liberal societies. 
 
As noted in Chapter 1123, the ‘digital citizen’ for our purposes is any individual 
who in the course of their daily lives partakes in some way in the modern 
internet-connected world and ‘digital citizenship’ as used in this thesis is about 
with the way in which they go about it. As such, we are not concerned here with 
any particular conceptions of ‘citizenship’, but with the way in which the digital 
citizen has come to engage with the online world, which can be seen to be 
broadly neo-liberal in nature. We will look at digital citizenship in three ways – 
first, how the digital citizen interacts with the public sector, then how the digital 
citizen participates in politics, and, finally, how digital citizens manage the self 
and their interactions with others 
 
2.3.1 | Digitalisation and E-government 
 
The forms of public service provision in the UK enabled by digitalisation and 
commonly categorised as ‘e-government’ can be clearly located within a 
governmentality framework. Gilritly Nygren describes e-government as “a term 
that blurs the borders between public administration, new technology, and 
changing administrative methods. It has no one definition, but roughly speaking is 
applied to the processes intended to develop administrative services using a 
variety of electronic means, and to increase internal efficiency and the public’s 
political influence”124. E-government is itself a governmentality which utilises an 
array of digitalisation strategies and techniques to bring about a smaller State 
and render the individual as a digital citizen more amenable to government 
according to neo-liberal modernising rationalities. 
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E-government represents a fundamental change in the way that services are 
provided by the State125. Digitalisation, reflecting wider ideals of modernisation 
drawn from neo-liberal principles, is about ‘making up’ citizens in the neo-
liberal mould by involving them more substantively in their own governance, 
emphasising citizens actively engaging with the State, citizen choice, and a ‘two-
way’ process of government. E-government requires the individual to take 
greater responsibility for the self – the citizen becomes the active consumer-
citizen in the marketised arena of the public. We have seen how Foucault argued 
that government lay at the ‘contact point’ between two kinds of technologies of 
power – those of the self and those of coercion. E-government moves this 
contact point closer to the citizen by placing it online, bringing it into computers 
and other internet-connected devices in people’s homes and pockets. 
Digitalisation thus moves government beyond the traditional confines of the 
centralised state in which services were provided by the Government in specific 
locations to which the citizen would have to travel in order to avail of them. In 
doing so, as digitally-provided services require fewer staff and resources, and 
despite moving government closer to the citizen, e-government also facilitates a 
reduction in the size of the State itself in accordance with neo-liberal aims. As 
Schou and Hjelholt put it, “Placing the individual at the center of public service 
means transferring or delegating administrative tasks to citizens rather than 
governmental personal”126. We can therefore conceptualise e-government – and 
the policies, systems, and interactions it encompasses – as establishing a new 
locus for the exercise of government in line with the modernising programmes 
adopted in the late twentieth century. The governmentality of e-government, 
then, employs technologies of power to ‘make up’ the individual as a digital 
citizen in the neo-liberal mould and render them governable according to neo-
liberal rationalities. 
 
In describing this process of making up individuals as digital citizens through e-
government, Schou and Hjelholt show that neo-liberal and digital citizenship are 
becoming intertwined and co-dependent127. They examine the Danish 
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government’s digitalisation strategy and argue that neo-liberalisation and 
digitalisation are mutually reinforcing, and that the development of a digital 
society has relied on and reproduced neo-liberal forms of citizenship128. They 
describe how the Danish government’s strategies seek to render the digital 
citizen as a neo-liberal subject in several ways. These strategies place, for 
example, an emphasis on Danish citizens as economically-driven subjects, 
seeking to maximise both their own productivity and the efficiency of public 
services129. Schou and Hjelholt observe that “one of the primary objectives of the 
Danish digitalization strategies has been to transfer the responsibilities from 
governmental employees, such as social caseworkers and administrative personal 
employed at the ground level, to the citizens themselves … It also consists in 
articulating citizens as individualized and responsible for their own 
circumstances: as agent capable of being active”130. Thus the standard of digital 
citizenship is set according to neo-liberal principles and the individual is 
expected to meet that standard. Those who fail to do so are constructed as 
problematic and undesirable subjects who may be ‘digitally illiterate’, 
‘technophobes’, or have ‘weak IT skills’, and who should be corrected through 
disciplinary measures (education, advertisement campaigns, penalties for 
performing digital citizenship insufficiently, etc.) in order to bring them up to 
the required standard131. 
 
The tax Self-Assessment process provides an example of how digitalisation of a 
fundamental State function (tax collection) seeks to re-make the role of the 
citizen in the UK. This encourages eligible individuals to fulfil their annual tax 
returns through an online system. This includes, for example, individuals who 
are self-employed, or who have earnings from overseas on which they need to 
pay tax132, and there are penalties for failure to comply133. Public awareness 
campaigns for Self-Assessment have used the slogan ‘tax doesn’t have to be 
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taxing’ and emphasise the benefits of using the online system to complete these 
returns, promoting it as being a convenient option for the individuals who are 
required to interact with it while at the same time requiring active engagement 
with the State through ICT and punishing non-compliance. HMRC received 
10.24 million Self-Assessment tax returns in the 2014-15 tax year, with 85.5% 
of these being made using the online system134. This represents more than one-
third of the total number of UK taxpayers135, with 210,000 more tax returns 
filed online than the previous year.  
 
It has been noted136 that in many countries e-government is still at the 
‘informational’ stage (i.e. citizens are interacting with systems that are primarily 
focused on “cataloguing, providing government information by creating 
government agency Web sites”137) rather than the ‘sophisticated’ stage (i.e. 
systems that promote “transformation, horizontal integration and 
participation”138). The high engagement rate with the online system is indicative 
of the fact that policy makers in the UK have been relatively successful in 
encouraging interaction with the State using ICT, suggesting that e-government 
here is in the sophisticated stage. While the fact that 14.5% of returns did not 
use the online system shows that there is a way to go in increasing participation, 
each of those submitted online represents a separate government-type 
interaction between the State and the citizen in which individuals have felt 
compelled by an array of techniques employed by the Government to do as 
instructed and in which the performance of these instructions is facilitated by 
digitalisation. In this we can see how ICT and the disciplinary power of the state 
is employed to reshape the citizen-state relationship as one requiring active 
participation from the citizen while cloaking this change in the language of 
choice and convenience by providing online access and bringing the locus of 
government into the citizen’s home.  
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As Morison describes, e-government policies and practices as employed in the 
UK have sought to “re-engineer public services, re-construct ideas of the public, 
the citizen and the consumer, and govern through these ideas in new market-
based citizenship models that privilege consumer power as a means of securing 
equality and participation through the exercise of choice”139. In truth, promoting 
online Self-Assessment, and moving government closer to the citizen, means 
that the Government can close tax offices, reduce staff, reduce expenditure, and 
cut back the State. We can therefore see the promotion and use of online Self-
Assessment as utilising the governmentality of e-government to produce 
millions of concurrent government-type power interactions facilitated by 
particular technologies of power (such as digitalisation) in the pursuit of 
particular rationalities (such as the desire to continue to collect taxes efficiently 
while reducing the size of the State). E-government assembles systems, ideas, 
and techniques into one, and this assemblage forms a governmentality that aims 
to translate general modernising aspirations grown from neo-liberal 
rationalisations of government into specific outcomes tied to specific 
programmes. Silcock argues that at the centre of e-government is the 
customer140 who, in this case, is the citizen-consumer identified as the subject of 
neo-liberal governance. Morison concurs, writing that e-government reforms 
have “intended to help people not only ‘choose’ as empowered citizen-consumers 
but also take part and engage as citizen-participants in shared decision-making as 
they govern themselves within a wider project of rule”141.  
 
Digitalisation, as a technology of power, has allowed individuals to be ‘made up’ 
as digital citizens in the neo-liberal mould and so be rendered governable 
according to the rationalities of the modernised state. Government has moved 
closer to the citizen (individuals can access services without leaving the house), 
but conversely the State has shrunk (by being placed online fewer resources are 
required to provide the service). Rather than services being actively provided to 
passive citizens, they are passively provided only to active citizens. While it is 
often emphasised that digitalisation is convenient and empowering for the 
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citizen142, we must recognise that this has the effect of reducing the size of the 
State, that this is an identifiable trend across many areas of Government policy 
in the UK, and that this trend can be seen to have been on-going for decades. 
This reduction in the size of the State in pursuit of the neo-liberal reforming 
agenda is thus furthered by the use of ICT and the remaking of the individual as 
a digital citizen. Through this, desires to reinvent the State and to make the 
public operate more like the private – the rationalities of neo-liberal 
modernised government – are translated into modernising programmes and 
specific strategies not only for reforming the State and its interaction with 
citizens but also for reforming the citizen and their interaction with the State.  
 
 
2.3.2 | Active Digital Citizenship 
 
In a time where metrics of traditional political participation have been in 
decline, other forms of participation have taken an increasingly prominent role 
in public life. Indeed, differences in what is meant by ‘political participation’ can 
make a significant difference to how the extent of participation is viewed. Those 
with a narrow, formal understanding of politics are likely to see a decline in 
levels of participation, but those with a broader understanding are more likely 
to see a change in the form of participation143. So what do we mean when we 
talk about political participation? It has often been taken to mean “those 
activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the 
selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take”144. However, 
this is a narrow definition and excludes attempts to influence the actions of 
private entities, whether corporations or non-profit organisations, through 
boycotting and suchlike145. We can instead look to the definition formulated by 
Brady, and understand political participation to mean “action by ordinary 
citizens directed toward influencing some political outcomes”146. This 
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encompasses any attempt to influence the actions of governmental personnel as 
well as those by decision makers in corporations and non-profit entities, so long 
as those attempts are directed towards a political outcome. 
 
In seeking to conceptualise the factors that enhance or impede political 
participation, Dahlgren talks about ‘civic cultures’147. In this he takes the idea 
that citizens are social agents and asks which cultural factors are behind this 
agency, looking to determine how they influence and inform the ways that 
citizens engage politically: “Civic cultures are potentially both strong and 
vulnerable: They help to promote the functioning of democracy, they can serve to 
empower or disempower citizens, yet like all domains of culture, they can easily be 
affected by political and economic power”148. We can understand that it is within 
the context of a society that has undergone a neo-liberal revolution over the last 
few decades, in which the role of the citizen has been dramatically reconfigured 
as the active consumer-citizen in the marketised public, that people choose 
whether and how to engage politically online. As Dahlgren acknowledges, 
“Market logic, together with emerging legal frameworks and the impetus toward 
political restrictions, serves to constrain the extent and forms of representation for 
civic purposes”149 . 
 
Reflecting this, much of online political participation takes what Dahlberg calls a 
‘liberal individualist’150 form. That is to say that they involve using the internet 
to provide individuals with the means to access political information and to 
contact elected representatives directly151. The trend towards choice-making 
and active citizenship promoted through neo-liberalisation can be seen in the 
forms online political participation that are facilitated by the internet and 
promoted online. These are largely a consumer form of politics where the digital 
citizen can pick and choose among single-issue campaigns being offered as 
commodities in the marketised public and is imbued with responsibility for 
                                                          
147 Dahlgren, 2005, p.157; see also Dahlgren, 2003 
148 Dahlgren, 2005, p.158 
149 Dahlgren, 2005, p.151 
150 Dahlberg, 2001, p.618 
151 Dahlberg, 2001, p.618 
Digital Citizenship and the Contemporary State | Chapter 2 
  
 
Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 61 
  
contacting politicians and decision-makers directly, creating a form of active 
digital citizenship. As Dahlberg argues,  
 
“liberal individualist political initiatives share an emphasis upon 
information provision and direct communication between 
individuals and decision makers. This emphasis assumes a political 
subject who only needs to be given the appropriate information in 
order to make the right choices. This subject suits governments and 
corporates because it fits a top-down consumer model of politics 
where individuals choose from an array of competing political 
positions displayed before them”152 
 
Websites such as TheyWorkForYou153 and WriteToThem154 provide 
information on the voting records of elected representatives and transcripts of 
their speeches in Parliament, in the European Parliament, in the devolved 
legislatures, and in local councils, as well as information on their expenses 
claims, social media contact information, and methods by which individuals can 
contact their representatives directly using online forms of communication 
facilitated by those sites. And, e-petitioning systems, both official (such as 
https://petition.parliament.uk or https://petitions.whitehouse.gov) and 
unofficial (such as https://www.change.org and https://38degrees.org.uk), 
provide ways for citizens to contact decision makers in government as well as in 
corporations and non-profit organisations. Individuals are asked to sign and 
share e-petitions created by an array of activist groups (or by private companies 
such as Uber, which uses e-petitions to put pressure on governments who are 
considering regulating or banning its service155). The digital citizen is thus 
presented with an array of options where issues and campaigns are offered to 
them as commodities, and, just as the consumer is tasked with choosing the 
products they wish to purchase in a supermarket, is tasked with making an 
informed choice of which campaigns to support. Links to these e-petitions and 
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other forms of consumer political action may be widely shared in online spaces, 
and as a result may attract large audiences (an e-petition which sought a second 
referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU, for example, received more than 
four million signatures156 after being widely shared on social media, while a 
petition requesting that the Government cancel a proposed state visit by Donald 
Trump received nearly two million signatures157). As of 2017, 23% of the British 
public say that they have signed an e-petition in the last 12 months and 36% say 
that they would do so158. While still low compared to the proportion of the 
public who have voted in the last year (57%), participation through e-
petitioning is on an upward trend – since 2013 the proportion of the public who 
have signed an e-petition in the previous 12 months has increased by 14 points 
(from 9%)159. Change.org strongly encourages those who sign e-petitions on its 
website to take an active part in the campaign by sharing the petition on social 
media, and provides links and suggested text for doing so. 
 
But it is not just through obviously liberal individualist forms of activism that 
the digital citizen participates in politics. Graham et al discuss how websites act 
as incubators of political action, creating everyday public spaces160. They look at 
places that are formally non-political –which are not intended for political 
purposes – where people interact informally and where political talk, 
organising, and action can organically develop as users make connections 
between their everyday experiences and contemporary social and political 
issues161. Graham et al note that in a time of austerity in the UK, where 
individuals are increasingly expected to fend for themselves and public services 
are cut back or contracted out as the State is reduced in size, these kinds of 
online spaces have grown in prominence as people take a greater role in 
actively managing their lives and their relationship with civil society162. Their 
research shows that not only do people involved in these spaces routinely seek 
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and give advice and support on dealing with government and civil society on a 
personal level163 – for example, on how to obtain social housing or a crisis loan, 
how to manage personal debt, or how to navigate the bureaucracy of public 
services – but also that such conversations can (in 68% of studied cases) spawn 
broader political discussions164 that may go on to encourage action on a more 
general level165. These include, for example, joining or organising a campaign or 
protest, boycotting and consumer activism, and signing or creating a petition166. 
And these kinds of participation are increasing in popularity – as of 2017, 10% 
of the British public say that they have taken part in a boycott in the last 12 
months (a further 25% say that they would do so in future), and 9% say that 
they have taken part in an online political discussion in the last 12 months (19% 
say that they would do so in future)167. Since 2013 these numbers have 
increased by 4 points (from 6%) and by 6 points (from 3%)168, respectively. At 
the same time the online world has facilitated the creation of spaces in which 
members of historically marginalised groups to gather and discuss 
commonalities. These spaces offer support, advice, and community, and may 
also provide other opportunities. Baker et al169, for example, looked at how 
disabled and elderly people use social networking sites to form community 
groups, and found that the members of these groups use social networks for 
community participation – as may be expected – but also for political action and 
civil engagement170.  
 
While online spaces may be seen as facilitating somewhat more communitarian 
participation, co-ordinating campaigns and bring people together for common 
purposes, in terms of the political action they foster it is often single issue in 
nature, again reflecting consumer forms of politics, and in many cases they do 
little more than provide guidance on how individuals can contact politicians or 
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engage with the State and civil society directly themselves. As such, the digital 
citizen ultimately still fulfils a largely liberal individualist role (and even 
boycotting, a form of collective rather than individual action, is politics through 
consumer choice-making171). This is a product of the neo-liberal civic culture in 
which these spaces develop in the UK. The need to seek help with navigating the 
neo-liberal state as an active consumer-citizen combined with forms of online 
communication and interaction results in digital citizens organically discussing 
the social and personal issues that they encounter in their everyday lives, 
making connections between those issues and Government policies, and 
organising politically against the effects of neo-liberalism itself, but doing so in a 
way that’s fundamentally neo-liberal in nature. 
 
The internet thus contributes to an ongoing neo-liberalisation of participatory 
democracy and of politics, facilitating a marketization, commercialisation, and 
commodification of politics. As a result, the role of the digital citizen as a 
political agent in these spaces is fundamentally neo-liberal in nature, reflecting 
that of the active consumer-citizen of the neo-liberal ideal operating in a 
marketised public. 
 
2.3.3 | Digital Self-Management 
 
In contemporary society individuals are expected to construct their own lives 
and encouraged to take responsibility for themselves172. Individualisation is 
central to self-hood and citizenship in neo-liberalism, which, as discussed 
previously, in theory prioritises the sovereign individual as the key component 
of society, imbued with personal responsibility and engaged in self-
management in the pursuit of self-interest. Self-management forms the self-
directed element of personal responsibility alongside societally-directed active 
consumer-citizen, which in a governmentality framework can be located as 
those technologies of the self that are concerned with managing the self. In our 
analysis of digital citizenship this can broadly be divided into two categories – 
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the first, digitally managing the self, concerns using digital tools to manage life 
and health; the second, managing the digital self, concerns privacy, identity, and 
representation of the self in the online world. 
 
Digitally Managing the Self 
 
An important aspect of neo-liberal citizenship is that the individual takes 
personal responsibility for the management of their own physical self, and 
recent developments in ICT have made this possible in new ways. These include, 
for example, devices such as fitness trackers and health monitoring wristbands, 
as well as apps to measure sleep quality, to record calorie intake, to monitor 
medication use, and so on. ‘Smart’ objects forming part of the Internet of Things 
have also been developed, allowing individuals to monitor driving habits and 
drowsiness, for example173. Self-tracking devices or apps will often set goals or 
targets for the user to meet, such as a recommended calorie intake (sometimes 
tailored to achieve a certain level of weight loss) or an apparently beneficial 
level of physical activity (such as walking 10,000 steps per day174). Self-tracking 
allows users to track and quantify all aspects of their lives175, helping them to 
measure and manage their behaviour176. Individuals are often encouraged to 
engage in self-tracking177, whether by the companies who offer these services as 
they promote their benefits, by organisations promoting health and fitness, or, 
for example, by car insurance companies who promise lower premiums if a 
driver allows their driving to be tracked.  
 
Part of this process is the datafication of health, fitness, and daily activity, or 
what Charitsis calls ‘self-quantification’: “self-quantification aspires to enhance 
human abilities through self-knowledge, by collecting and analyzing data for 
everything related to the human body and mind that can be measured”178. The 
                                                          
173 Lupton, 2014 
174 Goodyear et al, 2017, p.3 
175 Charitsis, 2016, p.38 
176 Dennison et al, 2013; see, e.g., Lupton, 2015; Lupton, 2013 
177 Lupton, 2013; Lupton, 2014; Goodyear et al, 2017 
178 Charitsis, 2016, p.45; see also Lupton, 2016 
Digital Citizenship and the Contemporary State | Chapter 2 
  
 
Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 66 
  
‘quantified self’ has become a popular term to describe this self-tracking179. 
Shilton describes it as ‘participatory personal data’, or “aggregations of 
representations or measurements collected by people, about people”180. According 
to Shilton, these are participatory in that data is collected with the intention that 
it will be available to the individual themselves181, a form of self-surveillance by 
which the digital citizen makes use of ICT in order to manage the real-world 
self182.  
 
This facilitates the increasingly detailed measurement and monitoring of 
people’s lives, bodies, and behaviours183, and fits the neo-liberal drive to 
quantify all aspects of life so as to render them thinkable, knowable, and 
therefore governable184. And setting a goal for a user to attain establishes a 
behavioural norm for the individual to meet. This process of normalisation was 
identified by Foucault as being central to neo-liberal forms of government185, 
whereby standards of ideal behaviour are established and the individual is held 
to that standard. Self-tracking can also be located as a form nudging186, a 
method of control put forward by Thaler and Sunstein187 that can be located in 
the neo-liberal tradition whereby responsibilities are placed onto individuals. 
We can further locate self-tracking as a form of the algorithmic regulation 
described by Keren Yeung188, in this case an individual seeking to regulate the 
self. And in our governmentality analysis we can recognise self-regulation 
through self-tracking as a technology of the self which is used in line with neo-
liberal concepts of citizenship and the role of the individual within society189. 
Through this, self-tracking seeks, as Miller and Rose describe the 
governmentalities of neo-liberalism, “to act upon and instrumentalize the self-
regulating propensities of individuals in order to ally them with socio-political 
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objectives”190, and reflects the emphasis in neo-liberal theory placed on the 
citizen as a self-managing, sovereign individual, ultimately responsible for their 
own health and lifestyle191.  
 
Self-tracking of the kind identified here therefore helps manage the behaviour 
of the digital citizen and renders them self-governable according to 
modernising, neo-liberal norms, with the idea of perpetual self-management in 
everything from personal fitness to car insurance becoming normalised192. And 
as well as the use of digital technologies to manage the physical self, the digital 
citizen also uses a variety of techniques to manage the digital self. We will move 
on to discuss this now. 
 
Managing the Digital Self 
 
Digital life requires the active managing of social relationships. It is no longer 
enough to maintain a sporadic friendship with someone in the era of social 
media, instead the individual is expected to continually take part in a wide range 
of online forms of social interaction – from ‘liking’ or commenting on photos and 
statuses posted by friends, to uploading their own content, posting statuses, and 
so on. Social life becomes something to be actively managed in much the same 
way as any other aspect of life. There are two inter-related aspects to this: 
privacy management and identity management. We will deal with each of these 
in turn. 
 
We begin with what Daniel Solove calls ‘privacy self-management’193, where 
individuals are largely held to be responsible for managing their own privacy 
and security online. This places responsibility for privacy violations firmly with 
the individual, as would be expected in neo-liberalism. Users have developed a 
variety of strategies to manage their online privacy194. They may, for example, 
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limit self-disclosure195, make use of the privacy settings provided by various 
platforms196, or control the size of their network or friend list. They may, to a 
greater or lesser degree, perform some combination of the three197. Users may 
target what they post to the ‘lowest common denominator’ – i.e. if their friends 
on social media include a combination real friends, family, and colleagues then 
they may self-censor so as to post only benign content intended to avoid offence 
or controversy among members of all of those groups in order to avoid 
disapproval198. Some users may post more personal or contentious information 
but make use of privacy settings to limit the audience for each post, so as to 
effectively disclose different things in different social settings199. Research has 
shown that users actively engage with privacy and security settings on social 
media, managing their exposure to risk by taking precautions according to their 
perception of risk200, and where a particular setting is perceived to address a 
greater risk users are more likely to make use of it201. This means that users 
consider the implications of privacy management behaviours and take steps 
accordingly, although navigating privacy settings – which differ across 
platforms – may require a degree of knowledge about the platforms themselves 
in order to be operated most effectively. And Raento and Oulasvirta found that 
in many cases users aren’t concerned so much with protecting their privacy per 
se as they are with presenting themselves appropriately in different situations 
and contexts202.  
 
Privacy self-management thus forms part of online identity management, where 
the choice of what to share or not to share, which is often informed by privacy 
concerns203, forms part of the process of developing and maintaining an online 
identity (usually manifested through a user profile). As van Zoonen observes, 
cultural and social theories of identity hold that it is not just something that we 
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are, but something that we do204. On the internet, as is the case elsewhere, 
identity is constructed and performed205. Users on social media will often have 
to decide whether, accounting for privacy and other factors, it is prudent to 
share a particular photo or a particular piece of information about 
themselves206. Self-expression on social media therefore in large part involves a 
‘risk versus reward’ calculation207, whereby the choice of what to post online is 
made with conscious awareness of privacy implications, of the intended 
audience, and of the image that they hope to present to others208. Individuals 
engage in a process of self-monitoring when presenting themselves online209, 
just as they do offline210. Will a particular photo convey them in the desired 
way? Will a particular comment divulge information about them that they do 
not wish to be made public? Is a particular post something that they would want 
their family or employer to see, or should it be limited only to their real-world 
friends? These kinds of questions, and many more, are routinely considered as 
part of self-monitoring and self-performance on social media211. Someone who 
visits both an art gallery and a bar in the same day may choose to ‘check in’ at 
the former rather than the latter (or vice-versa) so as to present a particular 
version of themselves according to the identity that they wish to perform, for 
example. And research into the behaviour of teens on Facebook shows that they 
actively manage their profiles in order to manage the way that they present 
themselves212.  
 
This process of determining how to present oneself to whom is one by which 
users “present a highly curated version of themselves”213. In the online world, 
user profiles, such as those on Facebook, for example, stand in for the real 
person as ‘data doubles’ of the real person214. These profiles are digital 
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representations of the self that provide a window into the personality of the 
individual. And the way that each user chooses to portray themselves through 
their social media profiles is itself a form of active self-management where users 
are managing their digital selves. The ongoing process of profile curation – for 
example, choosing a profile picture, choosing what posts to make public, 
choosing which photos to upload, and choosing what information to share about 
yourself in terms of your age, gender, religious beliefs, political views, work, 
education, and relationships – is an online manifestation of the self-
management in which the neo-liberal citizen is expected to be engaged. 
 
Many individuals – including teenagers, young adults, and professional adults of 
all ages – shape their online identities with the goal of gaining popularity with, 
recognition from, and connection to peers, colleagues, and potential 
employers215. Thus identity self-management on social media can also be 
understood as self-commodification, as Bauman describes: 
 
“The schoolgirls and schoolboys avidly and enthusiastically putting 
on display their qualities in the hope of capturing attention and 
possibly also gaining the recognition and approval required to stay 
in the game of socializing … are enticed, nudged or forced to 
promote an attractive and desirable commodity, and so to try as 
hard as they can, and using the best means at their disposal, to 
enhance the market value of the goods they sell. And the commodity 
they are prompted to put on the market, promote and sell are 
themselves. 
 
They are, simultaneously, promoters of commodities and the 
commodities they promote”216 
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Curating a Facebook profile is therefore commodification of the self of the kind 
identified by Bauman as being central to the modern consumerist society217. As 
he puts it, “The most prominent feature of the society of consumers – however 
carefully concealed and most thoroughly covered up – is the transformation of 
consumers into commodities”218. In the marketised neo-liberal state, as part of 
the need to self-manage, the digital self therefore becomes a commodity to be 
actively promoted in the social and employment markets. As part of the need to 
actively manage online identity and engage in social and professional 
relationships online, the digital citizen is thus involved in both self-
commodification (turning the self into a commodity by creating and curating a 
profile representing that self) and also self-promotion (‘selling’ that 
commodified self to others)219. 
 
Self-commodification is an ongoing, perpetual process, but it isn’t entirely of the 
digital citizen’s own doing. Through the process of profile curation, the 
information that each website asks of users and prioritises for the purposes of 
completing and displaying their profile shapes the way that identity is 
constructed in those spaces220. Facebook profiles reflect its emphasis on social 
activity and personal relationships, whereas LinkedIn promotes the creation of 
a profile centred on education and employment history, professional 
achievements, and business-related networking221. van Dijck argues that the 
influence that sites hold over the creation of online identity means that identity 
self-management becomes directed towards corporate ends:  
 
“[user profiles] are not a reflection of one’s identity, as Facebook’s 
Marc Zuckerberg wants us to believe, but are part and parcel of a 
power struggle between users, employers/employees and platform 
owners to steer online information and behaviour”222 
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These sites thus guide the construction of the online identity of their users, 
tailoring it to the purpose envisaged by and in line with the values of the sites 
themselves223. But this also means that individuals can use each site to present a 
different aspect of their identity for a different audience, actively managing the 
performance of their selves across multiple platforms, and self-commodifying in 
a different way in different contexts. We can adopt our governmentality analysis 
to identify the various ways that sites encourage users to present themselves – 
whether by prompting for particular information, by algorithmically promoting 
certain information, and so on – as technologies of power that shape self-
commodification by users in line with corporate goals (which we can recognise 
as rationalities). They exercise this form of government at the contact point of 
these technologies and of the technologies of the self and in doing so encourage 
the selective, context-specific sharing of information that constitutes self-
management of digital identity. 
 
Through privacy self-management as part of identity management and self-
commodification the digital citizen is engaged in the self-management required 
of the individual in neo-liberal societies, facilitated by ICT. Along with the 
remaking of the relationship between the citizen and the State through the 
governmentality of e-government and the increasingly neo-liberalised form of 
active citizenship in the political sphere, we can identify this as a key aspect of 
the emergence of a neo-liberal form of digital citizenship. 
 
 
2.4 | Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have set out the key points of neo-liberal theory, and shown 
how reform has been pursued by framing it as being in the best interests of 
society as a whole in disciplinary neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism prioritises the 
free market, a smaller state, and the sovereign individual imbued with personal 
responsibility for all aspects of their lives as the self-managing consumer-citizen 
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actively engaged in civil society. This brings a shift from nation state to market 
state and requires the revolution described in governance theories, with the 
shrinking of government, privatisation of the public, and an emphasis on self-
government by the citizen representing a significant shift away from the welfare 
state. 
 
Concepts of governance and governmentality can explain how government in 
neo-liberal societies functions, and provide us with a theoretical framework for 
discussing the forms of power and control to which the digital citizen is subject 
in the online world. With this governmentality framework we can now conceive 
of the state, power, and government in such a way as to allow us to determine 
why, how, and where it is exercised. As we have seen, government, as the 
conduct of conduct, is located at the ‘contact point’ of two kinds of technologies 
of power – where technologies of the self and technologies of coercion combine 
to govern conduct.  
 
We have also seen how digital citizenship has itself developed along neo-liberal 
lines, reflecting the fact that the emergence of the internet as a significant factor 
in society has taken place alongside the revolution in British government and 
society that the neo-liberal reforming project represents. We can understand 
the digital citizen as a sovereign, self-managing consumer-citizen, imbued with 
personal responsibility for all aspects of their life and tasked with exercising 
their agency through the technologies of the self as a social, economic, and 
political actor in pursuit of their own self-interest. Successive governments in 
the UK have adopted the governmentality of e-government to encourage 
individuals to interact with a smaller, hollowed-out State online, reflecting the 
move of all aspects of life towards the digital. Online forms of consumer politics 
have resulted in the individual operating as an active digital citizen in the new 
marketised public, choosing from an array of commodified issues and 
campaigns in liberal individualist varieties of political engagement. The 
individualised digital citizen manages their physical body through the 
technologies of the self which are enabled by digital self-tracking. They also 
manage the digital self in the ongoing processes of privacy and identity 
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management through their technologies of the self, shaped by the technologies 
of coercion of corporations who are pursuing their own rationalities, resulting 
in the self-commodification of the individual in digital form as expected in 
contemporary marketised society. 
 
These conceptual foundations will allow us to develop the central argument of 
this thesis. We can recognise the neo-liberal characteristics of digital citizenship, 
and governmentality gives us a framework within which we can locate and 
define power, government, and the state and with which we can discuss the 
forms of control to which the digital citizen is subject – the governmentalities, 
with their rationalities and technologies of power, that exist in the digital world. 
As we shall see in subsequent chapters, this neo-liberal form of digital 
citizenship renders the individual more amenable to surveillance-based 
governmentalities involving commercial, security, and political rationalities 
which remake the relationship between the digital citizen and corporations, the 
State, and political organisations to the detriment of the digital citizen. We will 
now move on to examine the first of these – the commercial rationalities of 
surveillance capitalism, and how corporations involved in this new business 
model exercise control over the digital citizen through the technology of power 
of algorithmic governmentality. 
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Chapter 3 | Commodifying Life: 




“Google is ground zero for a wholly new subspecies of capitalism in 
which profits derive from the unilateral surveillance and 
modification of human behavior.  This is a new surveillance 
capitalism that is unimaginable outside the inscrutable high 
velocity circuits of Google’s digital universe”1 
 
- Shoshana Zuboff 
 
 
So far we have seen how in the UK the state has developed along broadly neo-
liberal lines since late 1970s, bringing a marketization of the public and civil 
society and a remaking of the individual as an active consumer-citizen, and have 
identified the emergence of a digital form of citizenship in this mould with the 
growing influence and prevalence of ICT and online life. We will now look at 
how this increasingly digital modern world has opened the digital citizen up to 
new forms of dataveillance-based control by corporations, who seek to 
commodify modern life in the pursuit of profit. And we will see that this 
involves a new relationship between corporations and digital citizens, as 
individuals are commodified as data profiles and their agency is appropriated 
and turned against them for profit. 
 
In 2015, Shoshana Zuboff identified the emergence of a new form of capitalism, 
created by Google through its use of big data in much the same way as Ford lead 
the way in mass production and General Motors pioneered managerial 
capitalism a century earlier. In doing so Zuboff described big data not as a new 
                                                          
1 Zuboff, 2016 
Commodifying Life: Surveillance Capitalism and the Digital Citizen | Chapter 3 
  
 
Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 76 
  
technology itself nor an inevitable and unavoidable consequence of 
technological progress, but as a “foundational component” in a new business 
model that “aims to predict and modify human behavior as a means to produce 
revenue and market control”2. She calls this new model ‘surveillance capitalism’3, 
with gathering and analysing as much data as possible at its core, seeking to 
predict and influence user behaviour in order to induce desired behaviours 
from which profit can be generated. Ultimately, surveillance capitalism involves 
commodifying as much as possible of everyday life in the pursuit of profit. 
Zuboff makes a largely business- and economics-orientated argument and 
makes little reference to the surveillance studies literature. In this chapter, 
surveillance capitalism will in part be located within that and other literature 
with the aim of contextualising and further fleshing out some of her ideas, 
intending to expand on what surveillance capitalism means for the digital 
citizen.  
 
Andrejevic observes that an analysis of big data that takes the form only of a 
critique of privacy invasion “does not do justice to the productive character of 
consumer surveillance”4. Looking at the implications for power and control is 
necessary in order to produce a fuller picture of what this means for the digital 
citizen in the modern world – as Andrejevic says, “the prospect that advertising 
might become more effective because it will be able to predict human behaviour 
with a high degree of reliability and thereby manage the populace more efficiently 
in accordance with commercial imperatives is disturbing in a different way from 
privacy concerns”5. The rationality and technology of power of surveillance 
capitalism, the role of the individual in surveillance capitalism, and the 
possibility of resisting surveillance capitalism are therefore essential topics for 
discussion.  
 
As such, this chapter will set out the origins of surveillance capitalism and adopt 
the governmentality analysis set out in Chapter 2 to identify and describe its 
                                                          
2 Zuboff, 2015, p.75 
3 Zuboff, 2015 
4 Andrejevic, 2012, p.73 
5 Andrejevic, 2012, p.73 
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rationality and technology of power; then we will look at what this means for 
the digital citizen in terms of their role within that system and the implications 
for individual sovereignty in the neo-liberal ideal; and will discuss the prospects 
for resistance in the age of surveillance capitalism. In all, we will identify and 
account for the relationship between the digital citizen and the corporations 
involved in surveillance capitalism, and will locate surveillance, predictive 
algorithmic analysis, and associated developments as a technology of power 
that translates the rationality of surveillance capitalism into reality by remaking 
the digital citizen as an individual amenable to its control. 
 
 
3.1 | The Reality Business 
 
We will first set out the business model identified by Zuboff and put forward its 
underlying rationality, before moving on to identify the technologies of power 
involved in surveillance capitalism and examine how they operate through the 
algorithmic analysis of user data to translate this rationality into reality by 
predicting and influencing human behaviour. 
 
3.1.1 | The New Surveillance Capitalism 
 
Zuboff grounds her analysis in two articles written by Google’s Chief Economist, 
Hal Varian, on big data6 and computer-mediated transactions7, which broadly 
set out the principles behind Google’s business model. Computer mediation will 
first be discussed, describing what it is and how has been utilised in this 
business model, and surveillance capitalism will then be identified as a new 
form of capitalism involving the computer mediation of big data with an 
underlying logic of accumulation that we can identify as its new rationality. 
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Informating through Computer Mediation 
 
Zuboff herself laid the groundwork for theoretical discussions around computer 
mediation, first in 19818 and through her subsequent work. She recognised that 
computers not only have the capacity to automate tasks, as was the case with 
previous technologies created to replicate or reduce human labour, but also to 
‘informate’. This means that automation by computers, unlike automation by 
mechanical devices such as the weaving loom of the first industrial revolution, 
also produces information that is new and otherwise unknowable, leading to 
greater understanding of things which had previously been opaque9. Zuboff 
contrasted the ‘dumb’ mechanical devices of previous technologies, which can 
only automate, with ‘smart’ computers that can informate10. As Zuboff notes, 
informating through computer mediation has become part of everyday life as it 
is increasingly rendered in the digital dimension, meaning that events, objects, 
processes, and people become “visible, knowable, and shareable in a new way”11.  
 
Informating through computer mediation of big data can provide a wealth of 
otherwise unknowable information to companies involved in surveillance 
capitalism. Research into what information Facebook Likes can disclose about 
an individual when analysed provides a good example of how computer 
mediation can provide insight into personal lives from relatively impersonal 
behavioural data12. Analysis of Likes has been shown to accurately predict 
various sensitive personal attributes including sexual orientation, ethnicity, 
religious and political views, personality traits, intelligence, happiness, use of 
addictive substances, parental separation, age, and gender. The accuracy of such 
prediction is in some cases very high – the analytical model employed by the 
researchers in the study of Likes can correctly distinguish between homosexual 
and heterosexual men in 88% of cases, between African Americans and 
Caucasian Americans in 95% of cases, and between Democrat and Republican in 
                                                          
8 Zuboff, 1981 
9 Zuboff, 1988 
10 Zuboff, 1988, p.395 
11 Zuboff, 2015, p.76 
12 Kosinki et al, 2013, p.5802 
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85% of cases. This kind of information can be fed into predictive models in 
order to enable companies to more accurately target prospective customers and 
to more effectively guide them towards the desired behaviour. 
 
Utilising Computer Mediation 
 
Google provides the prototypical model of how informating through computer 
mediation of data gathered through surveillance of online behaviour can 
provide otherwise unknown information which can be used to predict and 
influence future behaviour in order to produce profit. In using Google search we 
provide Google with behavioural data, such as the queries that we enter into the 
search box. For Google this data is essentially a cost-free by-product of our use 
of their services, what Zuboff calls ‘behavioural surplus’13, and is collected 
without much effort or even awareness on the part of those being surveilled14. 
Varian tells us that Google’s co-founder Larry Page used to say that Google’s 
problem was that users had to ask it questions – “He thought Google should 
know what you want and tell it to you before you ask the question”15. By gathering 
the behavioural data produced by users and subjecting it to algorithmic analysis 
Google is able to predict what users are going to type and offer auto-complete 
suggestions for searches. They can then provide targeted advertising on the 
search results page based on the predicted likelihood of users who have entered 
similar search terms and who fit similar user profiles, again determined by 
predictive analysis, to follow particular links or prompts.  
 
It is this ability to use the information produced by computer-mediating 
behavioural data to predict future user behaviour that enables Google and 
similar companies to attempt to influence that behaviour. And the same 
principle has been applied beyond search. For example, through the Google Now 
smartphone app, Google can constantly provide users with information that it 
predicts will be relevant to them at any given point in time or in any given 
                                                          
13 Zuboff, 2016 
14 Mayer-Schoenberger and Cukier, 2013, p.101 
15 Varian, 2014, p.4 
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location in order to prompt users to engage with Google’s targeted services and 
advertising. Google sells space for targeted advertising both within their own 
services and on other websites, which receive a share of the revenue from that 
advertising, to other companies for profit. Google itself determines which 
adverts and prompts should be shown when, where, and to whom. As such, over 
the past two decades Google has derived substantial profit from the computer 
mediation of behavioural data, first by using it to sell targeted advertising in 
search, then by surveilling and datafying behaviour elsewhere so as to predict 
and modify future behaviour more generally and maximise opportunities for 
profit in many other contexts. This is how Google, which began in Page and co-
founder Sergey Brin’s shared dorm room at Stanford University in 1995, went 
from being an unprofitable internet search engine in the 1990s to being a vastly 
profitable advertising company in the 2000s and one of the biggest companies 
in the world in the 2010s. In doing so it invented the business model broadly 
followed by the companies that dominate the new digital world. This model 
underpins what Zuboff calls the ‘reality business’ – “a new business frontier 
comprised of knowledge about real-time behavior that creates opportunities to 
intervene in and modify behavior for profit”16. 
 
Computer mediation of the behavioural data produced by our use of online 
services with the result of both automated and informated outputs is therefore 
central to surveillance capitalism. And as our lives are increasingly digital they 
are increasingly computer-mediated, rendering us as digital citizens visible, 
knowable, and amenable to control.  
 
The Rationality of Surveillance Capitalism 
 
Zuboff sets out the component parts of surveillance capitalism – what she calls 
its ‘equation’; what we can recognise as its rationality – as follows: 
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“First, the push for more users and more channels, services, devices, 
places, and spaces is imperative for access to an ever-expanding 
range of behavioral surplus. Users are the human nature-al 
resource that provides this free raw material. Second, the 
application of machine learning, artificial intelligence, and data 
science for continuous algorithmic improvement constitutes an 
immensely expensive, sophisticated, and exclusive twenty-first 
century ‘means of production.’ Third, the new manufacturing 
process converts behavioral surplus into prediction products 
designed to predict behavior now and soon. Fourth, these prediction 
products are sold into a new kind of meta-market that trades 
exclusively in future behavior. The better (more predictive) the 
product, the lower the risks for buyers, and the greater the volume 
of sales. Surveillance capitalism’s profits derive primarily, if not 
entirely, from such markets for future behaviour”17 
 
There should be little doubt that, as Zuboff puts it and has been noted by others, 
including Google’s former Engineering Director James Whittaker18, “Google’s 
business is the [advertising] auction business and its customers are advertisers”19. 
The advertising market is the ‘meta-market’ identified by Zuboff. For Google, the 
digital citizen is a user, rather than a customer, and we are the source of the raw 
material of surveillance capitalism, to be auctioned to highest bidder – not just 
personal data, but the computer-mediated behavioural surplus produced by the 
digital citizen as they move through the digital world. Through computer 
mediation of the daily life of the digital citizen, surveillance capitalism renders 
their lives visible, knowable, and profitable to corporations. 
 
This represents a break from previous forms of capitalism. While in industrial 
capitalism profit derived from the production of goods, and in financial 
capitalism profit derives from speculating on the future value of financial 
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instruments, in surveillance capitalism profit derives from the surveillance and 
modification of human behaviour20. Consequently, while in industrial capitalism 
power derived from control of labour and ownership of the means of 
production, in surveillance capitalism power derives from surveillance and 
computer mediation21. This moves surveillance capitalism away from the 
analysis of scholars such as Fuchs, who has argued that Marx’s cycle of capital 
accumulation – in which labour power and the means of production are 
purchased in order to produce new commodities in the expectation of making a 
profit, some of which may be reinvested thus continuing the cycle – can be 
applied to other forms of surveillance22, including the early neo-liberal 
consumer surveillance identified by Stephen Gill23, to show how surveillance is 
a device for extending power in that cycle. Fuchs himself does acknowledge this, 
and has put forward his own interpretation of Google’s business model which is 
grounded in Marx’s theory but rightly departs from it24. But in this he does not 
account either for the role of predictive algorithmic analysis as a new means of 
production in converting behavioural data into prediction products or for the 
role of behaviour modification within that business model, so does not identify 
its key aspects and thus in that sense does not go far enough in distinguishing 
this new form of capitalism from what has gone before. 
 
The new cycle of capital accumulation of surveillance capitalism, which we can 
identify as its rationality, does not fit the industrial model of accumulation, nor 
does it fit the model of financial capitalism that has been central to the global 
economy for decades. It moves beyond past and present forms of capitalism – as 
well as past and present analyses of capitalism, such as that provided by Marx 
and built upon by Fuchs – into something new, with surveillance standing not 
just as a technology of power in the existing order but becoming the defining 
                                                          
20 Zuboff, 2016  
21 Yeung, 2017a, p.130 
22 Fuchs, 2012 
23 Fuchs, 2012, pp.681-682; Gill, 1995 
24 Fuchs, 2011; Fuchs is by no means the only writer to apply Marxian perspectives to ICT generally 
(see, for example, Dyer-Wytheford, 1999 and Dyer-Wytheford, 2015). But, although Galič et al. refer 
to surveillance capitalism as described by Zuboff as “(neo-) Marxist surveillance theory” (2017, p.24), 
few other than Fuchs have attempted to apply such an analysis to explain surveillance capitalism, 
specifically. 
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feature of a new order, at the heart of a new logic of accumulation. As Zuboff 
says,  
 
“This is how in our own lifetimes we observe capitalism shifting 
under our gaze: once profits from products and services, then 
profits from speculation, and now profits from surveillance”25.  
 
Having distinguished surveillance capitalism from previous forms of capitalism, 
it is necessary at this point to also distinguish surveillance capitalism from the 
'platform capitalism' described by Srnicek26, Pasquale27, and others28. This 
involves corporations extending their reach through the creation of platforms: 
 
"At the most general level, platforms are digital infrastructures that 
enable two or more groups to interact.  They therefore position 
themselves as intermediaries that bring together different users: 
customers, advertisers, service providers, producers, suppliers, and 
even physical objects.  More often than not, these platforms also 
come with a series of tools that enable their users to build their own 
products, services, and marketplaces"29 
 
Advertising platforms are one of the five types of platform identified by 
Srnicek30, and he acknowledges surveillance capitalism within that category. 
But while not all platforms are surveillance corporations (platforms typically do 
extract and analyse personal and behavioural data, but this is not necessarily for 
use in a surveillance capitalist mode of profit-making), it is also the case that not 
all surveillance corporations are platform corporations. However, there is 
significant overlap. In particular, Google, Facebook, and Amazon, three of the 
leading proponents of surveillance capitalism (or, in the case of Amazon, a 
variant thereof), are clearly platform corporation; their presence stretches 
                                                          
25 Zuboff, 2016, p.6 
26 Srnicek, 2016 
27 See, e.g., Pasquale, 2017 
28 See, e.g., Olma, 2014; Langley and Leyshon, 2017 
29 Srnicek, 2016, p.43 
30 Srnicek, 2016, p.50 
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across the internet and they provide products and services far beyond their 
original iterations of search, social media, and selling books. But smaller 
companies, which make use of broadly the same business model, do not 
necessarily take the form of a platform. 
 
In order to reconcile these two concepts, we can distinguish between the 
organisational characteristics and the profit-making characteristics of any 
particular corporation (the two are of course linked, but the distinction, while 
blurry, is a useful one to make for our purposes). Organisational characteristics 
are those which describe the form of organisation that the corporation takes as 
it seems to maximise opportunities for profit, while profit-making 
characteristics are those which describe how a corporation goes about actually 
generating revenue from whichever organisational form it has taken. 'Platform 
capitalism' thus describes a form of organisation which seeks to maximise the 
opportunities for profit by positioning themselves as intermediaries which 
bring people together and often provide tools for building products and services 
within that space, while 'surveillance capitalism' describes a mode of profit-
making which seeks to track, analyse, and modify user behaviour so as to 
actually generate revenue. Rather than surveillance capitalism being an aspect 
of a subset of platform capitalism, we can understand that 'platform capitalism' 
refers to a particular form of organisation which seeks to maximise 
opportunities to make profit in a particular way, whereas 'surveillance 
capitalism' refers to particular mode of profit-making which is sometimes 
separate from and sometimes combined with platform capitalism. 
 
3.1.2 | From Datafication to Control 
 
So far we have seen what surveillance capitalism is and how it emerged, and 
have identified the rationality behind it. Now we move on to identify the 
dataveillance-based technology of power of surveillance capitalism and discuss 
how it operates through the computer mediation of big data so as to translate 
that rationality into reality by predicting behaviour and exerting control.  
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Building on the work of DeLanda on technology in warfare31 and Deleuze on 
surveillance32, Palmås calls this form of dataveillance, based on mass 
observation and experimentation in order to predict and influence user 
behaviour, ‘panspectric’ surveillance33. Unlike panoptic surveillance, which 
focuses on potentially observing an individual to control that individual34, this 
kind of dataveillance focuses on observing the behaviour of a spectrum of 
millions of people at once so as to potentially influence the behaviour of any 
individual. Involving pre-emptive forms of control35, panspectric dataveillance 
seeks to spot opportunities to intervene in future behaviour in order to direct it 
as desired. In 2008, Thrift predicted that we were moving towards a political 
economy of propensity in which the propensity of people to behave in certain 
ways in response to certain stimuli is exploited by corporations for profit36. In 
panspectric dataveillance, algorithmic regulation is employed to study users not 
as individuals, but as patterns and propensities of behaviour distilled from very 
large datasets37 which can be used to predict individual user behaviour. 
 
As we’ve seen, the corporations involved in surveillance capitalism rely 
fundamentally on algorithms. Google’s early success as a search engine was 
built on the back of its famous PageRank algorithm, which ranks search results 
by importance based on the number and quality of links to a page38. And its 
subsequent vast profits from advertising have been generated using its AdSense 
and AdWords algorithms, the former of which is responsible for placing ads on 
Google’s search results pages and the latter for placing ads on other websites. 
Facebook’s News Feed algorithm, which ranks content for display every time a 
user visits the Facebook home page based both on what is popular and on what 
it determines that the user will want to see 39, is at its heart. Amazon’s 
recommendation algorithm, which personalises the online store for each 
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34 See Chapter 4.1 
35 Palmås, 2011, p.343 
36 Thrift, 2008 
37 Palmås, 2011, p.347 
38 Google, Facts about Google and Competition 
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customer based on their usage history, has been identified as a key factor in its 
success40. Algorithms are central in surveillance capitalism.  
 
We will first discuss algorithmic regulation in this context from a 
governmentality point of view, before examining how this operates in practice 
by looking at how the individual is made hypervisible and behaviour is made 
predictable through surveillance and predictive analysis of big data, and will 
finally discuss the form of control used to direct user behaviour as desired. 
 
Algorithmic Regulation and Governmentality 
 
We saw in Chapter 1 that algorithms are tools of governance, of algorithmic 
regulation, in which they computationally generate knowledge from data in 
order to regulate behaviour in pursuit of some pre-specified goal. But, as we 
saw in Chapter 2, governance is concerned with the ‘what’ and the ‘why’ of 
government, whereas governmentality looks at the ‘why’ and the ‘how’. A 
governmentality analysis of algorithmic regulation therefore allows us to go 
further and examine how algorithms are used in technologies of power for 
translating the rationality of surveillance capitalism into reality.  
 
Antoinette Rouvroy has written extensively about the concept of ‘algorithmic 
governmentality’. She identifies “an unprecedented mode of government fuelled 
mostly with infra-personal, meaningless but quantifiable signals (raw data and 
metadata), addressing individuals through their ‘profiles’”41. In Rouvroy’s view, 
“the atunement of individuals’ (informational or physical) environments and 
interactions according to their constantly evolving « profiles » … [opens] the way 
to pre-emptive action to secure commercial profit and forestall dangerous or sub-
optimal behaviors” 42. Algorithmic governmentality involves a rationality 
founded on the automated collection, aggregation, and analysis of big data so as 
to predict and pre-emptively influence human behaviour43. The logic of 
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41 Rouvroy, 2015 
42 Rouvroy, 2015 
43 Rouvroy and Berns, 2013, p.X 
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accumulation of surveillance capitalism is one such rationality, and the 
technologies of power of algorithmic governmentality seek, as do all 
technologies of power in governmentality, to translate rationality into reality. 
This requires a government-type power interaction, and as in all government-
type power interactions this means the creation of a contact point where a 
change in the behaviour of an individual is effected in order to produce a 
desired outcome. 
 
For example, Bucher discusses how algorithms make people feel when they 
encounter them. Bucher looks at how and where people and algorithms meet44, 
and describes some of the many ways that people consciously and 
subconsciously alter their behaviour in response to encountering the Facebook 
News Feed algorithm. This is where in governmentality the technologies of the 
self and of coercion meet – the contact point at which a government-type power 
interaction takes place. Some of those interviewed by Bucher routinely altered 
their behaviour in order to maximise the benefit that they found in the 
algorithm, while conversely some deliberately set out to confuse the algorithm 
and others even reported feeling angry when it made suggestions that they felt 
were inaccurate as they did not like the person that the algorithm ‘thought’ they 
were45. She notes that while none of the participants in her study have any 
knowledge of how Facebook’s algorithm actually works, an example of 
algorithmic opacity and their invisible and unknowable nature, most of them 
had their own theories of varying degrees of complexity46. These users 
experience and respond to the algorithm in different ways, but what they share 
is that a change in their behaviour has been effected at the contact point of their 
regular encounter with an algorithm. The key to surveillance capitalism is in 
harnessing that potential for effecting a change in behaviour in order to direct it 
in the way desired. 
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A governmentality-based analysis of how algorithms are combined with 
consumer surveillance in order to predict behaviour and exert control over the 
digital citizen in surveillance capitalism will identify this process as a 
technology of power that seeks to translate rationality of surveillance capitalism 
into reality. Rouvroy and Berns talk about the ‘three stages’ of algorithmic 
governmentality: first, the collection of big data in data warehouses; second, 
data processing and knowledge production; and third, action on behaviours47. 
They point out that these stages are interrelated and overlapping and are 
especially powerful because they mutually reinforce one another48. It is as a 
whole, therefore, that algorithmic governmentality can provide a particularly 
powerful mode of government, so it is as a whole that these three stages should 
be understood as the technology of power of surveillance capitalism. Rouvroy 
and Berns decline to connect algorithmic governmentality as a concept to any 
particular implementation49, but these three stages will broadly speaking form 
the basis for our analysis. As such, the following will seek to provide an account 
of the technology of power of algorithmic governmentality as it operates in 
practice in surveillance capitalism, first through data collection, then through 
algorithmic analysis, and finally through the application of behavioural nudges 
based on this predictive analysis. 
 
Surveillance and Datafication 
 
This first stage of algorithmic governmentality involves the collection and 
storage of unfiltered big data50. The key this is obtaining as much data from as 
many sources as possible through surveillance and datafication. Indeed, it is 
only possible to perform the kind of predictive analysis involved in algorithmic 
governmentality with access to huge quantities of data. Datafication focuses 
algorithmic governmentality not on the real, physical person but on their 
datafied representations.  
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There are several sources on which surveillance capitalism corporations rely. As 
well as their own surveillance operations, these corporations obtain significant 
amounts of data from data brokers. As a result, and while they provide data to a 
wide variety of companies involved in business of many kinds, fuelling a data 
economy that extends beyond surveillance capitalism, data brokers play an 
important role in surveillance capitalism. Companies like Axciom and Experian 
build comprehensive profiles of individuals, bringing together data from both 
online and offline sources, and provide a valuable source of personal and 
behavioural data to surveillance capitalism corporations. The exponentially-
increasing processing power, as predicted by Moore’s law51, which can be 
applied to this data, as well as the ever-increasing capacity for data storage, 
allows for vast quantities of data to be collected for analysis. The databases that 
store this data are at the centre of an extensive surveillance apparatus, holding a 
wide range of personal information gathered through the monitoring of the 
everyday activities of consumers52. 
 
Much of this data, whether obtained directly by a surveillance capitalism 
corporation or from a data broker, comes from personal data that we 
voluntarily supply. But the bulk of it is behavioural data, obtained through 
surveillance. The gradual expansion of IoT devices feeding data back into 
databases has the potential to dramatically expand the quantity of this 
behavioural data available for reality mining. The spread of IoT devices 
involving cameras and microphones brings the possibility not just of an internet 
of things but also of an internet of eyes and ears feeding back into databases and 
potentially revealing a large amount of information directly about us as 
individuals beyond that revealed by data derived from our online interactions 
or from the sensor-laden smart devices that we use in our homes and carry with 
us everywhere.  
 
                                                          
51 In 1965 Gordon Moore, the founder of Fairchild Semiconductor and Intel, predicted that due to 
advances in technology processing power would double every two years. This has proved to be an 
accurate prediction that still holds true (Pressman, 2017) 
52 Manzerolle and Smeltzer, 2011, p.324 
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The increasingly online nature of private, social, and economic life feeds directly 
into this data-gathering. Take, for example, the explosive growth in ownership 
of smartphones in the last decade. Google controls the development of the 
Android smartphone operating system, which is the most used smartphone 
operating system in the world, installed on 46% of all smartphones sold in the 
UK in 201653 and 88% sold worldwide54, and which comes with Google apps – 
including its core search app – pre-installed as a condition of the licensing of the 
operating system to smartphone manufacturers. With nearly 9 of every 10 
smartphones sold worldwide therefore coming with Google’s software baked in 
– including all its data gathering tools and its apps for delivering targeted 
content to users – Google has unprecedented access to the most personal data 
about the daily lives of two billion people55. If you are a digital citizen who uses 
an Android smartphone then it’s likely that not only does Google know your 
name, your age, your gender, where you live, your relationship status, and who 
you are friends with, but it also knows where you are, where you have been, 
what you search for, who you call and message, where you work, what you buy, 
what your emails say, what appointments you have, and a host of other highly 
personal information about you that can be fed into algorithms and used to 
predict and influence your future behaviour in order to extract the maximum 
possible profit from you. For these companies, computer mediation of personal 
and behavioural data means there is little that is unknown about the true digital 
citizen – as Siva Vaidhyanathan says, “Google reads our minds, or at least Google 
simulates the reading of our minds”56.  
 
Hypervisibility through Predictive Analytics 
 
This is the second stage of algorithmic governmentality. Zuboff calls this 
informating, while Rouvroy and Berns call it ‘knowledge production’57, and it’s 
commonly known as ‘reality mining’58. These are substantively the same thing, 
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57 Rouvroy and Berns, 2013, p.VII 
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and involve subjecting the data gathered in the first stage to algorithmic 
analysis in order to provide insights into users from which predictions can be 
made. Yeung identifies this as the ‘information gathering’ component of 
algorithmic regulation59, in this case taking a pre-emptive form by which future 
behaviour is predicted so that it can be intervened upon60.  
 
While this kind of analysis can only provide insight into correlations, the 
predictive power of algorithms should not be underestimated. A 2010 study of 
mobile phone location data found that the movement behaviour of users could 
be predicted with 93% accuracy61. And, as discussed previously, highly personal 
information about an individual can be determined through predictive analysis 
of impersonal behavioural data, such as that relating to Facebook Likes. Ayres, 
who calls this ‘Super Crunching’62, says that algorithmic analysis “will predict 
what you will want and what you will do”63, meaning that corporations may be 
able to more accurately predict your behaviour than you ever could yourself64. 
In Pentland’s view, reality mining provides the capacity to collect and analyse 
data about people with a previously inconceivable breadth and depth65, giving 
us a “a God’s eye view of ourselves”66. As companies gather ever more data and as 
technology exponentially advances, algorithmic predictions will become ever 
more accurate and detailed67. 
 
The individual is made visible and knowable by surveillance, datafication, and 
the analytical power of the invisible and unknowable algorithm. When it comes 
to the corporations to which we are willingly providing vast quantities of the 
most personal data imaginable there is and can be no such thing as true 
privacy68. Surveillance capitalism requires us to be visible, and through mass 
                                                          
59 Yeung, 2017b, p.7 
60 Yeung, 2017b, p.8 
61 Song et al, 2010, p.1018 
62 Ayres, 2008 
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64 Ayres, 2008, p.33 
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participation in the online world and the datafication and analysis of our lives 
the digital citizen is not just visible but hypervisible to the companies engaged in 
this new form of capitalism.  
 
Hypervisibility in the Internet of Things 
 
For the most part this hypervisibility has until recently been limited to the 
analysis of data produced as we move through the digital world. However, 
Rouvroy and Berns note that software can now recognise and datafy emotions, 
facial movements, and skin tones69. For example, in 2017 Amazon announced its 
‘Echo Look’ device, which would take full-body photos of customers and will 
analyse them in order to help users dress and give fashion advice70. Vincent 
highlights what kinds of insight these kinds of devices could potentially provide 
to corporations: 
 
“Think about it. If you pass a stranger in the street, how much 
information do you get with a second’s glance? You can probably 
make some decent estimates about their height, weight, age, race, 
and gender. If they were far enough along in pregnancy, you’d 
know. And you could take a stab at other, more contentious 
questions, like: are they rich or poor? Friendly or closed-off? Are 
they having a good day? If it takes a second for you to answer these 
questions, then Amazon’s AI could take a stab at it as well. And, 
given enough data, it can offer far, far more accurate answers.”71 
 
In the IoT the digital citizen becomes hypervisible both in a figurative and in a 
literal sense, potentially and more readily revealing a wealth of information 
about their immediate emotional state, health, or other aspects of life. Beyond 
microphones and cameras, the internet of things promises to bring monitoring, 
tracking, and predictive analysis into many areas of everyday life, creating a 
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physical architecture for surveillance capitalism and extending its reach beyond 
the digital and into the real world and offline public space. 
 
Control through Hypernudging 
 
This forms the third and final stage of algorithmic governmentality, and involves 
using the information produced by the algorithmic analysis of earlier stages to 
create ways to influence behaviour. Yeung calls this the ‘enforcement and 
behaviour modification’ component of algorithmic regulation72. She shows how 
dataveillance in surveillance capitalism uses prediction based on computer 
mediation of past group and individual behaviour to produce behavioural 
nudges in order to exert a form of control over the individual in the hope of 
effecting a desired outcome73. Building on the fact that much human decision-
making takes place subconsciously and unreflectively rather than through 
active deliberation74, and taking advantage of known vulnerabilities in decision-
making, including the use of heuristics and the resulting prevalence of cognitive 
biases, the concept of nudges for behaviour modification was first put forward 
by Thaler and Sunstein. They describe them as “any aspect of choice architecture 
that alters people’s behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options 
or significantly changing their economic incentives”75. While nudging as a form of 
behaviour modification is not unique to dataveillance, the confluence of several 
factors that are unique to big data mean that nudging in this context can be 
particularly effective.  
 
Yeung calls this form of control, a highly amplified form of nudging unique to big 
data, ‘hypernudge’76. She argues that there are two key factors that distinguish 
hypernudges in the digital world from nudges in the real world77 – the fact that 
they can be highly personalised, and the fact that they can altered dynamically 
in real time in response to user behaviour, neither of which are true of real-
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76 Yeung, 2017a 
77 Yeung, 2017a, p.122 
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world nudges. As Yeung puts it, with the personalised, dynamic, and responsive 
nature of digital spaces, “these nudges channel user choices in directions 
preferred by the choice architect through processes that are subtle, unobtrusive, 
yet extraordinarily powerful”78. 
 
Yeung identifies two forms of decision-making associated with dataveillance – 
‘automated decision-making processes’, which involve a machine making a 
decision based on data analysis, and ‘digital decision-making processes’, which 
target an individual based on data analysis in order to lead them to make a 
desired decision79. While automated decision-making processes do have 
implications for the individual in society, the latter, which seek to direct an 
individual’s decision-making in the way deemed optimal by the underlying 
algorithm by offering suggestions intended to prompt the individual into 
making the desired decision80, is our focus in this instance.  Yeung provides the 
example of a Google search result page to demonstrate how this works in 
practice: 
 
“In the Google search engine, for example, the most prominently 
displayed sites are ‘paid for’ sponsored listings (thus enabling firms 
to pay for search engine salience), followed by weblinks ranked in 
order of Google’s algorithmically determined relevance. Although 
theoretically free to review all the potentially relevant pages (from 
the hundreds of thousands ranked), in practice each individual 
searcher is likely to visit only those on the first page or two … Hence 
the user’s click-through behaviour is subject to the ‘priming’ effect, 
brought about by the algorithmic configuration of her 
informational choice architecture seeking to ‘nudge’ her click-
through behaviour in directions favoured by the choice architect. 
For Google, this entails driving web traffic in directions that 
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promote greater use of Google applications (thereby increasing the 
value of Google’s sponsored advertising space).”81 
 
This kind of control is prevalent both on the web and in the mobile apps 
produced by companies such as Google and Facebook. Links and associated 
information are often determined algorithmically in order to induce a desired 
behaviour in the user. Indeed, as Rouvroy and Berns point out, “the aim is of 
course precisely not so much to tailor the offer to individuals’ spontaneous desires 
(assuming such a thing exists), as to adapt those desires to the offer by tailoring 
sales strategies (the way of presenting the product, of pricing it, etc.) to each 
person’s profile”82. The way in which nudges operate in the digital to achieve this 
is vastly more sophisticated than in the offline world.  
 
Algorithms can continuously update suggestions on the fly to account for 
changes in behaviour or to offer new suggestions in repeated attempts to induce 
the desired behaviour should those previously proffered be ignored by the user. 
As a result, they can dynamically provide more relevant and, in theory, more 
effective nudges based on changing circumstances and tailored both to take into 
account changing trends in the behaviour and responses of users generally and 
to reflect the variable and unique behaviour of the targeted individual 
specifically83. As both a response and a lack of response from a user can be 
taken into account in future attempts to provide more effective nudges, there is, 
in effect, no such thing as failure. Every nudge, whether acted upon or not, 
provides an opportunity to learn more about an individual user’s behaviour and 
to feed this into models that predict the behaviour of people more generally so 
as to more effectively influence that behaviour. Rouvroy and Berns put it like 
this:  
 
“Algorithmic governmentality, with its perfect adaptation in ‘real 
time’, its ‘virality’, (the more it is used, the more the algorithmic 
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system is refined and improves, since all interaction between the 
system and the world translates into a recording of digitized data, 
correlative enrichment of the ‘statistical base’, and improvement of 
the algorithms’ performance) and its plasticity, renders the very 
notion of ‘misfire’ meaningless; in other words, a misfire cannot 
‘jeopardize’ the system, it is immediately re-ingested to further 
refine behavioural models or profiles”84 
 
As previously noted, data models produced by analysis of behavioural surplus 
will only show correlations in consumer behaviour. This may lead to an 
inaccurate picture being produced85, and, as Rouvroy points out, it is important 
to remain wary of the sufficiency of correlations86. Key to refining data models 
in order to more accurately predict behaviour is taking advantage of the ability 
to learn from failure by deliberately experimenting with different nudges, both 
in terms of the form of nudges themselves and in terms of the contexts in which 
they are provided, which allows analysis to move beyond identifying correlation 
to potentially identifying causation87. Google as of 2014 ran about 10,000 
experiments a year, with around 1,000 running at any given time88. In 2008 
these experiments resulted in 450-500 changes in the system, tweaking 
everything from the background colour of ads and the spacing between ads and 
search results, to the underlying ranking algorithm89. When you use Google you 
are unwittingly participating in dozens of experiments at once. Continual 
experimentation like this – “pretty easy to do on the web”, according to Varian90 
– would be impossible with nudges in the offline world. A speed hump, an 
example of an offline nudge, cannot be continually repositioned in order to 
determine the best location to most effectively reduce a particular driver’s 
speed on a particular street, but in digital space this kind of experimentation is 
commonplace. Businesses have, of course, always experimented in one way or 
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another, but the availability of computer mediation makes these experiments 
cheaper and more flexible than ever before91. Google’s experiments are 
successful enough that they have been made available to advertisers, allowing 
them to experiment with different factors in order to find the optimal settings 
for their ads92. In the offline world nudges simply do not have this capacity to 
learn as they go and can be neither anywhere near as dynamic nor anywhere 
near as personalised. Dataveillance therefore uses our personal and behavioural 
data to provide a highly individualised, dynamic, and reactive form of control 
that does not – and could not – exist in the offline world. It is this difference 
between offline and digital nudges that leads Yeung to describe this form of 
control as ‘hypernudge’93.  
 
Remember that in our governmentality analysis government is a power 
interaction located at the contact point where the technologies of the self (our 
self-management, and the techniques through which we manage our own 
behaviour) and technologies of coercion (the techniques through which others 
compel us to act in certain ways) combine to govern conduct – the conduct of 
conduct. It is primarily through combining big data surveillance, analytical 
techniques, and these algorithmically produced, highly dynamic, highly 
personalised hypernudges as a technology of power in algorithmic 
governmentality that corporations seek to create this contact point and effect a 
change in behaviour so as to translate the underlying rationality – the logic of 
accumulation of surveillance capitalism – into reality.  
 
We can now understand how algorithmic governmentality operates in 
surveillance capitalism, and can identify its rationality and its technology of 
power. Next we will examine what this means for the digital citizen in terms of 
their role within surveillance capitalism and how the practices of surveillance 
capitalism appropriate the sovereignty of the individual – the central concept of 
neo-liberal theory – for corporate ends. 
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3.2 | The Digital Citizen in Surveillance Capitalism 
 
Now that we know what surveillance capitalism is (in terms of its rationality) 
and how it operates (in terms of its technology of power) we can discuss what it 
means for the digital citizen. In his analysis of modern western society’s shift 
from being a disciplinary society, described by Foucault94, to a control society, 
operating with computers, Deleuze argues that the individual is no longer the 
smallest unit in that society95. He observes that ‘individual’ means ‘indivisible’, 
but that consumer surveillance turns the individual into a ‘dividual’96 – a 
divisible assemblage of the component parts of the individual. As Williams puts 
it, the dividual is “a physically embodied human subject that is endlessly divisible 
and reducible to data representations via the modern technologies of control, like 
computer-based systems”97.  
 
In a control society the point isn’t to make real bodies docile, but to mould 
people as consumers through their data bodies98. In surveillance capitalism, the 
goal is not to control people as physical entities, but to use datafied 
representations of them to predict and influence their behaviour as consumer-
citizens in all areas of life. Datafication in this context involves abstracting 
human bodies and behaviour from the real world into data points which can 
then be assembled into profiles – what Heggarty and Ericson call ‘data doubles’, 
composed of pure information99 – and analysed and targeted for intervention. 
This involves building profiles of individuals and models of behaviours without 
ever involving the individual, and without asking them to describe what or who 
they are, so these data doubles can only ever be representations of our datafied 
component parts as constructed by others100. Yet our data double operates as a 
shadow self that stands in for our physical self and allows us to be subjected to 
predictive analysis and therefore the control of algorithmic governmentality. 
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Foucault argues that disciplinary societies engage in individuation101, where 
government is focused on the individual, measuring them against an idealised 
norm. Similarly, we could say that the reduction of the individual to the dividual 
is a process of dividuation, where the datafied component parts of the dividual 
are variously analysed and held to different norms. Hintz et al echo Isin and 
Ruppert’s description of the digital subject as a composite102 of multiple 
identifications, affiliations, and associations to describe an ongoing 
fragmentation and a loss of classic reference points for citizenship103. Instead 
the digital citizen is cast anew. Foucault wrote of power which is capillary, and 
which affects “the grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into 
their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday 
lives”104. Through algorithmic governmentality in surveillance capitalism the 
digital citizen is remade according to a new rationality. 
 
In this the digital citizen becomes splintered, and rather than being the well-
informed active consumer-citizen freely engaged in perpetual choice-making in 
pursuit of their own self-interest of the neo-liberal ideal, they are reduced to 
their datafied constituent parts – name, age, gender, location, likes, dislikes, 
friends, relatives, etc. – and take on a new role. We will first examine how they 
become simultaneously a producer and a consumer of content – what has been 
called a ‘prosumer’ – but therefore also a producer of behavioural surplus 
through both production and consumption, will introduce new terms to account 
for this new role, will see how this facilitates the commodification of the digital 
citizen, and will attempt to determine whether or not the digital citizen in this 
role is exploited in surveillance capitalism. We will then discuss how in taking 
on this multi-faceted role, and through the asymmetry of information between 
the visible, knowable computer-mediated digital citizen and the corporation 
with its access to the most personal information about us and its invisible, 
unknowable algorithms, the sovereignty of the individual, the key concept in 
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neo-liberalism, becomes appropriated and turned against the digital citizen for 
profit.  
 
3.2.1 | The Role of the Digital Citizen  
 
Various writers, most ambitiously George Ritzer, have written about a new role 
for the digital citizen as a producer-consumer, or ‘prosumer’105. For Ritzer, 
prosumption involves an interrelationship between production and 
consumption in which it is difficult, if not impossible, to clearly distinguish one 
from the other106. Ritzer recognises that production and consumption have 
always been linked, and that capitalism has always involved a dual role for the 
individual – a prosumer acting as both a producer and a consumer107. In his 
view, while the individual has always played this dual role, over successive 
stages of capitalism the relationship between the two components of the 
prosumer has changed108. As a result, he argues, production capitalism was 
‘singly’ exploitative as it involved exploitation of the prosumer primarily as a 
producer, and consumer capitalism was ‘doubly’ exploitative as it involved 
exploitation of the prosumer as both a producer and a consumer but in different 
ways and in different spaces109, but in the digital world the exploitation of the 
prosumer as a consumer and as a producer now occur in the same place and at 
the same time, taking exploitation to a new form and an unprecedented level110. 
He argues that as a result of this temporal-spatial unity of exploitation, 
capitalism in the digital is “synergistically doubly exploitative”111. Ritzer further 
argues that the emergence of this new form and level of exploitation of the 
prosumer signals the emergence of a new form of capitalism, which he terms 
‘prosumer capitalism’, centred on this simultaneous exploitation of the 
prosumer as a producer and a consumer112. This claim is vigorously and 
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reasonably contested by Zwick on a number of grounds, including that Ritzer 
goes too far in elevating prosumption to the level of a new form of capitalism 
and in the extent to which he claims that prosumers are exploited and that he 
doesn’t go far enough in considering the degree to which marketing turns 
consumers into mass producers113.  
 
While Ritzer’s argument is persuasive in places, it should also be noted that his 
analysis claiming a new form of capitalism looks largely at the role of the 
individual, focusing on one aspect of the political economy at the expense of 
others and arguing from this narrow focus that a change in the whole has 
occurred without demonstrating a significant shift in other aspects of that 
whole (for example changes in the underlying model of accumulation such as 
those which delineate industrial, financial, and surveillance capitalism). More 
significantly, his analysis also fails to account for the role of behavioural surplus 
in surveillance capitalism – remember that it is through the use of our 
behavioural data, not through the use of our content as Ritzer’s analysis would 
have it, that corporations such as Google and Facebook generate most of their 
profits (although there is money in content, it can often be accessed for free to 
draw users in since the behavioural surplus that they will produce in consuming 
that content is potentially far more profitable). In our analysis, therefore, it 
would be more accurate to discuss the behavioural surplus generated by the 
prosumer acting simultaneously as a producer and a consumer of content as 
being an important component part of the new form of capitalism known as 
surveillance capitalism, not as heralding a new form of capitalism in and of 
itself. 
 
In surveillance capitalism, the digital citizen is the source of the raw material – 
behavioural surplus – from which the profits of corporations are ultimately 
derived114. The following will propose the concept of the ‘produsumer’ in order 
to account for this new role, and will seek to determine whether the digital 
citizen as a producer of behavioural surplus is exploited in surveillance 
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capitalism. Whether this is the case depends to a large extent on whether or not 
they are producing valuable work without reward. So in order to determine the 
answer to this question we will first identify production of behavioural surplus 
as being a form of work and will determine what kind of work this is, before the 
describing the commodification of the surplus produced through this work and 




To show how generation of behavioural surplus should be considered to be 
work we can look to Fuchs’s demonstration of how production of content – 
whether that be, for example, websites that are indexed by Google search or 
posts and photos on Facebook that draw in other users – should be considered 
to be work115. Content is vitally important to many online services, and Fuchs 
uses the question of what would happen if this was withdrawn to demonstrate 
that its production is labour: 
 
“The number of users would drop, advertisers would stop 
investments because no objects for their advertising messages and 
therefore no potential customers for their products could be found, 
the profits of Google would drop, and the company would go 
bankrupt. If such activities were carried out on a large scale, a new 
economy crisis would arise”116 
 
As production of content generates surplus value for Google, it should be 
recognised to be work. Fuchs’s argument echoes that made by Lazzarato, of the 
Italian autonomist school of thought, about immaterial labour117. This states 
that in an information society, dominated by ICT, the production of the 
informational and cultural aspect of an immaterial commodity should itself be 
considered to be work as it is that informational and cultural content that 
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provides the commodity’s value. A similar argument has also been put forward 
by Terranova, following from Lazzarato118.  
 
So as the production of content is work, what about the production of 
behavioural surplus? Clearly, and even more so than the production of content, 
the production of behavioural data creates surplus value for Google – 
behavioural surplus is, after all, the raw material from which they ultimately 
derive around 90% of their profit119. And if behavioural surplus was withdrawn 
then Google’s business model would collapse. So, following Fuchs, the 
production of behavioural surplus should be considered to be work just as the 
production of content can be considered to be work120. And if we follow 
Lazzarato and Terranova, the production of behavioural surplus creates the 
informational value of the principal commodity of surveillance capitalism – the 
data profiles bought and sold on the advertising market – and so should be 
considered to be work. We can therefore recognise behavioural surplus, the raw 
material of surveillance capitalism without which the vast profits drawn from 
dataveillance would be impossible, as being generated through the work of the 
digital citizen. As we can consider the generation of behavioural surplus to be 
work, we can consider first what kind of work this is and then the extent to 
which this work is exploited. 
 
As behavioural data is generated by both our production and our consumption 
of content it could be said that through dataveillance both production and 
consumption become productive121. It is in this sense, more than any other, that 
we take on a new role in surveillance capitalism – through both production and 
consumption of content we become a productive source of raw material, often 
without being aware that this is happening122. We could call this role the 
produsumer to distinguish from the prosumer of Ritzer's and others’ analyses, in 
which individuals act as producers and consumers of content as a role in and of 
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itself rather than as producers of behavioural surplus through both production 
and consumption of content, and in doing so emphasise the productive nature of 
both production and consumption.  
 
Goss argues that the adoption of the practices of what we can recognise as 
surveillance capitalism is an attempt to bring consumption under the control of 
production123. Compare this with what Kotz describes as neo-liberal 
capitalism’s domination of labour by capital124. Kotz notes that every form of 
capitalism must stabilise the relationship between labour and capital in some 
way125. Zuboff argues that surveillance capitalism involves a parasitic form of 
profit126, and in this the relationship between labour and capital is one in which 
not just productive labour is dominated by capital, as in neo-liberalism, but in 
which productive labour is united with what we could call consumptive labour 
as a new form of production and together they are brought within the dominion 
of capital. 
 
Consumptive labour can be distinguished from productive labour in 
surveillance capitalism in that productive labour in this context involves 
producing behavioural surplus through the production of content and 
consumptive labour involves producing behavioural surplus through the 
consumption of content. And consumptive labour is perhaps the primary way by 
which the individual produces behavioural surplus. Fuchs, however, in his 
Marxian analysis considers all production of behavioural data to be productive 
labour in the same vein as production of content, with no distinction as to the 
origin of the surplus, and therefore prosumption127. But this cannot be correct. 
Marx wrote that at the “end of every labour process, a result emerges which had 
already been conceived by the worker at the beginning, hence already existed 
ideally”128. As Fuchs himself says, this means that “All human labor requires 
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mental planning and anticipation of the result”129. Thus productive labour 
involves some form of intention to produce, or anticipation of producing, what 
is produced. Or, as Jeon puts it, productive labour “presupposes knowledge of the 
goal of the labor (i.e., what to produce) and the techniques to realize the goal (i.e., 
how to produce) “130. Yet in the production of behavioural surplus through 
consumption this is not always, or perhaps even often, the case. It is unlikely 
indeed that many people are using Facebook with the goal of providing them 
with behavioural data – many, if not most, are at least some of the time using 
Facebook with the intention not of producing anything for anyone but of 
consuming content. They may not even be aware that through consumption 
they are producing anything at all. So production of behavioural surplus 
through consumption cannot be productive labour, and the work of the digital 
citizen performed through consumption cannot be located within a traditional 
Marxian analysis. Marx’s concept of labour, upon which Fuchs builds his 
analysis, cannot include the production of behavioural surplus through 
consumption and therefore cannot adequately explain the role of the individual 
in surveillance capitalism. Consumptive labour therefore takes us beyond 
Fuchs’s analysis, and beyond Marx. 
 
However, uploading a photo to Facebook or Instagram, for example, can be 
considered to be productive labour as the user knows that the site will store 
data about it, will associate it with their profile, will show it to others, and will 
track it how it is interacted with. Indeed, these will often be the reasons for 
uploading the photo in the first place. As such, the user is not just aware that in 
uploading the photo they will produce behavioural surplus, although they may 
not think of it in those terms, but is often uploading it with the intention that 
this will happen. So while most work in surveillance capitalism is consumptive, 
some is productive. And while productive labour and consumptive labour can 
and should be distinguished, it is in the union of these two forms of labour, both 
of which are performed by the digital citizen in surveillance capitalism, often 
simultaneously, that we find the work of the produsumer. 
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And consumptive labour should also be distinguished from Marx’s concept of 
productive consumption. Marx argued that as things are productively consumed 
in order to produce other things, consumption and production are correlates 
and come hand-in-hand, giving the example of a man consuming food to 
produce body131. But in surveillance capitalism this does not hold. Behavioural 
surplus is produced as a by-product of consumption, rather than consumption 
being a precursor to production as in Marx’s analysis. Consumptive labour 
therefore involves production as a side-effect of consumption, rather than 
consumption in order to produce. Hence consumptive labour (production 
through consumption) rather than productive consumption (consumption for 
production). In any case, both productive and consumptive labour come 
together to form a new kind of production in surveillance capitalism – 
produsumption – undertaken by the digital citizen as a produsumer. In 
produsumption both productive labour and consumptive labour are sources of 
raw material to be brought within the control of capital through algorithmic 
governmentality.  
 
As well as a new cycle of accumulation that moves beyond Marx’s analysis of 
previous forms of capitalism, surveillance capitalism therefore also involves a 
new form of labour that also moves beyond Marx’s analysis of previous forms of 
capitalism. And it is in the combination of this new form of labour (consumptive 
labour) with existing forms of labour (productive labour) that we find the new 
role for the digital citizen – the produsumer. Now that we can identify 
produsumption as work, and can identify what form this work takes, we can 
move on to see how the produsumer’s work allows the digital citizen as a 
produsumer to be commodified, before moving on to determine whether this 
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As digital citizens we become commodities in surveillance capitalism132. The 
behavioural surplus generated by the labour of the produsumer is its raw 
material, and is subject to predictive algorithmic analysis in order to produce a 
commodity to be sold on the advertising market for profit. The transformation 
of the digital citizen into a series of data points allows a user profile to 
substitute for the real-world individual133, and thus the digital citizen’s 
commodification. In this we become representations of our physical selves; data 
doubles of produsumers that can be computer-mediated and so made visible, 
knowable, and saleable.  
 
Peterson describes how social media transforms users into commodities to be 
sold on the market134 and while, as Bauman observes135, there has long been an 
element of consumer-as-commodity in consumer capitalism136, in surveillance 
capitalism this takes on a different nature. In consumer capitalism, the 
individual may often have to commodify and sell themselves in order to ‘get 
ahead’ (as a prospective employee sending out CVs to employers, for example). 
But, as we saw in Chapter 2137, neo-liberal digital citizenship involves self-
commodification and self-promotion through online identity performance, often 
to gain social approval – curating Facebook profiles to present the self in the 
desired way, or posting carefully-posed selfies in the hope of receiving likes, for 
example. As we’ve seen, in this it is not just the individual selling themselves to 
friends or potential employers according to their own desires, but the 
surveillance capitalism corporation shaping the process of identity performance 
and thus self-commodification according to its desires138. In surveillance 
capitalism this self-commodified individual is combined with the behavioural 
surplus generated through their work as a produsumer, packaged as a data 
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profile, and sold as a commodity to other corporations for profit. While 
television and radio advertising has long relied on the commodification of 
consumers, in the past this took the form of commodifying the audience as a 
whole, or as segments of the whole139. In surveillance capitalism, and while of 
course the digital citizen remains the audience for advertisers, this becomes 
individualised, based on the user’s commodified self and their behavioural 
profile. Rather than segments of consumers as a group being sold as 
commodities to advertisers, the digital citizen as an individual is datafied and 
sold as a commodity to advertisers. This is perhaps the next logical step: first 
the neo-liberal digital citizen turns themselves into a commodity to meet the 
demands of a consumer society whose norms are often dictated by 
corporations140; next the self-commodified digital citizen is made hypervisible 
and knowable through computer mediation; and then they are sold as a 
commodity for profit and subjected to new forms of control. This takes us 
beyond the analysis of Bauman and the consumer society into something new – 
a surveillance capitalism society, in which the corporation monetises our life for 
their profit.   
 
In this, data profiles stand-in and speak for the real individual141, and much of 
this occurs without the knowledge of the digital citizen, who is often neither 
aware that their data doubles are being bought and sold, nor aware of who they 
are being bought and sold by. Through computer mediation in the logic of 
surveillance capitalism the digital citizen is reimagined as a disembodied data 
double with an exchange value like any other commodity142. The process of 
datafying the digital citizen based on their work as a produsumer thus not only 
renders them amenable to the control of algorithmic governmentality, but also 
allows them to be sold on the advertising market for profit. It is this 
commodification – turning the composite of our datafied selves and the 
behavioural surplus that we generate into a commodity to be bought and sold 
on the advertising market – that makes the work of the produsumer truly 
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valuable in surveillance capitalism. So it is on the basis of this commodification 
of the produsumer – which builds on the self-commodification performed by the 
digital citizen as a neo-liberal subject – that we can attempt to determine 




In 2000, Terranova looked at the free labour performed by chat room 
moderators in exchange for services and argued that “free labour is the moment 
where this knowledgeable consumption of culture is translated into productive 
activities that are pleasurably embraced and at the same time often shamelessly 
exploited”143. In a similar way, the digital citizen engaging with the online world 
as a produsumer generates vast quantities of behavioural data through free 
labour in their embrace of the digital, and the surplus produced by this labour is 
exploited through commodification in order to extract profit without their 
financial gain144.  
 
Our generation of behavioural surplus through produsumption – whether in the 
form of productive or consumptive labour – and the vast profits that are derived 
from it through the commodification of the produsumer both occur in such a 
way that many people may be entirely oblivious to the fact that it is happening, 
calling into question whether the average digital citizen is aware of the true 
value of what they’re producing. While it could, therefore, be argued that 
produsumers are to some extent exploited in that the surplus generated by their 
work is collected, commodified, and sold by Google, Facebook, et al. for profit 
without recompense and potentially without their knowledge, we should be 
mindful of Zwick’s issues with Ritzer’s analysis of the prosumer in terms of the 
degree to which exploitation occurs, which he also levels at Fuchs’s claims of 
exploitation and which arguably could also apply to Terranova. While Zwick 
agrees that “exploitation of the productive forces of the individual remains at the 
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center”145, and accepts that “proliferation of prosumer work, and correspondingly 
its exploitation, has been helped along dramatically by the emergence of 
collaborative media, such as Web 2.0”146, that the profits and value of internet 
companies “can be explained by the accumulated labor value of millions of unpaid 
producers”147, and that the “variety of the work done by its users could never be 
accomplished by Facebook itself”148, he makes the point that clearly the users of 
these services receive something in return or else they wouldn’t keep using 
them. The same could be said to an extent with the produsumer. Where the 
prosumer receives in return interaction both with other prosumers and with 
consumers – say, a band who uploads their music to YouTube and can therefore 
gain interaction both with other prosumers (other bands) and consumers (the 
audience) – the produsumer receives in return interaction with other 
produsumers and/or the use of an online service that they may enjoy or find 
useful, enjoyable, or interesting.  
 
However, as Andrejevic argues, exploitation isn’t just about a loss of monetary 
value, but also a loss of control over productive and creative activity149. And if, 
as in Lazzarato’s analysis, it is the informational and cultural content of an 
immaterial commodity that gives it value, then loss of control of the surplus 
stemming from that informational and cultural content, which is generated 
through produsumption, can also be exploitation. So it would perhaps be 
accurate to conclude that in surveillance capitalism the digital citizen takes on a 
new role as a produsumer and is exploited in that they lose control of the 
surplus of their work and it is instead commodified, allowing the digital citizen 
to be sold by for profit without sufficient recompense for their true value – a 
value that these companies have a vested interest in the digital citizen neither 
knowing nor realising. 
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This process of datafication, commodification, and exploitation of the digital 
citizen is just one half of how surveillance capitalism remakes the relationship 
between corporations and the digital citizen. The other, which we come to now, 
lies in the way that this process creates informational asymmetries between the 
corporation and the individual which result in the appropriation of the 
sovereignty of the neo-liberal digital citizen and facilitate their control by 
corporations. 
 
3.2.2 | The Appropriation of Consumer Sovereignty 
 
One of the key reasons put forward in neo-liberal theory for why the free 
market should be unregulated and prioritised is that it mediates transactions 
between sovereign consumers150. The concept of the sovereign consumer leads 
to the active consumer-citizen, expected to freely engage in perpetual choice-
making in pursuit of their own self-interest, as described in Chapter 2. 
Manzerolle and Smeltzer argue that a principal aspect of online consumer 
surveillance is the articulation of consumer sovereignty for two purposes in 
pursuit of commercial interests151 – to better tune production and to help create 
consumer wants and needs. In their view, the sovereignty of the consumer is 
invoked – implicitly or explicitly – in order to justify surveillance of the 
consumer, often in the language of providing choice or of giving the consumer 
what they want. For them, it is important to note that this articulation of 
consumer sovereignty is the result of “the ideological fusion of neoliberal 
capitalism and information society utopianism; a belief that with additional 
information and the progressive powers of ICTs society will function more 
smoothly, equitably, and democratically”152. This remains the case in surveillance 
capitalism, but the pervasive surveillance of online behaviour and subsequent 
predictive algorithmic analysis also creates informational asymmetries between 
the corporation engaged in these practices and the digital consumer-citizen 
engaged in the process of perpetual choice-making in the online environment. 
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Such informational asymmetries, in which the individual is hypervisible and the 
corporation shrouds its activities in algorithmic opacity, allow control to be 
extended over the digital citizen through hypernudging and their behaviour to 
be influenced as desired by the corporation. And these informational 
asymmetries mean that it is not only the digital citizen that is commodified in 
surveillance capitalism. Advertisers gain access to the knowledge required to 
influence the exercise of the social and economic agency of the consumer-citizen 
as the sovereign actor of neo-liberalism, so that sovereignty itself also becomes 
commodified and sold for profit. The three stages of algorithmic 
governmentality as employed in surveillance capitalism therefore mean that 
corporations move beyond merely articulating, or invoking, consumer 
sovereignty in order to justify their practices, although this articulation still 
occurs, to now also appropriating that sovereignty in order to facilitate and 
further those practices for corporate ends. 
 
This appropriation involves presenting the expansion of the online world as 
being an expansion in consumer freedom and choice, while in reality the 
asymmetries of information that exist between the digital citizen and the 
corporation have made the former more amendable to control by the latter than 
ever before. While in neo-liberal theory a flow of information to and from the 
consumer is essential for the functioning of the market153, surveillance 
capitalism requires a flow of information from the individual to the corporation 
(through the gathering and analysis of behavioural data), and from corporation 
to corporation (through the sale of user profiles on the advertising market), but 
not from the corporation to the individual. This manifests both in algorithmic 
opacity, as discussed previously154, and in a general lack of information about 
corporations and their business practices. As a result, while corporations may 
know the most intimate details about an individual’s life and may know how to 
most effectively influence their behaviour155, the individual may know very little 
indeed about the corporation or about how their data is being used. This is often 
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justified on the basis that the corporation needs to ‘listen’ to the consumer in 
order to provide them with their desired product or service156, and while it may 
seem that this is in fact an expression of consumer sovereignty – in that the 
consumer can ‘instruct’ the corporation on how best to meet their desires – the 
informational asymmetry created by this unidirectional flow of information in 
reality undermines the power and therefore the sovereignty of the consumer. 
 
As we have seen, computer mediation of the vast quantities of data gathered 
about an individual consumer renders them visible and knowable to an 
unprecedented degree and allows corporations to predict and influence their 
future behaviour. As well as a flow of information, therefore, surveillance 
capitalism involves a flow of knowledge, therefore a flow of power, and therefore 
a flow of sovereignty, from the consumer to the corporation. Hintz et al observe 
that we are “confronted with the emergence of a new power dynamic; one that is 
premised on an order of ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ between those who provide 
personal data (digital citizens) and those who own, trade, and control it (typically, 
large Internet companies and the state)”157. Far from the flows of information to 
and from the consumer that are essential for the functioning of the market in 
neo-liberal theory, the asymmetry of information inherent to surveillance 
capitalism entrenches the asymmetry of power between the consumer and the 
corporation and facilitates the appropriation of the sovereignty of the 
consumer. 
 
Information is of use primarily in generating knowledge, and when we talk 
about asymmetry of information we should recognise that what we are really 
talking about is an asymmetry of potential knowledge. This manifests not just in 
asymmetry of access to information, but also in asymmetry of the ability to 
productively use this information by turning it into knowledge. Mantelero 
argues that while individuals now have new and varied means to access 
information, the distribution of information is asymmetric in terms of access to 
valuable and reliable data as well as to the ability to make use of it, given that 
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power over information is concentrated in the hands of a few158. Mantelero 
makes the point that even if we had access to behavioural data it is unlikely that 
this would make a significant difference to the power imbalance inherent in 
surveillance capitalism:  
 
“A large amount of data creates knowledge if the holders have the 
adequate interpretation tools to select relevant information, to 
reorganize it, to place the data in a systematic context, and if there 
are people with the skills to define the design of the research and 
give an interpretation to the results generated by Big Data 
analytics”159.  
 
In a similar vein, Innis talked about ‘monopolies of knowledge’160, by which 
power is maintained through the control of knowledge. Heyer and Crowley 
observe that these lead to “inequitable distribution of power and wealth”161. As 
Lightfoot and Wisnieski argue, informational asymmetries are essential in 
maintaining power yet may come with severe consequences for some162. 
Reviewing the economic literature on informational asymmetries, they conclude 
that they are “insidious for both a variety of specific actors and for broader 
society”163, with only a select few benefiting and at great cost to the many, and 
argue that in surveillance the asymmetry of information determines the 
possession of power164. This echoes the argument put forward by Lyon that 
surveillance “usually involves relations of power in which watchers are 
privileged”165. Aside from the fact that corporations generally control the 
platforms that allow them to provide nudges to guide our behaviour, only 
corporations, not consumers, are practicably able to invest in the equipment 
and research needed to properly gather, store, and analyse the large quantities 
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of behavioural data produced by the multitude of digital citizens in the logic of 
algorithmic governmentality, and so only corporations, not consumers, are 
capable of producing knowledge from this information and exerting power and 
control.  
 
Dataveillance, like all surveillance, therefore relies on an asymmetry of 
knowledge in which the watchers hold a privileged position in terms of both 
their access to information and their ability to turn this information into 
knowledge in order to be successful. This imbalance determines that power is 
possessed by the corporation, not the consumer. Remember that in Chapter 2 
we defined power as the capacity to perform a certain act or to bring about a 
change in behaviour, or the performance of certain behaviour, in another. In this 
it is clear that the individual holds little power while the corporation holds a lot 
– in dataveillance, the digital citizen may be to a large extent unaware that their 
personal and behavioural data is being gathered, how it is turned into profit, 
that it is often sold to third parties, or who these third parties are. To take 
Facebook as an example, in truth we know relatively little about its business 
practices and we know even less about its algorithms, but Facebook ‘knows’ 
much about each of its users and is therefore able to attempt to predict and 
influence their future behaviour for profit. Facebook’s knowledge of us is central 
to its power – the most fundamental informational asymmetry of all in 
surveillance capitalism is between the visible and knowable computer mediated 
individual and the invisible and unknowable algorithms that exert control over 
them on behalf of the corporation. Of course, informational asymmetry is not 
new to surveillance capitalism – Akerlof, Spence, and Stiglitz were awarded the 
Nobel Prize in economics in 2001 for their analyses of markets with asymmetric 
information166, for example – but the extent of the asymmetry created by a 
combination of big data, dataveillance, and the global reach of many of these 
corporations is a unique feature of surveillance capitalism. 
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The wealth of information that can be determined about the digital citizen from 
the computer mediation of behavioural data gathered through the surveillance 
of their lives as they move through the digital world allows the individual to be 
known intimately. And the information about what forms of nudges most 
effectively influence a given individual’s behaviour, which is obtained through 
the continual experimentation at the heart of hypernudging in the algorithmic 
governmentality of surveillance capitalism, means that corporations know how 
to most effectively influence their behaviour. Through this, the algorithms of 
surveillance capitalism don’t just seek to optimise what they show us to match 
our wants, but they seek also to optimise us as consumers by influencing what 
we want in the first place by providing nudges to drive behaviour in the way 
desired. Rather than being the active consumer-citizen engaging in a perpetual 
process of choice-making in pursuit of their own self-interest, the choice-
making of the neo-liberal digital citizen exercising agency as a social and 
economic actor is thus directed towards the pursuit of the interests of 
corporations. Surveillance capitalism, then, doesn’t just respond to consumer 
wants – it creates, reinforces, and directs those wants in such a way as to benefit 
corporations. And it is the informational asymmetry between consumer and 
corporation inherent in surveillance capitalism that allows this to happen, thus 
facilitating the appropriation the sovereignty of the consumer. 
 
And we are assumed to be the active consumer-citizen of the neo-liberal ideal 
despite the fact that the informational asymmetry that exists in surveillance 
capitalism strips us of power in this way and reduces consumer sovereignty to 
an artifice. This is because neo-liberalism does not account for asymmetries of 
knowledge or power167, but instead places personal responsibility for individual 
wellbeing firmly with the individual regardless of attenuating circumstances. 
Indeed, this is a central feature of the neo-liberal concept of the role of the 
individual within the state168. As such it becomes our fault if we as digital 
citizens fail to fulfil the role of the sovereign consumer actively making choices 
in our self-interest – if, say, we become knowable and predictable to the extent 
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that corporations can target us with highly persuasive nudges designed to be as 
effective as they can possibly be at influencing how we exercise our agency as a 
social and economic actor so as to direct it in the way that is most profitable for 
corporations. Despite the asymmetries of information that lead to this being 
possible and which lie beyond our control, we as digital citizens are responsible 
for failing to pursue our own self-interest at all opportunities. However, there 
are ways that the digital citizen can go some way towards resisting these 
practices, which we will now move on to discuss. 
 
 
3.3 | Resisting Surveillance Capitalism 
 
As Foucault says, “Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather 
consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to 
power”169. Resistance is a part of the network of power relations that we 
recognise in a governmentality analysis, so if we wish to get a fuller picture of 
surveillance capitalism then it is not enough just to discuss its governmentality 
and the role of the individual as desired by corporations, but we should also talk 
about the ways that it can be resisted. We will do this by discussing how people 
are attempting to engage in small, everyday acts of resistance. Scott describes 
‘everyday resistance’, which involves “tacit de facto gains” as opposed to the 
“formal de jure recognition of those gains” sought by other forms of 
resistance170. Everyday resistance techniques are typically small scale, relatively 
safe, promise material gains, and require little or no formal coordination, but do 
require some degree of cooperation and can become a wider pattern of 
resistance171. The key characteristic of everyday resistance, according to Scott, 
is concealment either of the identity of the resister or of the act of resistance 
itself172. Vinthagen and Johansson, following from Scott, talk of everyday 
resistance as being that which takes the form not of demonstrations, rebellions, 
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or other typically public and collective forms of resistance, but “how people act 
in their everyday lives in ways that might undermine power”173. Much of the 
resistance to surveillance capitalism takes this form, so it is this everyday 
resistance on which we will focus. 
 
A variety of ways have sprung up in which people can engage in everyday 
resistance to the algorithmic governmentality of surveillance capitalism. We will 
look at a two of these in order to illustrate how digital citizens are engaging in 
resistance. The first is the spread of ad-blocking; the second is the ‘do not track’ 
movement. While there are other forms of resistance to surveillance capitalism, 
such as users deleting their accounts, these are in practice quite limited in effect. 
Account deletion does not prevent tracking and surveillance of behaviour – 
Facebook, for example, is known to track even non-users around the internet174, 
and Google’s targeted advertising, based on surveillance, is pervasive even 
beyond Google’s services (provided by DoubleClick, a Google subsidiary). 
Managing privacy settings has, for the most part, been a way for users to protect 
their privacy in relation to other users rather than in relation to the 
corporations who provide the services in question (built-in options for limiting 
surveillance have generally been far more limited, reflecting the fact that 
surveillance is an intrinsic feature of these services). As a result, it is on ad-
blocking and do-not-track – which can potentially bring more tangible gains – 
that we will focus. We will look at these in turn, and will also discuss ways in 
which surveillance capitalism companies have attempted to overcome these 
forms of resistance. 
 
3.3.1 | Ad-blocking 
 
Ad-blocking is perhaps the most prevalent form of resistance to surveillance 
capitalism – as of 2016 an estimated 615 million devices ran some form of ad-
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blocking software175, potentially costing advertising companies up to $27 billion 
globally by 2020 in lost revenue (about 10% of their total revenue)176. 
 
Ad-blocking generally speaking only works on the web, and in most cases only 
on the desktop web (although some mobile browsers with built in ad-blocking, 
such as Samsung’s Android browser177 do exist – it is notable, however, that 
when Samsung first released a browser with ad-blocking capabilities Google 
tried to remove it from the Android Play Store before eventually restoring it178, 
highlighting how Google’s control of the Android platform, by far the dominant 
smartphone platform globally, can be leveraged to suit their ends). The popular 
ad-blocking software AdBlock, for example, works by inserting code into 
websites as they are downloaded which prevents adverts from appearing179. 
This is in theory a stealthy form of resistance, in that, as blocking occurs on the 
user’s computer, websites and ad providers do not know when it is occurring. 
Some websites, however, seek to detect when ad-blocking software is being 
used and to circumvent it or to prevent access to the site, with varying degrees 
of success. To the extent that it is possible, concealment of the act of ad-
blocking, one of the key features of everyday resistance as identified by Scott, is 
therefore vital for the success of ad-blocking software. To this end, researchers 
have developed what they call ‘perceptual ad-blocking’. They claim that this will 
end the ‘arms race’ between ad-blockers and the companies that try to 
circumvent them by employing a number of innovative techniques, including by 
focusing on identifying ads by appearance rather than by trying to spot code in 
websites that may carry them and by borrowing techniques from malicious 
software that seeks to escape detention from anti-virus software and applying 
them to trying to avoid detection by anti-ad-blocking scripts180. Whether their 
claims stand up, of course, remains to be seen. 
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Dataveillance companies have responded to the increasing use of ad-blocking 
software in a number of ways. On mobile platforms they often encourage users 
to install and use their apps rather than accessing services through browsers, as 
within these apps they can provide an environment that is under their control 
and beyond the reach of ad-blockers without system modifications that require 
technical knowledge to implement and often void the device’s warranty. Google, 
Microsoft, and Amazon have also been known to pay the creators of ad-blocking 
software to not block their ads181. And Google has proposed to include its own 
ad-blocker in its Chrome web browser. This may seem like a counter-intuitive 
move by a company that makes the vast majority of its profit through online 
advertising, but the details of Google’s proposal reveal that what it is actually 
trying to do is both protect its business model and strike a decisive blow against 
competitors. 
 
Google’s plan is two-fold – implement an ad-blocker across both desktop and 
mobile that blocks ads from other companies that don’t meet their standards, 
while also restricting access to websites by users of third party ad-blockers 
unless they are willing to pay a fee (a proposal that it calls ‘Funding Choices’)182. 
The internet is by now the most important publishing platform in the world and 
Chrome is the most used web browser in the world, with a market share of 56% 
at the end of 2016183. Google presents this plan as being for the benefit of users 
and publishers, but by creating an advertising platform in which ads provided 
by other companies are blocked unless they meet Google's standards for quality 
while at the same time restricting access to pages that use Google's ads if the 
user tries to block them without paying a fee they are attempting not just to 
break resistance to surveillance capitalism, but also to break competitors who 
don't conform to Google's rules. In this model Google would be both a leading 
player in the advertising market as well as the arbiter of which of its 
competitors’ ads should be shown to users. This plan should therefore be 
understood as nothing less than an audacious attempt to monopolise the 
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principle revenue stream of the most important publishing platform in the 
world. It has already been shown that online ad platforms other than Google 
and Facebook are struggling to compete – between them, Facebook and Google 
accounted for nearly half of global digital ad spending and 77% of digital ad 
revenue growth in 2016184 – and if their plan is successful and Google cements 
its position as the primary way to reliably generate revenue in this way then 
this would give them immense power. In short, they intend to co-opt as-
blocking as resistance in order to more completely monetise the flow of 
information in the modern world and to control access to the resulting flow of 
capital.  
 
3.3.2 | The ‘Do Not Track’ Movement 
 
While ad-blocking primarily seeks to prevent adverts from being shown to a 
user, the do not track (‘DNT’) movement takes a different approach and seeks to 
prevent the tracking of users’ behaviour across the internet in the first place. 
Such tracking allows corporations to build up detailed pictures of user 
behaviour and preferences beyond the confines of their own websites, even 
when users are not logged into those websites. Facebook, for example, 
successfully argued in litigation in the United States that it should be permitted 
to track its users across the internet even after they had logged out as they had 
no reasonable expectation of privacy185. The judge in that case indicated that if 
users intended to keep their behaviour private then they should implement 
some form of DNT, whether through a browser extension or otherwise. DNT is 
itself simultaneously an act of resistance and an act of concealment, as by 
preventing the gathering of behavioural data it seeks to both disrupt the 
practices of surveillance capitalism and to conceal the behaviour of the 
individual. 
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There are various tools that can be used for DNT, including the TrackMeNot186  
and Privacy Badger187 Chrome extensions. Some ad-blockers, such as AdBlock, 
have incorporated DNT into their software188. Alternative web services that do 
not track users have also sprung up, for example the search engine 
DuckDuckGo189 which seeks to provide an alternative to Google without 
tracking user behaviour. Beyond these, Apple announced in September 2017 
that it intends to implement DNT in its Safari browser in the latest versions of 
macOS and iOS, leading to accusations from major advertising companies that 
Apple is sabotaging the economic model of the internet190. However, DNT isn’t 
perfect – French researchers have shown, for example, that even with both ad-
blocking and DNT users can be identified and tracked by combining aspects of 
their browsing (for example, the browser and version that they are using, 
websites that they are logged into, the extensions that they have installed, their 
time zone, their screen resolution, etc.) into a unique digital fingerprint in order 
to circumvent DNT191.  
 
There have been attempts to put DNT on a legal footing, which have inevitably 
faced opposition. In the US, advertising firms have invoked First Amendment 
protections of free speech in order to challenge federal rules that attempt to 
provide for an ‘opt-in’ approach to user-tracking192, and in the same challenge 
Google has argued that web browsing data is not sensitive information that 
should be protected193. Likewise, the Internet Association – whose founding 
members include Google and Facebook – has come out in opposition to a Bill 
introduced to Congress that would provide for opt-in tracking194. And in 2015 
the FCC ruled that websites are permitted to ignore DNT requests sent by 
browsers195. However, in the EU, the European Commission’s working party on 
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data protection strongly recommended making DNT compliance mandatory in 
the proposed ePrivacy Regulation196. Article 10 of the proposed Regulation 
therefore currently requires that web browsers and other software and 
equipment by default offer an option to opt-out of tracking197, and amendments 
to the draft Regulation proposed by the European Parliament’s Committee on 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs seek to make DNT the default setting 
and to ensure a greater degree of user control over tracking where the user 
chooses to permit it198. The law in the US and the EU, therefore, appears to be 
diverging when it comes to recognition of DNT. 
 
While DNT remains an act of everyday resistance, in that it remains a largely 
individual effort to achieve de facto gains, there is, therefore, a move towards 
providing for de jure recognition of a need to provide protections against 
tracking. Through this, it is possible that resistance in this form will become 
more formalised and, perhaps, more effective, although it remains to be seen 
whether and to what extent such moves will be successful. 
 
 
3.4 | Conclusion 
 
ICT, the advent of big data, and associated societal developments have led to 
major changes in the state and in the role that the digital citizen plays within 
that state. Google and Facebook have led the way in developing new business 
models and practices allowing them to take advantage of these changes and 
grow from personal projects in college dorm rooms to become two of the most 
valuable and most profitable companies in the world in less than two decades, 
with a global reach and billions of users, and in doing so to spawn an array of 
other companies that seek to replicate both their practices and their success. 
Zuboff sees in this the emergence of a new form of capitalism, which she calls 
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‘surveillance capitalism’, in which profit derives from the unilateral surveillance 
and modification of human behaviour. 
 
In this chapter, and for the first time, surveillance capitalism has been 
elaborated on and contextualised in relation to key concepts in surveillance 
studies in order to provide a fuller account of how it operates. Beyond this, and 
again for the first time, we have connected the three stages of algorithmic 
governmentality to surveillance capitalism; identified its rationality in the form 
of a departure from the cycles of accumulation of previous forms of capitalism 
and based around the mass surveillance, prediction, and modification of human 
behaviour; and have shown how its technology of power operates by gathering 
data from the digital citizen, predictive algorithmic analysis of this data when 
combined with that of millions of others, and the dynamic, highly personalised 
form of behavioural nudging called hypernudge. And we can recognise that in 
surveillance capitalism the digital citizen takes on a new role, and have 
introduced a new concept to account for this – the produsumer, who is 
commodified and whose labour is exploited in the pursuit of profit. Along the 
way, we have identified the points at which existing analyses of other forms of 
capitalism – primarily that of Marx and of others who build on his work – cannot 
adequately explain either the logic of accumulation of surveillance capitalism or 
the role of the individual within that business model. What we have, then, is a 
new form of capitalism emerging in contemporary ICT-driven societies, which 
requires a new approach. 
 
The development of this new form of capitalism – and this new form of control – 
should be understood in the context of the neo-liberal societies in which it has 
primarily taken place. In surveillance capitalism the sovereignty of the 
individual – in theory the founding principle of neo-liberalism – becomes 
appropriated through informational asymmetries, allowing the agency of the 
digital citizen as a social and economic actor engaged in perpetual choice-
making as a consumer-citizen to be directed in the way desired by corporations 
and facilitating the control of the digital citizen by the powerful behaviour 
prediction and modification tools of algorithmic governmentality. The self-
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commodification of the digital citizen in neo-liberal society forms part of and 
facilitates their commodification as a data profile to be bought and sold in 
surveillance capitalism. And through pervasive surveillance, every social and 
economic interaction within the reach of surveillance capitalism becomes 
behavioural data to also be commodified and bought and sold on the advertising 
market, empowering the already powerful and enriching the already wealthy at 
the expense of the rest. As modern life becomes increasingly digital, surveillance 
capitalism’s voracious appetite for data from which to derive profit and its 
resulting desire to bring as much of human behaviour within its remit means 
that modern life also becomes increasingly datafied and commodified. 
Surveillance capitalism therefore represents the commodification of everyday 
life itself within the marketised neo-liberal state. The neo-liberal form of both 
contemporary society and contemporary digital citizenship thus facilitates 
control according to the rationality of this new variety of capitalism.  
 
In the next chapter we will see how the collection and storage of vast quantities 
of data in surveillance capitalism is taken advantage of by the State as it seeks to 
extend its control over the new online world, demonstrating how not just the 
functioning of the public and private are increasingly intertwined and 
overlapping in the digital, but also how the forms of control to which the digital 
citizen is subjected in the online modern world are intertwined and 
overlapping. 
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Chapter 4 | The Digital Panopticon: State 
Surveillance in the Online World  
 
 
In the preceding chapters we saw how the spread of ICT and the neo-liberal 
nature of digital engagement has opened the individual up to new forms of 
dataveillance-based control as corporations seek the commodification of life in 
pursuit of profit. In this chapter we will see how the State has taken advantage 
of technological developments and this role as a digital citizen, as well as of the 
surveillance apparatus of surveillance capitalism, in order to implement its own 
dataveillance-based forms of control so as to uphold the existing order in the 
name of security, and in doing so has fundamentally remade the relationship 
between the digital citizen and the State. 
 
In May 2013 the existence of global online surveillance networks operated by 
the NSA in the US and GCHQ in the UK was revealed as a result of the deliberate 
leaking of classified information by former CIA employee and NSA contractor 
Edward Snowden1. Snowden was motivated primarily by a desire to make 
public what he considered to be abuses of power2. There are a range of legal, 
privacy, and democratic concerns raised by this kind of surveillance. While 
some aspects of the NSA’s activities, for example, have legal authorisation under 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 2001, much of what the NSA has been 
engaged in may not3 and aspects of GCHQ’s operations have subsequently been 
found to be unlawful4.  
 
In the US, the NSA operated the PRISM programme, among others, and, in the 
UK, GCHQ operated Tempora, primarily, and others5. That security and 
                                                          
1 Greenwald and MacAskill, 07/06/2013; Gellman and Poitras, 2013; Landau, 2013 
2 MacAskill, 10/06/2013 
3 Bajaj, 2014, pp.583 
4 Liberty v Foreign Secretary and others [2015] UKIPTrib 13_77-H; Privacy International v Foreign 
Secretary and others [2016] UKIPTrib 15_110-CH, Tele2 Sverige AB v Post-och telestyrelsen, Secretary 
of State for the Home Department v Tom Watson and others [2017] 2 WLR 1289  
5 Bauman et al, 2014, p.122 
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intelligence agencies (‘SIAs’) engage in extensive surveillance of the internet has 
long been known, and there have for some time been legal regimes in place to 
allow for such surveillance to an extent. But the programmes revealed by 
Snowden were of such sophistication, scale, and reach that they surprised even 
seasoned observers6 (it has been suggested that even those who work for other 
SIAs were surprised at the extent of the NSA and GCHQ’s activities7). It was 
immediately obvious that the details of these programmes involved, as Bauman 
et al put it,  
 
“significant transgressions of established understandings of the 
character and legitimacy of those institutions concerned with 
security and intelligence operations … some revelations seem to 
confirm long-term transformations in the politics of states … and in 
the institutions and norms established in relation to democratic 
procedures, the rule of law, [and] relations between state and civil 
society”8.  
 
In short, the surveillance programmes that have been secretly put in place to 
monitor the digital world that digital citizens have been encouraged to take part 
in constitute a serious and significant break from preciously accepted societal, 
political, and legal norms, and they raise concerns about fundamental legal 
principles including the presumption of innocence and freedom of expression.  
 
As long ago as 1995 Stephen Gill argued that attempts to embed a more 
systematic form of neo-liberal discipline and surveillance were growing9, and he 
warned that as technology became more sophisticated it would increasingly be 
used to surveil and impose social control in order to reduce the individual to a 
pliant, obedient subject of the neo-liberal state10. The explosive growth since 
then in the use and sophistication of ICT has allowed the State to adopt 
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surveillance measures that would otherwise have been impossible both in 
extent and in reach. The programmes operated by SIAs move this surveillance 
from something targeted against suspected criminals or terrorists, to something 
that is exercised over whole populations and, indeed, the whole planet11.  
 
In this chapter we will first describe the surveillance programmes revealed by 
Snowden and show how they form a digital panopticon with a new technology 
of power of algorithmic panoptic uncertainty, and will link these with the 
practices of surveillance capitalism; then we will look at what this means for the 
digital citizen in terms of their relationship with the state through the 
fundamental norms of the presumption of innocence and the right to freedom of 
expression; and finally we will discuss the security rationality behind these 
practices. In all, we will identify the governmentality of the digital panopticon, 
facilitated by ICT, which seeks to translate rationalities of security into reality 
and maintain the neo-liberal order. 
 
 
4.1 | The Digital Panopticon 
 
We will first look at how GCHQ and the NSA’s programmes operate in practice 
and will then identify them as constructing a digital panopticon in which the 
digital citizen is permanently observable and, therefore, amenable to control. 
 
4.1.1 | Surveillance in Action 
 
There are two primary ways by which online surveillance is undertaken in the 
NSA and GCHQ programs – the first being Xkeyscore and similar systems 
involving the bulk interception of communications, and the second being PRISM 
and similar programs involving the acquisition of data from surveillance 
capitalism and communications companies as well as equipment interference. 
We will deal with each of these in turn. 
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The first is bulk interception through Xkeyscore and similar systems12. This 
involves the placing of interceptors on the data cables that connect countries 
and continents and the collection of the vast quantities of both content and, 
crucially, metadata that pass through them. Metadata is the ‘who’, ‘when’, 
‘where’, and ‘for how long’ of data rather than the content of a communication 
itself – a common analogy is that metadata is the envelope rather than the letter, 
which is content. It has been pointed out13 that metadata can provide more 
information and more readily analysed data on someone than content:  
 
“Law enforcement and intelligence officials … prefer metadata, not 
just [for] how revealing it is in an individual case, but because they 
can use their powerful analytic tools. They can mine metadata in a 
way that they really can't content. People can disguise what they're 
talking about when they're having conversations with each other, 
but metadata doesn't lie. Metadata says who contacted who, when 
and for how long”14  
 
According to former NSA General Counsel Stuart Baker, “Metadata absolutely 
tells you everything about somebody's life. If you have enough metadata you don't 
really need content"15.  
 
Xkeyscore is the most technologically advanced aspect of the NSA and GCHQ’s 
surveillance. Other programmes funnel data to Xkeyscore implementations, and 
the system is used by all members of the ‘Five Eyes’ group of countries (the UK, 
USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, who since 1946 have agreed to share 
intelligence and cooperate in surveillance). Xkeyscore allows for the collection 
                                                          
12 A redacted NSA presentation detailing how to use Xkeyscore is available via the Guardian at 
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of content and metadata and the real time searching of this data by analysists16, 
allowing communications to be monitored as they are happening. This is used to 
find out what a given target is doing online at any given point in time17. The 
British implementation of Xkeyscore, codenamed Tempora, is alone reported to 
involve over 200 interceptors on the internet backbone cables running from the 
British Isles to the rest of the world18, and UK telecommunications operators 
including BT and Vodafone are reported to have given GCHQ access to their 
cables19. Tempora is the biggest contributor to pooled content and metadata 
repositories held by the Five Eyes, and is estimated to be bigger than all other 
implementations of Xkeyscore combined20.  
 
As bulk interception of this kind involves all data, regardless of source or 
destination, the distinction between monitoring the communication of a State’s 
own citizens and of foreign nationals is lost21. Instead, everyone is rendered 
visible and potentially under suspicion22, casting doubt on claims made three 
months before the Snowden leak by the US Director of National Intelligence, 
who testified to the US Senate that the NSA had not knowingly collected any 
data on American citizens23. The fact that all data is collected also means that 
legal safeguards intended to limit the ability of SIAs to conduct mass 
surveillance of British citizens in the UK are undermined. While the Regulation 
of Investigatory Powers Act (‘RIPA’) states that internal warrants (for bulk 
interception of communications entirely within the UK) must be targeted at a 
specific address or a specific person, external warrants (for interception of 
communications coming to or leaving the UK) are not subject to this 
limitation24. The Investigatory Powers Act (‘IPA’), which will replace RIPA, 
permits bulk communications interception for what it calls “overseas-related 
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18 Bauman et al, 2014, p.122 
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communications”25, which, like external warrants, apply to communications 
coming to or leaving the UK26. Since a large proportion of internet traffic will be 
going to or coming from servers located outside the UK, most online activity by 
users located in the UK could be caught by an external warrant under RIPA or a 
bulk interception warrant under IPA and thus would come within the reach of 
Tempora. 
 
External warrants under RIPA are issued by the Home Secretary upon request 
from SIAs without requiring judicial approval27, but bulk interception warrants 
under IPA do require the approval of a Judicial Commissioner28 (the Judicial 
Commissioners are a team of current or former judges led by an Investigatory 
Powers Commissioner and appointed by the Prime Minister to oversee the 
exercise of surveillance powers under IPA29). As with most of these 
programmes, the legality of Tempora is contested. While the Investigatory 
Powers Tribunal (‘IPT’) has found that the use of RIPA external warrants for 
similar purposes is lawful30, the European Court of Human Rights is considering 
a case brought by Big Brother Watch and others, who contend that Tempora, as 
authorised under RIPA, is incompatible with Article 8 ECHR31.  
 
Unrelated to Xkeyscore, police and SIAs also obtain phone calls, text messages, 
and other video and audio communications by intercepting mobile phone 
communications with a man-in-the-middle attack32. Police and SIAs in the US33 
and in the UK use ‘Stingray’ devices that enable them to set up a dragnet to catch 
nearby mobile communications by simultaneously impersonating cell towers of 
up to four networks across the full 2G/3G/4G spectrum. Stingrays, more 
properly known as IMSI catchers, allow them to track mobile devices and to 
access content and metadata transmitted by all devices that unwittingly connect 
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to the fake cell tower, whether the operator of the device is suspected of an 
offence or not. UK police forces that appear to own Stingray (or Stingray-like) 
devices include the Metropolitan Police, West Midlands Police, Avon and 
Somerset Constabulary, West Mercia Police, Warwickshire Police, Staffordshire 
Police, and possibly others34. Journalistic investigations have detected that they 
are used in at least 20 locations in London35, including at the Palace of 
Westminster36. The strength of the legal basis for the use of Stingray devices by 
police forces in the UK, which is claimed by the Government to be authorised 





The second approach taken is the PRISM programme, and similar. This involves 
accessing data held by technology companies and telecommunications 
operators, as well as systematically weakening encryption standards and 
installing backdoors in networking equipment so as to facilitate acquisition. 
This data is then fed into over 500 data repositories distributed in 
approximately 150 locations around the world40 and again allows for real time 
searching of this data by analysts using Xkeyscore’s systems and collation and 




PRISM, in part, involves regularly forcing surveillance capitalism corporations 
to provide personal and behavioural user data to the NSA without the 
knowledge or consent of users41. As users provide data to the corporations who 
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38 Police Act 1997 
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40 http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jul/31/nsa-xkeyscore-program-full-
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subsequently provide this data to intelligence agencies they are unwittingly 
complicit in their own surveillance. We have seen already42 that surveillance 
capitalism involves datafying and commodifying the digital citizen in order to 
sell them as data profiles on the advertising market and generate profit, and this 
data is also of interest to SIAs as they seek to exercise control over populations. 
And not only are surveillance capitalism corporations providing their data to 
SIAs, but as users of their services digital citizens make the SIAs’ job easier by 
delineating themselves into groups of shared interests and shared connections. 
In effect, they perform the first sorting of intelligence data themselves: 
 
“The clustering of groups who like the same music or movies or 
sports is achieved by the users themselves, before the work … of 
splitting them up using algorithms begins. Social media continue to 
be hugely popular, and while they can be a potent means of shaping 
political opinion and protest, they also provide the raw materials of 
data for both corporations and, as Snowden has shown us, police 
and intelligence agencies.”43 
 
Various legal powers in both the US and the UK underpin this. According to 
court documents, Yahoo attempted to fight NSA demands for data but was 
threatened with a $250,000 per day fine if it did not comply, with the fine 
doubling every week that non-compliance continued44. In the US, the Supreme 
Court has ruled that disclosure of an individual’s data by a corporation that 
holds it to a third party is not protected by the Fourth Amendment45 – this 
doctrine is widely criticised46. In the UK, IPA provides for warrants allowing 
SIAs to obtain personal data, including sensitive personal data, in bulk from 
third parties47. While it has been public knowledge that the NSA acquired data 
from technology companies, the use of bulk personal data acquisition powers by 
UK SIAs authorised under previous legislation was only admitted to in March 
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201548 (the IPT ruled that these powers did not comply with ECHR prior to 
being admitted to, but did comply once their existence was known49). And 
documents released to Privacy International in September 2017 as part of 
proceedings brought by them before the IPT revealed that GCHQ has been 
acquiring personal data in bulk from social media companies, with the 
Investigatory Powers Commissioner apparently unaware that this was taking 
place50. Under a proposed agreement between the US and the UK, US-based 
technology companies would be obliged to provide data to UK SIAs51. 
 
IPA also provides for the systematic retention of bulk communications data52 
(i.e. metadata, rather than content) by ISPs, including mobile operators, with 
retained data on specific individuals to be provided to certain public authorities 
– including police and SIAs – upon request53. The data to potentially be retained 
is wide-ranging54, and includes, for a home broadband connection, as well as the 
hostname of each website that a user has visited (the hostname is the address of 
the website visited rather than the address of the specific webpage on the 
website visited – e.g. ‘www.example.com’ rather than 
‘www.example.com/index.html’), 17 different items for every single data 
communication covered by a retention notice including, inter alia, the name, 
address, and phone number of the customer holding the account with the ISP; 
email addresses linked to the account; bank account information used to pay for 
and billing information relating to the account; the username and password for 
the account; and a variety of technical details that would enable the 
identification of the specific devices involved. For a mobile connection, network 
providers may also be required to retain information identifying the 
geographical location of the device including network maps and details of the 
network masts that the device is connected to. This aspect of IPA, which is 
popularly known as the ‘snooper’s charter’ and which replaces powers under 
                                                          
48 Privacy International [2016] UKIPTrib 15_110-CH at [13] 
49 Privacy International [2016] UKIPTrib 15_110-CH at [101] 
50 Privacy International, 2017 
51 Murgia, 2017 
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54 Joint Committee, HL 93/HC 651, pp.515-517 
The Digital Panopticon: State Surveillance in the Online World | Chapter 4 
  
 
Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 135 
  
earlier legislation that were found to be incompatible with EU law55, also 
appears to itself be incompatible with EU law56. IPA further gives British SIAs 
the power to require that UK telecommunications operators – including ISPs, 
telephone companies, and mobile phone networks – provide communications 
data to them in bulk upon request57, rather than in relation to specific 





As part of PRISM, the NSA has also engaged in a systematic assault on 
encryption standards, and collected content and metadata directly from 
backdoors in network equipment. In this, they have infiltrated standards-setting 
bodies so as to weaken standards and installed backdoors in firewalls, hard 
drives, network infrastructure, and encryption products in order to facilitate 
their access to networks and devices60. Data acquired this way is fed into other 
systems including Xkeyscore. The NSA’s Bullrun programme, part of PRISM, 
aims to break encryption and allow the NSA access to data encrypted using 
protocols such as HTTPS, voice-over-IP, and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), which 
are used to protect online shopping, banking, and business, among many other 
things. According to Schneier, “By deliberately undermining online security in a 
short-sighted effort to eavesdrop, the NSA is undermining the very fabric of the 
internet”61. In 2016 a set of exploit tools apparently originating inside the NSA 
appeared for sale on the dark net, seemingly having been accessed and then 
copied by hackers62. A further set of tools, released by the same group and again 
apparently originating inside the NSA, appeared on the dark net in 201763 and 
                                                          
55 Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009; Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 
56 See Chapter 6.3 for a full analysis of the compatibility of communications data retention and 
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61 Ball et al, 2013 
62 Groll, 15/08/2016 
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was used in an attack across 74 countries which severely impacted the NHS in 
May 201764. As Green points out,  
 
“The danger of these exploits is that they can be used to target 
anyone who is using a vulnerable router … So the risk is twofold: 
first, that the person or persons who stole this information might 
have used them against [the United States] … And now that the 
exploits have been released, we run the risk that ordinary criminals 
will use them against corporate targets”65.  
 
In the UK, IPA provides for warrants to conduct bulk equipment interference66  
for overseas-related communications67. These warrants are new to IPA, with 
bulk equipment interference having not previously been undertaken by any of 
the UK SIAs68, and have been described as “bulk hacking” by the Open Rights 
Group69. They would allow security and intelligence agencies to be granted a 
warrant to access content and metadata from “any equipment”70, without 
restriction71, in order to determine whether anything suspicious has occurred. 
According to the Government these powers can be used speculatively to access 
all devices in a particular area so as to identify potential targets of interest72. 
IPA also provides that technology companies can be required to maintain the 
technical capability to lift encryption on communications and stored data where 
requested or to provide a backdoor to SIAs, provided the Government issues 
regulations fleshing out the legal framework for this73. The Government has 
consulted on regulations74, signalling its intention to use this power, and in the 
wake of terrorist attacks in the UK during 2017 has repeatedly indicated that it 
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wants messaging services like WhatsApp, which uses end-to-end encryption, to 
implement backdoors so that the SIAs can access content75. 
 
Police in the UK are also known to have been downloading data from people’s 
phones – including call records, text messages, and contact lists, as well as any 
other data stored on the phone – when they have been stopped for questioning 
under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and sending it to GCHQ as part of a 
programme called Phantom Parrot76.  
 
The Black Hole 
 
Much of GCHQ and the NSA’s collected data flows into the Black Hole 
repository77, which is at the heart of GCHQ’s surveillance and from which 
GCHQ’s Karma Police programme draws its data. In operation since at least 
2009, Karma Police creates a profile of the browsing habits of every visible user 
on the internet without any distinction as to nationality and without any 
apparent oversight78. GCHQ themselves describe Black Hole as the world’s 
biggest data mining programme79, and by 2012 it was collecting over 50 billion 
records every day80. The operation of the Karma Police system in processing 
Black Hole data is summarised as follows: 
 
“One system builds profiles showing people’s web browsing 
histories. Another analyzes instant messenger communications, 
emails, Skype calls, text messages, cellphone locations, and social 
media interactions. Separate programs were built to keep tabs on 
‘suspicious’ Google searches and usage of Google Maps”81 
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Using the Mutant Broth system, GCHQ analysts can input an unidentified user’s 
IP address and return identifying information including email addresses, 
usernames, and passwords from Black Hole (likewise a known individual’s 
email address can be inputted to return their last known IP address)82. GCHQ 
also has a related system called Samuel Pepys, which provides a “near real-time 
diarisation” of communication and web browsing traffic linked to a particular IP 
address and which is used to find out “what is my target doing online right 
now?”83. The sophistication and extent of bulk content and metadata collection 
and collation and tracking of the activities of such a large number of people 
undertaken by GCHQ and the NSA would have been inconceivable in the pre-
digital era. 
 
4.1.2 | Constructing the Panopticon 
 
The panopticon was a plan for a prison put forward by the philosopher Jeremy 
Bentham in the 1790s, purporting to be a liberal reforming institution, in line 
with Bentham’s broader philosophy, which would remake prisoners as better 
citizens. Although it was never constructed, the principles applied in the 
panopticon have been of great significance in studies of power, control, and 
surveillance – Foucault described it as “the diagram of a mechanism of power 
reduced to its ideal form”84, writing that “whenever one is dealing with a 
multiplicity of individuals on whom a task or a particular form of behaviour must 
be imposed, the panoptic schema may be used”85.  
 
At the heart of the panopticon is visibility86. As Foucault wrote, in the 
panopticon “visibility is a trap”87. Cells would be arranged in a circular fashion 
around a central observation tower, with the sides facing the tower covered in 
bars but no wall, and all prisoners and all of their actions would be visible in 
                                                          
82 Gallagher, 2015 
83 https://theintercept.com/gchq-appendix/ 
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85 Foucault, 1991, p.205 
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their cells to the guards in the tower and could therefore be observed at any 
time. However, the guards, ensconced in the tower and hidden behind blinds, 
would themselves be invisible to the prisoners. All prisoners could be watched 
at any time, but they would go about their business without ever knowing for 
sure whether the guards were watching them in particular or not. As Foucault 
puts it, the prisoner is totally seen but never sees88: “he is the object of 
information, but never a subject in communication”89. In this, the crowd of 
prisoners is abolished and replaced by a collection of separated individuals who 
can be numbered and supervised90. It would not be necessary to constantly 
observe all prisoners – the “asymmetrical gaze”91 creates what we could call 
‘panoptic uncertainty’, the knowledge that at any point in time you could be 
being watched and the uncertainty of never knowing for sure whether you are 
or not.  
 
Uncertainty is, in theory, enough to regulate behaviour and is key to the 
effectiveness of the panopticon92. Bentham felt that “Punishment, even in its most 
hideous forms, loses its odious character, when bereft of that uncertainty”93. 
Utilising uncertainty to exert control is his true innovation94 and the primary 
control mechanism of panoptic forms of surveillance. As Foucault puts it, “the 
major effect of the Panopticon [is] to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and 
permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power”95. Harold 
Innis talked about ‘monopolies of knowledge’96, by which power is maintained 
through the control of knowledge, and Heyer and Crowley observe that these 
lead to “inequitable distribution of power and wealth”97. This imbalance of 
knowledge created by the imbalance of visibility leads to an imbalance of power 
between the watched and the watcher inherent in all surveillance, but it is 
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through the internet and surveillance of our everyday online lives that this 
imbalance is writ large.  
 
And the digital panopticon adds an extra dimension – not only can we not know 
when we are being watched, we also can’t know how we are being watched. 
Where in Bentham’s panopticon prisoners knew that they could be watched 
from the central tower, algorithmic opacity means that the tools by which SIAs 
make sense and use of the vast quantities of surveillance data available to them 
are hidden in black boxes, invisible and unknowable to those subject to their 
control. And just as it is impossible to know how these systems operate, it is also 
impossible to know what information about any given individual has been or 
could be inferred or predicted by algorithmic analysis, whether by surveillance 
capitalism corporations before they pass data to SIAs or by the SIAs themselves. 
By informating, smart machines turn informer, betraying the details of selves 
and lives to those who seek panoptic control. In our governmentality analysis 
we can locate this new algorithmic panoptic uncertainty - distinguished from 
previous forms of panoptic uncertainty in that algorithmic opacity and the 
power of predictive analytics elevates the imbalance of knowledge between the 
watched the watcher to a new level – as a technology of power that seeks to 
render the watched amenable to the control of the watcher according to the 
rationality being pursued. 
 
In the digital world surveillance no longer needs to be undertaken up close. 
With the internet and other modern forms of communication such as mobile 
phones it can be done at any distance, and far more data about the individual 
can be obtained than ever before. In large part this is because the nature of 
communication devices themselves has changed – mobile and smart phones can 
disclose far more personal and communications data than stationary phones 
ever could, for example98. But the fact that surveillance capitalism corporations 
also provide to SIAs the personal and behavioural data that they have obtained 
through consumer surveillance demonstrates that while it might seem that the 
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panspectric surveillance undertaken by corporations and discussed in Chapter 3 
and the panoptic surveillance undertaken by the State and discussed here are 
discrete regimes, they are in fact linked. While they exert control over the 
individual in different ways, in pursuit of different goals, and with different 
effects, consumer surveillance feeds into State surveillance. The extensive 
dataveillance apparatus of surveillance capitalism, making use of algorithmic 
governmentality to control the digital citizen as a social and economic actor in 
pursuit of commercial rationalities, is thus brought within the reach of the State 
in the digital panopticon, and expansions in the extent of consumer surveillance 
represent commensurate expansions in the extent of State surveillance. This 
may have major implications as IoT devices feeding data back to corporate 
databases become the norm and as cameras as microphones become embedded 
in an increasing number of every day devices, thereby creating not just an 
internet of things but an internet of eyes and ears, and the temptation for the 
State to bring this data even further within its control will grow. 
 
In our analysis we can recognise the digital panopticon as a governmentality, 
involving the technology of power of algorithmic panoptic uncertainty and 
seeking to exert control over the digital citizen. As we know from Chapter 2, 
every governmentality involves three elements – a rationality, a technology of 
power, and a subject. We will move on now to discuss the effect of this 
governmentality on its subject – the digital citizen – and their relationship with 




4.2 | The Digital Citizen in the Digital Panopticon 
 
The digital panopticon is, of course, not the first time that a State has 
undertaken mass surveillance of its population, but in the governmentality of 
the digital panopticon the State no longer requires the citizen to be an active 
participant in that surveillance. The digital citizen instead takes on a passive 
role, while work that was once done by people is increasingly done by machines 
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that watch and listen, that record and transmit, and that predict and inform. The 
Stasi, for example, had perhaps the most notorious State surveillance regime of 
all and compiled extensive records on many East Germans, but this relied on the 
co-operation of the public in divulging information and reporting their peers, 
and required huge numbers of staff. The Stasi employed 100,000 of East 
Germany’s 16 million people, and up to another 200,000 were used as ‘informal 
collaborators’ by 198999. It therefore relied, directly or indirectly, on up to 
300,000 people feeding it information and analysing that information. This 
would be equivalent to the NSA employing more than 6 million Americans – it is 
estimated to employ around 100,000100, yet processes orders of magnitude 
more data.  The Stasi also faced a significant problem – how to organise, store, 
and make use of such large quantities of information held in paper records.  
 
The digital panopticon avoids both of these problems – data can be 
systematically collected, sorted, and accessed without relying on the active co-
operation of the public, and algorithmic systems allow intelligence analysts to 
look up virtually any individual at will in real time. The NSA said in 2013 that it 
‘touches’ 29 petabytes of global data every day101 and, while even with modern 
computing power it struggles to process all of it102, its job is much easier than 
that of the Stasi. While the Stasi had 10,000 operatives dedicated to transcribing 
telephone conversations, now, as Kadidal points out, an array of smartphones 
could do the same task103. Foucault felt that the panopticon “makes it possible to 
perfect the exercise of power … because it can reduce the number of those who 
exercise it, while increasing the number of people on whom it is exercised”104, and 
when panoptic uncertainty is combined with big data and predictive analytics to 
create algorithmic panoptic uncertainty this is amplified to an unprecedented 
degree. This new passive role removes the digital citizen from this aspect of the 
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cycling of power through the differentiated polity of the neo-liberal state. Where 
before an army of informers was required to track, record, and feed data back to 
the State, now behaviour is tracked and recorded by devices as people go about 
their day-to-day lives and algorithmic analysis reveals otherwise unknown 
information about the individual. Rather than playing a role in the cycling of 
power as active participants in surveillance, the population is now reduced to 
pliant subjects of that power. 
 
While the digital panopticon does not signal a move to the kind of totalitarian 
police state seen in some countries where mass surveillance is employed in 
order to uphold an autocratic or dictatorial regime, it does raise important 
questions about the nature of surveillance and the role of the individual in a free 
and democratic society. Bell et al note that the State sees the acquisition of our 
data as its right, and citizens open to punishment for resisting105. Ultimately 
there is a tension between the concept of the sovereign individual free to pursue 
their own self-interest as they see fit without State interference in their rights 
and liberties – which in theory lies at the heart of neo-liberal society – and the 
role of the State in protecting security and society. As Bauman et al point out, 
this tension is often depoliticised by reference to the ‘need’ to strike a ‘balance’ 
between liberty and security106, often by those who wish to resolve the tension 
in favour of security, but the decisions to circumscribe liberty in pursuit of 
security and to what extent to do so, while perhaps desirable and 
understandable to a degree given the very real threats faced by western 
societies, are in fact political choices made in pursuit of certain rationalities. In 
the view of Ball et al, “talk of balance between ‘security’ and ‘liberty’ is highly 
misleading … liberty is an integral component of what makes security for citizens. 
Without liberty there is no citizenship, and there is only insecurity. Security is not 
a trump card”107.  
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The digital panopticon resolves this tension in favour of security in a way that 
challenges norms of democratic citizenship in relation to the presumption of 
innocence and freedom of expression, and ultimately may undermine the health 
of democracy itself. Murakami Wood argues that “We exist in a society of a kind 
of tacit social contract where we expect to be free and to have those freedoms 
protected and the main reason for security is to protect our rights to go about our 
daily business unhindered. Where that protection starts to remove those freedoms 
themselves, I think that tacit contract is challenged”108. Foucault wrote that 
through the control mechanism of uncertainty those within the panopticon are 
“caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers”, that 
they “assume responsibility for the constraints of power”109 becoming “the 
principle of [their] own subjection”110. The digital panopticon allows power to 
increase its points of contact111, and it is in these points of contact that 
government, as a power interaction that seeks influence an individual’s 
behaviour according to particular rationality, takes place. Through this, 
citizenship is remade by the technology of power of the digital panopticon, with 
the digital citizen rendered as a potential criminal, a constantly observed object 
of suspicion, while fundamental principles of a free and democratic society that 
exist for the benefit of the citizen are eroded. 
 
4.2.1 | Eroding the Presumption of Innocence 
 
The House of Lords Constitution Committee published a report on surveillance 
and the citizen in 2009, long before the true extent of mass electronic 
surveillance was known. The report said that that mass surveillance threatened 
to undermine basic tenets of the relationship between the citizen and the State, 
including that it could undermine trust in the State112. In Norris’s view, in giving 
evidence to that Committee, mass surveillance doesn’t just undermine trust in 
the State, but “promotes the view … that everybody is untrustworthy. If we are 
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gathering data on people all the time on the basis that they may do something 
wrong, this is promoting a view that as citizens we cannot be trusted”113. It should 
be remembered that Bentham’s original panopticon was conceived of as a 
liberal reforming institution, in which those subject to its control had already 
been convicted of a crime and were to be made up as better citizens. In the 
digital panopticon, the trust that may be thought to exist between the State and 
its citizens is replaced with undue suspicion between the State and the citizen 
cast as a potential criminal, undermining the presumption of innocence. 
 
Some argue that surveillance of this nature threatens to overturn the 
presumption of innocence, the fundamental norm upon which criminal justice in 
a democratic society is based – the “golden thread”114 that runs through criminal 
law. While Weigand115 says that there is only one presumption of innocence, 
that which exists after a criminal charge, there are competing strands of thought 
on what the presumption of innocence entails. Hadjimatheou observes that the 
presumption of innocence goes beyond a narrow procedural guarantee and that, 
in actuality, as it is understood in wider society it includes “a right not to be 
treated as criminally suspicious unless one has done something to warrant such 
suspicion”116. She refers to this as a ‘wrongful criminalisation’ view of the 
presumption of innocence117. An alternative view is what Duff calls ‘civic 
trust’118, involving a link between trust and the presumption of innocence in 
which the citizen should be trusted by the State to not be a criminal, which is 
supported by Milaj and Bonnici119 and reflects Norris’s view. The presumption 
of innocence in this sense is both a legal presumption – the procedural 
guarantee – and a moral presumption based on trust.  
 
What unites Hadjimatheou and Duff is that while they take quite different 
theoretical approaches they both ultimately focus on what the presumption of 
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innocence means in terms of what the State should not do – i.e. that it should not 
actively distrust citizens, for Duff’s part, and that it should not wrongfully 
criminalise citizens, for Hadjimatheou’s – rather than on the presumption as a 
strictly procedural guarantee. It is in this broader view of what the State should 
not do vis a vis the citizen, more fully reflecting the relationship between all 
individuals and the State, rather than just those who have been charged with an 
offence, that we should consider whether or not the digital panopticon 
undermines the presumption of innocence, as it is in this broader sense that the 
individual may understand their role within society, the nature of criminality, 
and their relationship with the State120. The key element in this broader sense of 
the presumption of innocence, which can be seen across both Hadjimatheou’s 
and Duff’s conceptions, is freedom from undue suspicion. A view of the 
presumption of innocence based on undue suspicion has received some 
tentative judicial support, with the European Court of Human Rights, while not 
going quite as far as either Hadjimatheou or Duff, agreeing in obiter that the 
retention of DNA samples of those who had been arrested on suspicion of a 
crime but not convicted contributed to a “perception that they are not being 
treated as innocent” in that “their data are retained indefinitely in the same way 
as the data of convicted persons”121.  
 
Compare this with the digital panopticon, where it is not just those who have 
been arrested but not convicted who have their data stored in the same way as 
those who have been convicted – it is everyone who participates in the digital 
world. Mass online surveillance, as the CJEU observed,  
 
“affects all persons using electronic communication services, even 
though those persons are not, even indirectly, in a situation that is 
liable to give rise to criminal proceedings. It therefore applies even 
to persons for whom there is no evidence capable of suggesting that 
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their conduct might have a link, even an indirect or remote one, 
with serious criminal offences”122 
 
The digital panopticon can be seen to extend the ‘perception that they are not 
being treated as innocent’, the undue suspicion, to include everyone who comes 
within its reach. Indeed, the Romanian Constitutional Court found that 
Romania’s mass electronic surveillance regime  
 
“equally addresses all the law subjects, regardless of whether they 
have committed penal crimes or not or whether they are the subject 
of a penal investigation or not, which is likely to overturn the 
presumption of innocence and to transform a priori all users of 
electronic communication services or public communication 
networks into people susceptible of committing terrorism crimes or 
other serious crimes”123  
 
If we accept that the presumption of innocence is a broader principle than often 
assumed, encompassing the right to not be treated with undue suspicion, then it 
is clear that the digital panopticon does not sit easily with it. As Milaj and 
Bonnici put it, “In the logic of mass surveillance programmes we can all 
potentially be involved in some criminal activities; we are all therefore general 
suspects”124. 
 
Milaj and Bonnici further argue that even if the more narrow procedural 
conception of the presumption of innocence supported by Weigand is preferred 
then mass surveillance still erodes the effectiveness of that procedural 
guarantee. They say that the post-charge use of apparently irrefutable 
surveillance evidence gathered when the accused was not a suspect de facto 
overturns the burden of proof in criminal proceedings, placing the burden on 
the accused – who, due to the imbalance of knowledge between the individual 
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and the State inherent in surveillance, is unaware of the precise nature of what 
all the prosecution knows about their private life – to find some way to prove 
from the moment of arrest that the evidence to be presented by the State is not 
reliable125. Milaj and Bonnici’s view is supported by Galetta, who says that the 
use of surveillance evidence in this way increases the ‘innocence threshold’ that 
must be overcome in order for the defendant to be acquitted126. And Edmond 
and San Roque show how lawyers, judges, and juries all tend to overestimate 
the reliability of surveillance evidence127, with the result that evidence that is 
perhaps not entirely reliable may be assumed to be virtually irrefutable. With 
this assumption the burden of proof is further shifted onto the defendant and 
the ‘innocence threshold’ is raised even higher. 
 
Galetta puts forward the idea that mass electronic surveillance is indicative of 
an ongoing shift from a ‘post-crime’ reactive model of policing, in which crimes 
are investigated and suspects prosecuted under a presumption of innocence, to 
a ‘pre-crime’ preventative model of policing, in which the police seek to predict 
crime through analysis of intelligence-derived data and then intervene at a 
preparatory stage before any crime actually occurs128. Maguire describes 
intelligence-led policing such as this as “a strategic, future-oriented and targeted 
approach to crime control, focussing upon the identification, analysis and 
‘management’ of persisting and developing ‘problems’ or ‘risks’ (which may be 
particular people, activities or areas), rather than on the reactive investigation 
and detection of individual crimes”129. Van Brakel and de Hert say that 
characteristic of intelligence-led, surveillance-based, pre-crime policing is its 
insistence on building up intelligence through data collection130, and the digital 
panopticon should be placed in this context. They argue that electronic 
surveillance allows the police to “increase their fields of vision and to 
simultaneously collect evidence”131, and the mass retention of data at the heart of 
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the State’s surveillance regime is in fact a mass retention of potential evidence 
that can be collated and analysed in order to predict crime or terrorism. In 
Galetta’s view, in a predictive, pre-crime society everyone is a target of 
surveillance132, and in the digital panopticon everyone, regardless of criminality, 
has their data gathered as potential evidence.  
 
In this, rather than assuming that any given individual is innocent unless proven 
otherwise, everyone within the reach of the digital panopticon is initially 
assumed to be a potential criminal. Hadjimatheou argues that mass surveillance 
in fact helps the ‘wrongful criminalisation’ presumption of innocence as through 
the mass collection of what we can call potential evidence individuals can more 
readily be eliminated from criminal enquiries and wrongful convictions can be 
avoided133. But if anything this reinforces the point that, as Galetta puts it, 
“everybody is considered as a potential offender in a pre-emptive society, 
regardless of the individual's [procedural] presumption of innocence, unless 
proved otherwise”134. It is the fact of being considered to be a potential criminal 
in the first place that leads to potential evidence being gathered. Hadjimatheou, 
who bases her argument on CCTV surveillance, argues that the presumption of 
innocence cannot have been reversed by mass surveillance as if it was then it 
would look like a panopticon135. This is, in fact, as we have seen, what mass 
online surveillance looks like, even if CCTV does not. The emerging pre-crime 
policing enabled by mass online surveillance is therefore based on potential 
rather than actual criminality, potential rather than actual evidence, and pre-
emptive rather than post-offending punishment136. Pre-crime policing enabled 
by mass online surveillance creates undue suspicion between the State and the 
citizen and stands contrary to the broader form of the presumption of 
innocence. If we presume that there are potentially criminals living in free 
society then we institute a regime whereby those for whom there is evidence of 
their involvement in serious criminality can be put under surveillance as an 
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exception to the rule. If we assume that everyone is a potential criminal then we 
put everyone under surveillance as the rule. The digital panopticon does the 
latter. 
 
Norris contends that if the State is gathering potential evidence on citizens on 
the basis that they may commit future crimes then the State is changing the 
nature of the social contract137. Through the digital panopticon and its emerging 
pre-emptive practices that undermine the presumption of innocence and may at 
times reverse the burden of proof the role of the individual is fundamentally 
changed. Whereas in post-crime models only those for whom there is evidence 
that they have committed a crime should, in theory, come under suspicion and 
they continue to be presumed innocent until conviction, in the new pre-crime 
surveillance-based model, as Bauman et al observe, everyone is placed under an 
“a priori suspicion that the individual then has to dismiss by his transparent 
behaviour”138. In a mass surveillance society you are watched at all times so you 
need to at all times behave in such a way that the potential evidence being 
gathered at all times can't be used against you if in future you are accused of an 
offence. The digital panopticon remakes the digital citizen as a subject who is 
not just constantly visible but constantly under suspicion as a potential criminal 
who must moderate their behaviour in full view of the State. This is how 
panoptic uncertainty as a technology of power is utilised as a form of control, 
but in doing so it threatens to undermine the relationship between the citizen 
and the State and put everyone within the reach of the digital panopticon under 
an undue suspicion of potential criminality that can only by dismissed by their 
transparently acceptable behaviour. 
 
4.2.2 | Undermining Freedom of Expression 
 
Central to the panopticon is visibility; it is what gives rise to the imbalance of 
knowledge represented by panoptic uncertainty. True privacy cannot exist in a 
panopticon – privacy is invisibility, and with privacy the imbalance of visibility 
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that gives rise to the imbalance of knowledge which, in turn, gives rise to 
uncertainty cannot exist. Where the individual is visible in this way they may 
become less willing to engage in the exchange of ideas that are thought to be 
undesirable or potentially subversive. Freedom of expression does not just 
include the right to speak freely, but is also widely recognised to include the 
right to freely seek, receive and impart information139 and, as such, is the 
keystone of a democratic society. While privacy and freedom of expression are 
often framed as competing interests in other contexts such as press regulation 
where a balance of rights may need to be struck between different persons, 
through the control mechanism of the digital panopticon they become tied 
together in the same person, now intrinsically linked. According to the UN’s 
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression, “Privacy and freedom of expression are interlinked and 
mutually dependent; an infringement upon one can be both the cause and 
consequence of an infringement upon the other”140. As the Special Rapporteur 
finds, “Undue interference with individuals’ privacy can both directly and 
indirectly limit the free development and exchange of ideas”141. And the potential 
impact of mass online surveillance has been recognised by the CJEU. In finding 
that bulk communications data retention is was incompatible with EU law, the 
Court opined that: 
 
“Even if such legislation does not permit retention of the content of 
a communication … the retention of traffic and location data could 
nonetheless have an effect on the use of means of electronic 
communication and, consequently, on the exercise by the users 
thereof of their freedom of expression”142 
 
The interference with privacy required in the digital panopticon may lead to 
interference with the free exchange of ideas. Even when awareness of electronic 
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surveillance extended only to what was understood before the Snowden leak 
the imbalance in visibility, knowledge, and power between the watched and the 
watcher that gives rise to panoptic uncertainty was present. But now that the 
true extent of this surveillance is public knowledge – and, as of 2015, 78% of 
Americans were aware of the NSA’s programs143 – the imbalance is even greater 
and the controlling effect on behaviour online has been empirically observed, as 
we shall now see. 
 
Self-imposed restrictions on freedom of expression due to fear of State 
retribution are known as a ‘chilling effects’144. Studies of internet user 
behaviour show how people change their behaviour in response to knowing 
about electronic surveillance in order to moderate their expression, 
demonstrating the effectiveness of panoptic uncertainty as a form of control. 
One study that compared search behaviour after the Snowden leak with search 
behaviour before the leak found that “US-based search traffic falls by quite a 
large extent in the Google index for terms that are perceived as having an above 
average likelihood of getting you in trouble with the US government” 145 and that 
there was “empirical evidence that the surveillance revelations caused a 
substantial chilling effect relating to users’ willingness to enter search terms that 
raters considered would get you into trouble with the US government”146.  
 
Penney, in using Wikipedia page views as a measure of willingness to enter into 
an information exchange on 48 topics involving keywords that are used by the 
US Department of Homeland Security to monitor social media147, found that 
after the Snowden revelations there was an “immediate decline in traffic”148, 
with an average decline of just under 25% in the first month following the 
leak149 across articles including those that are more obviously terrorism-related 
(including ‘Al Qaeda’, ‘terrorism’, ‘suicide bomber’, and ‘Improvised Explosive 
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Device’) and those that are perhaps somewhat less so (including ‘political 
radicalism’, ‘extremism’, ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘nationalism’). Penney also found 
that an ongoing decline in traffic to these articles persisted long after the public 
became aware of the scale of surveillance, showing a strong upward trend in the 
18 months prior to the revelations but still showing a strong downward trend 
14 months later150. This suggests that knowledge of potentially being watched 
not only leads people to moderate their behaviour in the short term but also in 
the longer term and possibly even permanently151. Penney describes Wikipedia 
as “an essential source of information and knowledge online, [functioning] as an 
important public tool to complement the democratic process in promoting 
collective understanding, decision-making, and deliberation”152, and points out 
that the activity involved – seeking out information on Wikipedia – is not only 
legal, but desirable in a healthy democratic society153.  
 
Further research by Penney has confirmed that the more that a given individual 
knows about online surveillance by SIAs the more likely it is that their speech is 
chilled154. He has also found that 62% of those studied said that they were 
somewhat less likely or much less likely to speak or write about certain topics 
online if they knew that they could be being watched155, that 78% were 
somewhat or much more likely to think more carefully about what they say156, 
that 78% were also somewhat or much more likely to think about what they 
search for online157, and that 60% were somewhat or much less likely to post or 
share content on social media158. His research shows that young people and 
women are more likely than other groups to feel the chilling effects of mass 
online surveillance159. 
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Noelle-Neumann introduced the idea of the ‘spiral of silence’ in the 1970s, in 
which, worried about isolation, people remain silent out of fear of society’s 
reaction to their opinion160. Stoycheff shows that this takes effect in relation to 
online discussion and fear of prosecution resulting from State surveillance161 
and results in an empirically evidenced stifling of the expression of minority 
political views and the reinforcement of majority opinions162. As Wright says, 
“People are scared when they learn about this. People stop accessing perfectly 
legal, legitimate and normal information because they are scared of those 
programs. That turns into a decreasing trend. The chilling effects … are real and 
empirically backed”163. It is clear that the awareness of potential observation is 
enough to drive people to change their behaviour, and this must be seen as 
evidence of both the effectiveness of the digital panopticon as a technology of 
power in translating rationalities into reality and, as collectively we become 
more compliant, of capillary power in action.  
 
The idea that a healthy democratic society is important for democratic 
government is one that is often acknowledged. As Balkin observes: 
 
“democracy is about far more than a set of procedures for resolving 
disputes. It is a feature of social life and a form of social 
organisation … in which ordinary people gain a greater say over 
institutions and practices that shape them and their futures”164.  
 
Balkin argues that what makes democracy is not just democratic governance but 
democratic participation, and that a democratic culture both extends beyond the 
institutions of democracy and underpins them165. According to Balkin, ICT 
changes the conditions of speech as it places freedom of expression in a new 
light, just as radio and television did in the past, greatly widening potential 
participation in the exchange of ideas but also creating new opportunities for 
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limiting and controlling that participation166. He argues that debates over 
freedom of expression should move from focusing on protecting only individual 
rights within a democratic process to focusing on protecting this wider 
democratic culture167, writing that “the free speech principle is about, and always 
has been about, the promotion and development of a democratic culture”168. The 
chilling effect of the digital panopticon suggests that at the point at which 
potential democratic participation is widening, thus necessitating its protection 
in the name of healthy democracy, according to Balkin, there is in fact a 
reduction in the willingness of people to engage in discussion of certain topics.  
 
The digital panopticon thus results in a significant chilling effect on the free 
speech of the digital citizen. In this, as is the case with the erosion of the 
presumption of innocence, the relationship between the digital citizen and the 
State is remade along new lines. Ideas that could be considered subversive, 
minority, or extreme may be pushed to the margins of public debate, reinforcing 
the existing order. As the digital citizen, who, through the erosion of the 
presumption of innocence, is cast as a potential criminal, becomes a passive 
subject of the control of the digital panopticon, their ability to engage in the free 
exchange of ideas that underpins democracy is undermined. In all, the digital 
citizen is rendered as a pliant, controllable entity, subject to the individualising 
power of the digital panopticon as the State seeks to extend its control. 
 
 
4.3 | Maintaining Order 
 
The rationality of the digital panopticon is rooted in security. What this means 
in practice depends on the nature of the society in which the governmentality is 
employed – in an authoritarian dictatorship, for example, ‘security’ may be 
directed towards the maintenance of the regime itself, in a liberal democracy it 
may be the security of the political institutions and the populace, and so on. A 
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technologically advanced form of the digital panopticon is used to help maintain 
the rule of the Communist Party in China, for example, and Russia has 
implemented a similar data retention framework as in IPA as the regime there 
seeks to cement its authority (which was found by the European Court of 
Human Rights to be incompatible with ECHR169). But the effect of the digital 
panopticon on the relationship between the digital citizen and the State in 
democratic societies calls into question its purpose. While it does not in law 
reverse the presumption of innocence or exclude the free exchange of ideas, and 
so on the face of it appears to be compatible with a democratic society, the 
reality of its nature is that, to some extent, it has the effect of doing those things. 
Bauman et al observe, in light of the Snowden revelations, that “the old suspicion 
that agencies claiming to secure our life and wellbeing often turn out to be 
extremely dangerous retains considerable wisdom”170, and ask “What, after all, 
are they supposed to be securing?”171. If we wish to understand the rationality 
behind the digital panopticon as it has been employed as a governmentality in 
the US and the UK then we must consider the societal context in which it exists.   
 
We should not assume that it is democracy, human rights, or the rule of law that 
is to be secured. The surveillance programmes undertaken by GCHQ and the 
NSA are of questionable legality and they undermine key principles of 
democratic society. The importance of this should not be overlooked, as it is the 
existence of a healthy democratic culture which fosters democratic norms 
among the population – including the presumption of innocence and the free 
exchange of ideas – that underpins the proper functioning of democracy. If this 
culture is undermined then democracy is undermined, with mass electronic 
surveillance leading, as Hintz and Brown found in their research into UK 
surveillance policy post-Snowden, to a power shift from citizens to the state172 
and, in the words of one of their interviewees, threatening a “sustained 
degradation of democracy”173. In the digital panopticon and in the name of 
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securing the democracy that it undermines the digital citizen takes on their new 
role as a potential criminal under constant suspicion, perhaps less willing to 
engage in an exchange of ideas that may be considered unpopular, undesirable, 
or subversive.  
 
Bauman et al argue that “it seems unwise to assume that these patterns [of 
surveillance] can be understood without some grasp on contemporary shifts 
toward globalizing markets and corporate wealth as the primary measure of 
economic and even political value”174. According to Gill, the US is the “military 
guarantor of disciplinary neo-liberalism”175. In the post-Cold War era this role 
has been emphasised. As discussed in Chapter 2, disciplinary neo-liberalism 
seeks to ‘lock-in’ the power gains made by capital through the neo-liberal 
revolution176, and Gill argues that it doesn’t just use economic power to do so 
but also military power, including surveillance practices177. Harvey equally says 
that neo-liberal states in practice augment the coercive arm of the State with 
surveillance in order to protect corporate interests and, if necessary, repress 
dissent178. Haines, as the official historian of the CIA, argued that “Following 
World War II the United States assumed, out of self-interest, responsibility for the 
welfare of the world capitalist system”179. The NSA (as the US Government’s 
principal global intelligence organisation, which focuses primarily on electronic 
surveillance and which has been described as the “largest and most secret 
intelligence agency”180 and the “inner circle of secrets”) and GCHQ (as the British 
Government’s equivalent) should be seen as an extension of this military power. 
As Taylor Owen observes, “The United States, which created the Internet as a 
defense research project, now considers cyberspace a ‘domain’ or potential 
battlefield equal in importance to land, sea, air, and outer space”181. In the context 
of the western societies that have undergone a revolution informed by neo-
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liberal social, political, and economic thought, the digital panopticon should thus 
be understood as a governmentality for maintaining the existing neo-liberal 
order.  
 
This does not necessarily mean that SIAs themselves are motivated by a desire 
to secure neo-liberal order, specifically, out of some attachment to that 
particular order, only that they seek to ensure the security of the existing order, 
whatever that is, and which, in western societies, as we saw in Chapter 2, is 
fundamentally neo-liberal in nature. The digital panopticon moves towards a 
pre-crime, pre-emptive form of control, in which everyone is a potential 
criminal and potential threats to the order can be identified in advance and 
intervened upon. And in the digital panopticon the willingness of the digital 
citizen to seek out and impart information and ideas that may be considered to 
be subversive, extreme, or otherwise undesirable is diminished. We can thus 
understand that the digital panopticon exists to secure neither democracy nor 
the rule of law but as a governmentality to render the digital citizen governable 
according to security rationalities in order to maintain the contemporary 




4.4 | Conclusion 
 
The extent and global reach of GCHQ’s and the NSA’s online surveillance was 
revealed by Edward Snowden in 2013. With the advent of the internet and 
online forms of community and communication, where almost everything we do 
leaves a digital trace of some kind and all of our text messages, emails, 
telephone calls, internet searches, and online transactions (and more) are 
potentially observable, as well as advances in data collection, storage, and 
retrieval, and algorithmic analysis, surveillance now reaches deep into our lives 
in a way that would have been impossible just a decade ago. New forms of ICT 
facilitate both new forms of control and the extension of older forms of control 
to unprecedented and otherwise impossible degrees. It is inconceivable that 
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such an extensive, real time programme of global surveillance could have been 
undertaken in the pre-digital age.  
 
Mass online surveillance has turned the UK into a digital panopticon, with 
serious implications for some of the most fundamental norms of a democratic 
society including the presumption of innocence and freedom of expression. In 
this, the relationship between the citizen and the State is remade by casting the 
digital citizen as a potential criminal deserving of constant observation who 
may, as a result, and particularly if they hold opinions that could be considered 
minority or subversive, feel unwilling to participate in the free exchange of 
ideas that is the keystone of democracy. And the digital panopticon should be 
understood as a governmentality that employs the technology of power of 
algorithmic panoptic uncertainty for translating security rationalities into 
reality so as to uphold the neo-liberal order in which the digital citizen plays a 
part. 
 
So far we have seen how surveillance and big data techniques have been used 
by corporations and by the state to exert control over the digital citizen and 
render them governable according to the rationalities of surveillance capitalism 
and the digital panopticon. In the next chapter, we will see how the same 
techniques have affected democratic the public sphere through the surveillance 
of voters and microtargeting of political advertising to them, and how this 
facilitates the appropriation of the agency of the digital citizen as a political 
actor as they go about fulfilling the role of the choice-making active citizen 
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Chapter 5 | The Algorithmic 
Manipulation of Online Public Space 
 
 
In the previous chapters we saw how corporations have developed new 
technologies of power based around big data and the surveillance and 
modification of human behaviour, seeking to commodify as much of life as 
possible by translating the rationality of surveillance capitalism into reality. We 
have also seen how the State uses panoptic forms of online surveillance, with 
the co-operation of corporations like Facebook and Google and in part using the 
surveillance apparatus that they have constructed, to exert control over the 
digital citizen in pursuit of security rationalities. In this chapter we turn to 
politics and the public sphere, and will see how the architecture of surveillance 
capitalism, the surveillance-based governmentalities that corporations use to 
appropriate the agency of the neo-liberal digital citizen as a social and economic 
actor for their own ends, is also used to appropriate the agency of the digital 
citizen as a political actor for the ends of political forces. 
 
Jürgen Habermas, sensing a decline in the public sphere and a crisis of 
democracy as a result of the domination of political discourse by the mass 
media, put forward the foremost account of the public sphere in 19671. He 
argued that public spheres first emerged in the eighteenth-century coffee 
houses of England, salons of France, and Tischgesellschaften of Germany, and 
that, while they differed in many respects, they shared, at least in theory, a 
number of common elements2. For Habermas the public sphere is where 
“society engaged in critical public debate”3 in which “the authority of the better 
argument could assert itself against that of social hierarchy and in the end can 
carry the day”4. He conceived of the public sphere as an uncoerced space created 
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by critical public debate, the rational exchange of ideas between equals 
undertaken with the intention of reaching a consensus – the “social space 
generated in communicative action”5. Mark Poster characterise Habermas’s view 
of the public sphere as being “a domain of uncoerced conversation oriented 
toward a pragmatic accord”6. The public sphere in Habermas’s conception is 
not, then, simply a physical space that permits discussion, but the public social 
space created by that uncoerced discussion itself7 (although, as Geiger notes, 
many analyses of the public sphere fail to recognise this distinction8). The 
concept of the public sphere is therefore vital in any discussion of the impact of 
the internet on the individual as a political actor, and freedom from coercion is 
at its heart. And the question of what impact online public spaces may have on 
the public sphere is one that has been addressed several times in the past by a 
variety of writers9, but not for some time and thus not in relation to these 
spaces as they exist today, and not with the aim of identifying the surveillance-
based forms of control to which the digital citizen is exposed to in those space 
and their impact on the digital citizen as a political actor. 
 
So why is the internet, in particular, worth considering for its impact on the 
public sphere? Two reasons stand out. The first is that the internet provides for 
virtual public spaces to develop. While social media, discussion forums, and 
other online platforms are generally speaking privately owned and operated, 
they are usually public in that anyone can sign up and participate in discussion 
of ideas, sharing of posts and photos, and other interactions with other users (as 
Habermas put it, “We call events and occasions 'public' when they are open to all, 
in contrast to closed or exclusive affairs”10). The second reason is that since the 
internet’s earliest days, writers have been highlighting its potential to increase 
access to information, give everyone a voice, and democratise debate. As Terje 
Rasmussen points out, “What is genuinely novel with the Internet in a democratic 
                                                          
5 Habermas, 1996, p.360 
6 Poster, 1995 
7 Geiger, 2009, p.22 
8 Geiger, 2009, p.22 
9 See, for example, Dahlberg, 2001a; Dahlberg 2001b; Papacharissi, 2002; Dahlgren, 2005; Fuchs, 
2014 
10 Habermas, 1989, p.1 
The Algorithmic Manipulation of Online Public Space | Chapter 5 
  
 
Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 162 
  
perspective is that it cancelled the social division between speakers and listeners of 
the public sphere and made everyone into potential participants in numerous 
public interactions and debates”11. On this basis the internet is often lauded for 
its emancipatory potential, apparently promising to renew both the public 
sphere and democracy more generally and in the process to empower the 
citizen12.  
 
But there have also been concerns raised, not least by Habermas himself, about 
the internet’s potential to increase the fragmentation of the public sphere13 and 
about the domination of online public spaces by commercial interests through 
what we can recognise as surveillance capitalism, as was identified by 
Habermas in the age of mass media. Writing in 1993, in the earliest days of the 
influence of the World Wide Web, Howard Rheingold summed up this conflict: 
“Virtual communities could help citizens revitalize democracy, or they could be 
luring us into an attractively packaged substitute for democratic discourse”14. And 
the last few years have also seen an emerging and significant debate about the 
role of various forms of algorithmic manipulation of online public space in 
political processes across the world. The contribution of surveillance and big 
data techniques to this, and their impact on political campaigning and online 
discussion, should not be underestimated. As Renee DiResta says: 
 
“We’re heading down the path of an arms race in algorithmic 
manipulation, in which every company, political party, activist 
group, and candidate is going to feel compelled to leverage these 
strategies. We’re at an inflection point … the marketplace of ideas is 
growing increasingly inefficient as unchecked manipulation 
influences our most important conversations.”15 
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Indeed, Nathaniel Persily, formerly the research director for the US Presidential 
Commission on Election Administration, questions whether democracy can 
survive the kind of disruption by algorithmic manipulation seen today16. 
 
Here we will discuss how the practices of surveillance capitalism have been 
repurposed to influence behaviour in the public sphere in order in order to try 
exert control over the digital citizen and appropriate their agency as a political 
actor through voter surveillance and the microtargeting of political advertising, 
and will discuss some of the ways that this impacts politics more generally. In 
doing so, we will identify the technologies of power to which the digital citizen 
as a political actor is subject to in online public spaces as well as the rationalities 
that underpin them, the effect that these have on online politics and on the 
digital citizen as a political actor, and the influence that they give political 
campaigns, corporations, and the State. While Habermas holds that the public 
sphere should be free of coercion – indeed, this is a key aspect of Habermas’s 
idealised public sphere – some critiques build on Foucault’s idea that no space is 
free of power to argue that it is impossible for public spaces to ever be free of 
some form of coercion17. This is where Habermas’s concept of the public sphere 
meets our analysis of the new forms of control to which the digital citizen is 
exposed online, so we will locate voter surveillance and microtargeting both 
within the governmentality framework set out in Chapter 2, and in relation to 
the surveillance-based regimes discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, and will account 
for how these practices impact the digital citizen as a political actor exercising 
their agency as a sovereign consumer-citizen within the public sphere.  
 
In all, the argument will be advanced that while the internet has been billed as a 
new, renewing, online part of the public sphere for all to come together, freely 
exchange ideas and information, and reinvigorate democracy, it is, in practice, 
severely lacking. We will see that in reality the neo-liberal digital citizenship of 
the internet of today enables new forms of control by political forces as they 
seek to manipulate democratic discussion and exercise greater influence over 
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the political agency of the digital citizen. The online world, while allowing for 
public spaces to develop and facilitating political engagement and debate of 
sorts, thus fails to facilitate the development of an online and renewing part the 
public sphere in which digital citizens can receive and impart ideas free of 
coercion. Instead it continues the decline identified by Habermas in the 1960s. 
While the internet is now much more public and plays a much greater role in 
modern life than in the past, as a host for the public sphere it is deeply flawed.  
 
 
5.1 | Voter Surveillance and Microtargeted 
Political Advertising 
 
Recent years have seen the development of new techniques for online political 
advertising, where voters are surveilled by political campaigns in order to 
enable the microtargeting of precisely tailored advertising directly to them. 
Here we will see how the practices of surveillance capitalism are repurposed to 
facilitate this surveillance of voters and microtargeting of political advertising, 
thus bringing forms of coercion which have been developed to influence the 
behaviour of the digital citizen as a social and economic actor in pursuit of 
commercial desires into the public sphere in order to use them to influence the 
behaviour of the digital citizen as a political actor.  
 
Targeting voters with advertising online isn’t, of course, a new development. In 
2001 Lincoln Dahlberg observed that “Even democratically-oriented Internet 
sites are increasingly being hosted or directly run by corporate ventures 
promoting an individualized consumer-oriented politics that allows politicians to 
sell their messages directly to citizens online without the mediation of public 
discourse”18. But in the past this was not done at the scale that can be reached 
today, or with the precision of targeting that can be achieved through the 
tracking of users and algorithmic analysis of massive datasets gathered through 
surveillance of the electorate. This allows political campaigns – whether they’re 
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candidates, parties, or referendum campaigns – to move beyond segmenting (a 
long-standing practice) to microtargeting individual voters and small groups 
who share desired characteristics. In the context of political campaigning this is 
known as ‘microtargeting’. Zeynep Tufekci says that this kind of campaigning, 
which involves targeting individuals as individuals rather as members of 
broadly defined groups, has long been the “holy grail” of political campaigns19, 
and argues that this kind of algorithmic microtargeting allows campaigns to 
attempt to ‘engineer the public’20. Microtargeting has been described by Justin 
Hendrix and David Carroll as a nightmare for democracy21. Microtargeting may 
particularly be an issue in parliamentary systems such as the UK where 
governments are elected on the basis of electoral performance across a large 
number of small constituencies with plurality voting and where elections are 
often decided by a relatively small number of marginal constituencies22. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, predictive analytics – the informating through 
computer mediation of big data that lies at the heart of surveillance capitalism – 
allows for the discovery of otherwise unknowable information about people, 
rendering them hypervisible and knowable to an unprecedented degree23. The 
hypervisibility created by these techniques means that a wealth of personal 
information may be determined about an individual from relatively impersonal 
behavioural data. When this behavioural data is combined with personal data 
gathered by political campaigns and subject to the same techniques, campaigns 
can predict personality traits in individuals as well as the likelihood of 
individuals voting at all, of voting for their candidate, of being able to be 
persuaded to vote for their candidate, and of caring about particular issues or 
being susceptible to particular kinds of campaign messaging24. We will first look 
at some examples of microtargeting from recent political campaigns in the US 
and the UK before discussing this from a theoretical point of view, linking the 
practices of surveillance-based microtargeting with those of surveillance 
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23 See Chapter 3 for a full exploration of how this operates 
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capitalism and discussing how information (as potential knowledge) and power 
are connected as well as highlighting some of the effects of microtargeting on 
the political process. In all, we will recognise the practices of surveillance-based 
microtargeting as a co-option of the technologies of power of surveillance 
capitalism that should be understood as attempting to algorithmically 
manipulate the public and exert control over the digital citizen for political ends, 
which may give capital, foreign governments, and political organisations undue 
influence over the digital citizen and the democratic process 
 
5.1.1 | Microtargeting in Practice 
 
Campaigning that took advantage of big data techniques to engage with and 
target voters online was first seen at scale in the primary and Presidential 
election campaigns of Barack Obama in 2007 and 2008, and more extensively in 
his 2012 campaign25. In 2008, Obama was able to harness data gathering and 
analysis to engage with voters and embrace the social-movement-like nature of 
his grassroots26, but it was in 2012, with dissipated enthusiasm among voters 
after four years of financial crisis and deadlock in Congress, that his campaign 
embraced big data behavioural modelling and analytics to engage in an 
unprecedented level of microtargeting in a handful of states in order to win a 
close election with carefully crafted, state-by-state tactics27. In the view of David 
Axelrod, Obama’s chief strategist in 2008, the Obama’s campaign’s use of voter 
surveillance, behavioural modelling, and microtargeting in 2012 made 2008’s 
campaign look prehistoric by comparison28. Microtargeting, for example, 
allowed the 2012 Obama campaign to reach inside specific voting districts that 
would otherwise vote Republican to pick out voters that they predicted would 
be sympathetic to their campaign’s message and microtarget them with tailored 
advertising29. In doing so, they could avoid spending money on more 
generalised advertising across the whole district, which would likely have gone 
                                                          
25 Bimber, 2014 
26 Bimber, 2014, p.131 
27 Bimber, 2014, p.131 
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largely to waste, and instead spend it on microtargeting individual voters in 
order to attempt to improve their candidate’s share of the vote on a state-wide 
basis (which, with the Electoral College system, is what matters).  
 
A British company named Cambridge Analytica is thought to have taken 
microtargeting a step further than seen in Obama’s campaigns in its work on 
Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign, in that it merged behavioural data with 
personal data to create much more detailed data profiles of voters in order to 
produce psychometric profiles of voters based on this data (a process which it 
calls ‘psychographing’). It is purported to have used data obtained from its work 
with the campaigns of Ted Cruz and Trump as well as personal and behavioural 
data obtained from data mining firms which it subjected to a form of predictive 
algorithmic analysis that it calls ‘psychographics’ in order to predict the 
psychological makeup of American voters and then microtarget them with ads 
tailored specifically for their psychological profile. It is believed that half of the 
Trump campaign’s spending was on digital advertising, largely of this kind30. 
While doubts have been raised about the effectiveness of psychographing31, 
Facebook itself is known to have mined users’ emotional states and sold that 
information to advertisers32. Cambridge Analytica claims to have had 5,000 data 
points on over 230 million voters33 allowing them to build target audiences and 
use this to engage voters and influence their behaviour34. It’s known that 
Cambridge Analytica offered people small amounts of money in exchange for 
completing a survey, and that they also required them to download an app that 
would harvest personal and behavioural data both from their own Facebook 
profiles and from those of their friends35. However, it appears that much of the 
voter data used to microtarget voters ultimately came from other sources, 
including the Republican Party’s own data operation36. 
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Research has shown the effectiveness of microtargeted political messaging 
online. A 2012 US study, carried out by Facebook, aimed at testing the 
effectiveness of online vote mobilisation operations, which compared targeted 
messages to official voting records released after polling day, found that these 
messages not only directly influenced the real-world voting behaviour of 
millions of people, but also influenced the friends of those people as well as 
friends of their friends37. While the difference was found to be small – with 
those who saw the message being 0.39% more likely to vote, and friends of 
those who saw the message being 0.11% more likely to say that they had 
voted38 – across the large audiences that can be targeted on social media this 
could make a significant difference to the outcome of close elections in which 
every vote counts. The authors estimated that around 340,000 extra votes were 
cast in the 2010 midterm elections (out of a total of around 82 million) as a 
result of a single message placed by them on Facebook39 (they note that in 2000 
George W Bush effectively won the US Presidency as the result of a 537-vote 
margin in Florida, or less than 0.01% of all votes cast40). Facebook repeated the 
experiment for the 2012 Presidential election and again found a significant 
increase in voting as a result41. If such techniques are taken up by political 
campaigns seeking to turn out sympathetic voters who may otherwise not vote 
then the effect on the turnout of a campaign’s supporters could be significant. 
Costas Panagopoulos argues that the ability to use microtargeting to mobilise a 
campaign’s base in this way may even be a more effective route to electoral 
success than using it to attempt to persuade undecided voters42. Indeed, the 
2012 Obama campaign (whose chief data scientist was previously employed in 
maximising the effectiveness of supermarket ad campaigns43) is known to have 
used similar techniques to successfully target people that they believed would 
be likely to support their candidate but who had a low likelihood of actually 
voting, leading one Romney aide to say that Obama had turned out voters that 
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their campaign didn’t even know existed44. However, Ballard, Hillygus, and 
Konitzer report that only 18% of ads in the 2012 Presidential election were ‘get 
out the vote’ ads, with the remainder being those soliciting donations or seeking 
to persuade or recruit potential voters outside the campaign’s core vote by 
microtargeting them with adverts tailored to specific issues on which the 
campaigns predicted that they may be persuadable45. Some 67% of Obama’s ads 
and 51% of Romney’s ads appeared to be targeted at non-supporters46. 
 
In 2016 Cambridge Analytica launched 4,000 different ad campaigns and 
received 1.4 billion impressions (that is, its ads were viewed 1.4 billion times) in 
order to microtarget 13.5 million persuadable voters in sixteen battleground 
states, including the ‘rust belt’ states of the Midwest that proved crucial to 
Trump’s victory47. The Trump campaign’s own voter microtargeting operations, 
named Project Alamo, ran alongside Cambridge Analytica’s and used data 
supplied by them48. According to the Republic Party’s director of advertising, 
the Trump campaign ran 40-50,000 variations of its ads on any one day, with 
175,000 variations on the day of the third Presidential debate49. In fact, some 
31% of the Trump campaign’s total expenditure was on online advertising, 
compared to 6% of Clinton’s (and 9% for Obama in 2012)50. Part of their 
strategy was to target likely Clinton voters to try to dissuade them from 
voting51, an inversion of the ‘get out the vote’ operations of Obama and Clinton. 
Nicole Rustin-Paschal observed in 2011 that microtargeting could potentially be 
used to provide information or disinformation designed to discourage 
susceptible potential voters from actually voting52. She argues that suppression 
operations, such as Trump’s microtargeting-based campaign, intimidate voters 
out of exercising their right to vote by undermining their confidence in the 
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electoral process53. In 2016, Trump’s team acknowledged that it was running 
three different opposition voter suppression operations in this way – targeting 
information about Bill Clinton’s sexual history to young women, information 
about Hillary Clinton’s 1994 comments on ‘super predators’ to African-
Americans, and information about her support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
to idealistic young liberals who had supported Bernie Sanders in the Democratic 
primary54. These took advantage of Facebook’s dark posts – or what it calls 
‘unpublished page posts’55 – that allow page admins to deliver ads through 
audience filters, providing non-public ads to selected groups of users56. As a 
result of the effectiveness of these operations, the Trump campaign’s digital 
director said after the election that “Facebook and Twitter were the reason we 
won this thing”57.  
 
As well as dark posts, which allow the microtargeting of narrow segments of 
users, Facebook provides a set of tools, known as ‘Custom Audiences’, which 
enable advertisers, including political organisations, to deliver advertising to 
specific individuals. These allow campaigns to submit lists of specific voters that 
they wish to target to Facebook, which then matches the entries on those lists to 
the Facebook profiles of those voters, allows them to be algorithmically filtered 
according to desired characteristics determined through their profiles and the 
surveillance of their online behaviour, and facilitates the sending of tailored 
advertising directly to those specific individuals. Facebook also provides a tool 
for identifying ‘Lookalike Audiences’, which allows advertisers to identify other 
users, who are not on their targeting list but share characteristics with those 
who are, to target with the same advertising, potentially dramatically expanding 
its reach. As well as this, there is a ‘Website Custom Audiences’ tool, which 
allows advertisers to implant a tracking pixel on their website (known as a ‘web 
beacon’) in order to keep note of which Facebook users visit that website, filter 
them, and microtarget those voters as well. And Facebook itself boasts about the 
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success of using their Custom Audiences tools to target specific voters. It cites 
the experience of a candidate for re-election to the US Senate in the 2016 
elections, Patrick Toomey, saying that his campaign “used a made-for-Facebook, 
audience-specific content strategy to significantly shift voter intent and increase 
favorability … contributing to his re-election.”58. Facebook claims a 10.5 point 
increase in pro-Toomey voter intention when using Custom Audiences (as well 
as a 19.4 point increase in voter intention among women aged 45-54 and a 13.1 
point increase among men aged 55-64)59. These Custom Audience tools, 
including the Lookalike Audience tool, were also used extensively by the Trump 
campaign in 2016, allowing them to upload their voter lists, filter out undesired 
voters, and target the voters they wanted60. And at all times, whether using dark 
posts, Custom Audiences, or Lookalike Audiences, user engagement can be 
monitored, tracked, and analysed through the ‘Conversion Tracking’ tool so as 
to identify which ads are most effective with which demographic and more 
precisely hone the message. 
 
Surveillance-based microtargeting appears to have taken place during the 2015 
and 2017 UK general elections as well as the 2016 referendum on the UK’s 
membership of the EU. While smaller parties with fewer resources may be 
largely limited to the use of spreadsheets and other relatively simple methods of 
data analysis61, in 2015 the Conservative Party hired Obama’s 2012 campaign 
manager Jim Messina and spent around 30% of their campaign budget on 
acquiring data, analytical behavioural modelling, and microtargeting undecided 
voters with specific concerns and behavioural traits62. However, much of their 
targeting came through phone calls and door knocks in marginal constituencies. 
They did, though, use online microtargeting, including Facebook’s Custom 
Audiences, Lookalike Audiences, and Conversion Tracking63 – according to 
Facebook’s own account of how the Conservatives used their platform to 
microtarget voters, “Using Facebook’s targeting tools, the [Conservative] party 
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was able to reach 80.65% of Facebook users in the key marginal seats. The party’s 
videos were viewed 3.5 million times, while 86.9% of all ads served had social 
context – the all-important endorsement by a friend”64. The effectiveness of the 
tools used provided by Facebook led the Digital Director at the Conservative 
Party to say that “for the first time in a UK election … digital made a demonstrable 
difference to the final election result”65. During the 2016 Brexit referendum, the 
Vote Leave campaign, according to its director, Dominic Cummings, put around 
98% of their money into digital, and served up about one billion microtargeted 
digital adverts during the official 10 week campaign, mostly via Facebook66. 
Thomas Borwick, Vote Leave’s chief technical officer, says that “We made full use 
of online marketing to ruthlessly target likely supporters online using innovative 
new ways to gain voter data”67. They held most of their advertising back until 
towards the end of the campaign, when they were able to spend their money on 
the microtargeted adverts that surveillance-driven experiments earlier in the 
campaign had shown would be most effective68. As Cummings puts it, “When 
things are digital you can be more empirical and control the timing”69. In 2017, 
microtargeting was widely used by the major parties during the general election 
campaign. Voter surveillance and microtargeting has been identified as a key 
aspect in the Labour Party’s campaign, helping them to close the sizable polling 
gap that existed before the election and bring about a hung Parliament70. 
According to Andrew Gwynne, then Labour’s Elections and Campaign Chair, “We 
put unprecedented levels of funding into online advertising, supported by a highly 
professional data targeting operation that gave us an edge in getting the right 
messages in front of the right voters. This allowed us to make quick decisions 
about who and where to target”71.  
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It’s worth noting that it isn’t just through microtargeted advertising on social 
media platforms that political campaigns can use surveillance techniques to 
influence voter behaviour. Dan Siroker, director of analytics for Obama’s 2008 
campaign, tells us how the campaign in its early days tested several variations of 
its website in order to find the layout and wording which would be most 
effective in driving sign-ups to campaign emails72. By recording the behavioural 
responses of visitors, they were able to determine which combination was most 
effective, and increase the rate at which voters provided personal information 
to the campaign. Siroker estimates that in doing so they were able to persuade 
almost three million more people to sign up. As each sign-up ended up donating 
an average of around $20 to the campaign, this single experiment – based on 
surveillance of user behaviour and big data analysis and similar to the 
hypernudging performed by websites such as Facebook – is estimated to have 
provided them with around $60m of extra campaign funding. Campaigns can 
use their own data and their own analysis to target voters in many locations, 
particularly in attempting to drive fundraising, but Facebook is now arguably 
the most effective way to microtarget voters73.  
 
All of the microtargeting operations discussed here are examples of political 
campaigns employing the technology of power of algorithmic governmentality – 
involving voter surveillance, predictive algorithmic analysis, and microtargeted 
advertising – in order to create a contact point where the behaviour of the voter 
can be directed in the way desired. We will move on now to discuss what this 
means in terms of information, knowledge, and power, and will locate voter 
surveillance and microtargeting within our governmentality framework as 
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5.2 | Information, Knowledge, and Political Power 
 
Just as surveillance capitalism datafies the digital citizen and microtargets them 
based on those datafied representations of their physical selves, their data 
doubles, so too surveillance-based microtargeting involves creating datafied 
doubles of individuals and microtargeting them on this basis. Much of the work 
in this is done by the surveillance capitalist corporations themselves – it is often 
them that gathers much of the behavioural data used in microtargeting through 
dataveillance, and it is often through their platforms that the desired individuals 
can be identified and microtargeted with online political advertising (and, of 
course, these corporations financially benefit from microtargeted political ads 
placed on their platforms). Here we will address some of the issues that this 
raises in terms of informational asymmetries, and therefore power 
asymmetries, and in relation to a lack of transparency and accountability and 
the influence of capital in the political process. 
 
Surveillance-based microtargeting involves, in part, taking the behavioural 
surplus produced by the digital citizen’s work as a produsumer in surveillance 
capitalism and using it to attempt to influence their behaviour as a political 
actor. This involves a form of the descending individuation described by 
Foucault, by which people are distinguished from one another and governed 
individually with reference to some idealised norm74. Through this process, as 
Kreiss points out, campaigns can develop narrow appeals to different groups of 
voters, “appearing to be all things to all people”75. Doing so allows political 
campaigns to focus wedge issues on sympathetic voters without the risk of 
potentially motivating voters who strongly disagree with a party or a 
candidate’s position76. This relies fundamentally on fragmenting the public and 
creating instead a multitude of different ‘publics’, each individually and 
algorithmically tailored to a particular individual. In fact, each of these ‘publics’ 
becomes less and less public and seen only by the individual, to the extent that 
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in truth they may even be considered to be private. As Tufekci argues, this turns 
political communication into a highly personalised, private activity77. 
Individuals each become subject to exercises of power tailored to them, with the 
intent of making them up to that standard – in this case, that of a political actor 
exercising their agency in the manner desired by political campaigns. As such, 
not only do the practices of surveillance capitalism render the digital citizen 
amenable to new forms of control by corporations, but also to new forms of 
control by political forces. 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, any given algorithm exists because somebody 
somewhere has a goal that they wish to attain through algorithmic computer 
mediation, whether that’s ranking search results or delivering targeted 
advertising78. In this context, the goal (or rationality) to be translated into 
reality by the technology of power of surveillance capitalism, which seeks to 
influence consumer behaviour in order to produce that which is most profitable 
for corporations, that of the algorithmic governmentality identified by 
Antoinette Rouvroy, is political in nature, with campaigns seeking to influence 
the behaviour of the digital citizen in such a way as to benefit them. To do this, 
personal and behavioural data obtained from surveillance capitalism 
companies, and from other sources, is algorithmically analysed, and the 
resulting information is used to nudge voters with a view to influencing their 
political views and behaviour. In this, the practices of algorithmic 
governmentality are repurposed in order to seek to influence voter behaviour 
and so produce a change in (or a reinforcement of) a given voter’s political view 
and thus the campaign’s desired outcome either through donations, through 
spreading the campaign’s message to friends or family, or in the voting booth. 
For example, using psychometric profiling campaigns could identify voters who 
are likely to become more conservative in their opinions when their fears are 
aroused and target them specifically with adverts designed to trigger that 
response – in relation to, say, crime, terrorism, family safety, or health – without 
showing those ads to people on whom they would have little to no (or even the 
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opposite) effect79. As well as the individuation discussed already, microtargeting 
of this kind also breaks the individual themselves down into their component 
parts through the same process of dividuation as seen in surveillance capitalism. 
The digital citizen as a political actor becomes a collection of datafied parts, with 
each part to be addressed separately by those seeking to influence their 
behaviour and win their vote. The digital citizen ceases to be a whole and 
coherent individual and becomes instead a fragmented dividual, a composite80 
of “multiple forces, identifications, affiliations, and associations”81. As Tufekci 
says, if those seeking to influence voter behaviour in the twentieth century had 
“magnifying glasses and baseball bats”, those of the twenty–first century have 
acquired “telescopes, microscopes and scalpels in the shape of algorithms and 
analytics”82. 
 
5.2.1 | Informational Asymmetries 
 
As we have seen with surveillance capitalism, information is potential 
knowledge and power is maintained through the control of knowledge83. Key to 
exerting control over the digital citizen as a political actor is the informational 
asymmetry between campaigns and voters produced through surveillance-
based microtargeting. As Howard and Kreiss argue, 
 
“Asymmetries in information between political actors and voters, in 
turn, facilitate the ability of elites to manipulate the electorate. For 
example, candidates and their agents — paid operatives or citizen–
supporters enlisted to spread their message and generate data on 
their friends and neighbors — know a lot more about those they are 
seeking to represent than citizens do about them. This makes these 
forms of ‘personalized political communication’ fundamentally 
transactional and manipulative, as campaigns and their supporters 
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strive to tailor their political speech in terms of what individual 
voters want to hear”84 
 
As such, the ability to surveil voters and analyse the data obtained through that 
surveillance is, in fact, the ability to produce knowledge about those voters and 
extend power over them. This creates an unequal public, where some political 
campaigns know a lot about voters while voters know little about their 
microtargeting practices or how they operate (as a result of a number of factors, 
including algorithmic opacity, the fact that campaigns may wish to keep their 
microtargeting operations out of public view, and so on). Just as the practices of 
surveillance capitalism involve an appropriation of consumer sovereignty in 
part through the creation of informational asymmetries, so too surveillance-
based microtargeting involves an appropriation of the political agency of the 
digital citizen through the creation of the same asymmetries. Political 
campaigns use the knowledge that they can generate about voters to subject 
them to manipulative microtargeted advertising, carefully crafted to trigger 
desired psychological responses, in an attempt to direct their agency in a 
manner that benefits the campaign, subjecting the digital citizen to new forms of 
control. Howard and Kreiss argue that surveillance of voters in this way, 
whereby they are rendered hypervisible and knowable to an unprecedented 
degree, has negative consequences for their willingness to engage in democratic 
debate and participation. In their view, privacy allows citizens to form their own 
viewpoints and develop political identities free from surveillance and public 
pressure, thus ensuring more robust political debate85.  
 
And just as asymmetries in information create asymmetries in potential 
knowledge and therefore asymmetries in power, so too controlling access to 
information means controlling access to potential knowledge and therefore 
confers power. In microtargeting on social media, surveillance capitalism 
corporations take up, according to Tambini et al, “positions of great power 
gatekeepers of information, with the ability to facilitate or impede information 
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dissemination”86, but with few, if any, safeguards. Tufekci argues that “By holding 
on to the valuable troves of big data, and by controlling of algorithms which 
determine visibility, sharing and flow of political information, the Internet’s key 
sites and social platforms have emerged as inscrutable, but important, power 
brokers of networked politics”87. Jonathan Zittrain warns of the potential for 
what he calls ‘digital gerrymandering’, or “the selective presentation of 
information by an intermediary to meet its agenda rather than to serve its 
users”88. Tufekci highlights the influence over elections that control of the flow 
of information in this way potentially gives social media platforms: 
 
“A platform that wanted to manipulate election results could, for 
example, model voters who were more likely to support a candidate 
it preferred and then target a preponderance of such voters with a 
‘civic’ message narrowcast so that most of the targets were in the 
desired target group, with just enough thrown in from other groups 
to make the targeting less obvious. Such a platform could help tilt 
an election without ever asking the voters whom they preferred 
(gleaning that information instead through modeling, which 
research shows is quite feasible) and without openly supporting any 
candidate. Such a program would be easy to implement, practically 
undetectable to observers (since each individual only sees a portion 
of the social media stream directed and nobody sees the totality of 
messages in the whole platform except the platform owners), easily 
deniable (since the algorithms that go into things like Facebook’s 
news feed are proprietary and closely guarded secrets), and 
practically unconfirmable”89 
 
As Tambini et al argue, social media companies “are in a position – should they 
wish – to offer different terms and services to different campaigns, and even to 
deny certain campaigns access. They could in theory make it easier for a political 
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The Algorithmic Manipulation of Online Public Space | Chapter 5 
  
 
Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 179 
  
party with which their business or ideological interests align to reach their 
supporters, or vice versa”90. Although there is no evidence that such digital 
gerrymandering has yet taken place it remains a possibility, and the willingness 
of these corporations to use their platforms to further their political goals is not 
hypothetical. For example, in 2012 Google ran a blacked-out version of its 
homepage ‘doodle’ (where they often replace the Google logo on their 
homepage with art, animations, or games) in protest against the proposed US 
Stop Online Piracy Act, which Google said would facilitate censorship, and 
provided a link to a blog post setting out its concerns91. Google’s use of its 
website – the most visited site on the entire internet, with around 1.5 billion 
daily views as of 2012 – to advance a political view in this way passed largely 
without comment92. Digital gerrymandering may become a more pressing issue 
in light of persistent speculation over whether Facebook’s founder and CEO, 
Mark Zuckerberg, intends to launch a campaign for the 2020 US Presidential 
election93. 
 
Microtargeting also produces informational asymmetries between political 
campaigns, as well as the asymmetry between campaigns and voters discussed 
already, potentially greatly amplifying the influence of capital in political 
campaigning. Smaller organisations with fewer resources cannot engage in this 
kind of surveillance-driven microtargeting. This manifests in three ways – first, 
that smaller organisations may not have the resources to collect large quantities 
of data; second, that they might not have the resources to subject the data that 
they do hold to the same degree of predictive algorithmic analysis that better-
resourced organisations can perform; and third, that they may not have the 
resources to buy targeted advertising on online platforms to the same extent 
that better-resourced organisations can. Not only does this create an asymmetry 
in the quantity of data that can be gathered, but, as data provides information 
which in turn is potential knowledge, it also creates an asymmetry in the 
knowledge that political campaigns can potentially generate about voters from 
                                                          
90 Tambini et al, 2017, p.13 
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that data and in the extent to which adverts can be microtargeted more 
individually to voters in key demographics or marginal constituencies.  
 
This may dramatically increase the influence of money on political campaigning 
and thus confer a competitive advantage on those who can afford to obtain data, 
perform algorithmic analysis, and microtarget advertising. As Howard and 
Kreiss point out, if non-institutional and non-wealthy candidates of major 
parties are at a competitive disadvantage, those of other parties with fewer 
resources and comparatively little organisational infrastructure have access to 
few of the advantages available to institutional political actors94. An example 
can be found in the 2015 UK general election – while the Conservative Party was 
spending millions of pounds on voter surveillance, predictive analytics, and 
microtargeting across numerous marginal constituencies, the Green Party was 
limited to using Excel spreadsheets to assist them with campaigning in the 
constituencies in which their leaders were running95. Through this 
informational asymmetry, offline financial status and political status are 
translated into significant online status and influence, thus potentially greatly 
amplifying offline status and influence to the benefit of established or wealthy 
campaigns and disadvantaging others. This informational asymmetry therefore 
creates power asymmetries between those already involved in mainstream 
politics (such as established parties and candidates) and those outside of the 
political elite (such as new or smaller parties and candidates), reinforcing their 
difference in status in online spaces and increasing the influence of capital in the 
democratic process.  
 
5.2.2 | Transparency and Accountability 
 
As noted above, microtargeting lacks transparency and accountability and 
comes with the same issues with algorithmic opacity as is seen in surveillance 
capitalism. Not only can we not know the algorithms by which political 
campaigns segment and profile voters, but we can also not know the algorithms 
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by which companies such as Facebook determine which voters meet the criteria 
set by those campaigns. Further, we generally speaking have thus far now been 
able to know which ads are shown to other people. In Tufekci’s view, and unlike 
TV ad campaigns, online ads microtargeted at individuals "take persuasion into a 
private, invisible realm”96. As she points out, “Misleading TV ads can be countered 
and fact-checked. A misleading message sent in just the kind of e-mail you will 
open or ad you will click on remains hidden from challenge by the other campaign 
or the media”97. This is seen particularly in relation to Facebook’s ‘dark posts’ 
which are targeted based on Facebook’s audience filtering and remain invisible 
to users other than those specifically selected in line with the filtering criteria. 
In this kind of microtargeting there is little transparency or accountability either 
in relation to any false or factual claims made in those ads or in relation to the 
selection both of filtering criteria and of users who are predicted to meet those 
criteria. This lack of transparency and accountability also extends to the fact 
that Facebook generally doesn’t disclose which organisations are spending what 
money on which ads.  
 
This lack of transparency and accountability means that a range of actors 
beyond campaigns may be able to take advantage of the surveillance and 
microtargeting services offered by Facebook. Indeed, it is apparent that some of 
the microtargeting has taken place under the direction of foreign governments 
seeking to influence democratic votes. In September 2017 Facebook reported 
that targeted political advertising had been purchased by Russian entities 
during the 2016 Presidential election period and that it had passed evidence of 
this to the US special counsel investigating Russian interference in the 
election98. Facebook says that Russian entities masquerading as US users placed 
some 3,000 ads, focusing on divisive political and social issues, in 2015 and 
2016 as they sought to influence the election99. In total, some 10 million people 
in the US are estimated by Facebook to have been exposed to Russian 
microtargeted advertising before and after the 2016 Presidential election, with 
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most adverts focusing on socially and politically divisive issues such as LGBT 
rights, race relations, and gun control100. In response, Facebook has indicated 
that it intends to end the practice of dark posts in relation to political 
advertising, and that it intends to increase transparency and accountability in a 
number of ways101. This includes by providing contextual information on which 
organisation paid for each ad, by allowing users to see other ads paid for by that 
organisation which are not targeted to them, and by requiring that companies 
wishing to place political advertising during US federal elections provide 
evidence that they are who they say they are. 
 
Microtargeted advertising is one of several ways by which public space can be 
algorithmically manipulated for political ends, and has begun to be used 
extensively in political campaigning both in the US and the UK. This repurposes 
the technologies of power of surveillance capitalism, which exist to predict and 
influence human behaviour at scale and with ever-increasing accuracy, for 
political purposes, seeking to exercise control over the agency of the digital 
citizen as a political actor. In doing so, surveillance-based microtargeting 
creates informational asymmetries between voters and campaigns and between 
campaigns themselves, and thus imbalances in the possession of and potential 
access to knowledge, and amplifying the influence of capital in the electoral 
process. And the opaque and unaccountable nature of these practices has 
opened the way for foreign actors to exercise influence over democratic 
elections.  
 
5.2.3 | Contextualising Microtargeting 
 
What we see, then, with these voter surveillance and microtargeting practices is 
that the digital citizen in exercising their agency as a political actor – involved in 
liberal individualist and consumer forms of online political participation and 
acting out the process of perpetual engagement and choice-making in the 
marketised state, including the public sphere, in the pursuit of their own 
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utilities as is expected of all sovereign citizens in neo-liberalism – is exposed to 
new forms of control by political organisations who make use of the apparatus 
and governmentality of surveillance capitalism for their own purposes in the 
online public sphere. The process of self-commodification – which, again, is 
expected of all citizens in neo-liberalism and which is taken advantage of by 
surveillance capitalism as it datafies and thus appropriates the commodified 
individual and sells them for profit – also allows the digital citizen to more 
easily datafied, filtered, and microtargeted in this context.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the consumer forms of politics seen online mean that 
the digital citizen must primarily exercise their agency as a political actor 
through active choice-making. Yet, as the sovereign individual of neo-liberalism, 
the digital citizen themselves is responsible for their failure to exercise that 
agency without succumbing to outside influence, despite the effectiveness of 
algorithmic governmentality, including the hypervisibility created by 
surveillance and algorithmic analysis and the power of hypernudges, in 
predicting and modifying human behaviour. These forms of control seek to 
leverage informational asymmetries so as to appropriate that agency, and 
thereby to influence the digital citizen to exercise that agency in such a way as 
to benefit the political organisations in question (whether through donating, 
through attempting to influence the opinions of others, or through voting). 
Similar informational asymmetries also disadvantage non-establishment and 
less resourced political parties, campaigns, and candidates, with the effect of 
increasing the influence and therefore the power of capital in the democratic 
process, thus reinforcing disciplinary neo-liberalism as it seeks to ‘lock in’ the 
power gains that capital has made in society more generally over the last few 
decades.  
 
In this way, forms of coercive power which were developed in order to pursue 
the rationalities of surveillance capitalism by appropriating the agency of the 
neo-liberal digital citizen as a social and economic actor and directing it for 
commercial gain are repurposed by political parties and campaigns in order to 
appropriate their agency as a political actor and direct it for political gain. 
The Algorithmic Manipulation of Online Public Space | Chapter 5 
  
 
Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 184 
  
However, and while it is indeed the case that the practices described herein 
represent a different application of the same targeting tools which were initially 
developed for use in a commercial context and which were discussed in Chapter 
3, what is clear from the preceding discussion is that the effect of using these 
tools in a political context for microtargeting is specific and specifically 
detrimental to the political process and to the public sphere. The practices of 
voter surveillance and microtargeting therefore bring powerful coercive tools 




5.3 | Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have identified the technologies of power based around 
surveillance and big data that the digital citizen encounters as a political actor in 
the online world, and seen some of the ways in which these new forms of 
control impact on the democratic process more generally. Far from providing 
for a new arena for a renewed public sphere of uncoerced discussion, what we 
have seen developing online are instead spaces where, in pursuit of certain 
agendas, voters are surveilled by political campaigns in order to enable the 
microtargeting of tailored advertising targeted directly to them so as to 
influence their behaviour as a political actor. As such, the public spaces that 
have developed on the internet cannot be considered to provide for an online 
renewal of the public sphere but instead to continue the decline identified by 
Habermas. 
 
Here we have explored how voter surveillance and microtargeting by political 
campaigns and foreign influences takes advantage of services offered by sites 
like Facebook which have built powerful engines for predicting and modifying 
human behaviour in pursuit of the rationalities of surveillance capitalism. In this 
the digital citizen is subject to new dataveillance-based forms of control, in 
which the algorithmic governmentality of surveillance capitalism is repurposed 
for political ends. We have identified the ways in which this creates 
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informational asymmetries – and therefore knowledge and power asymmetries 
– between voters and campaigns as well as between campaigns themselves, 
thus potentially greatly increasing the influence of capital in the electoral 
process and reinforcing disciplinary neo-liberalism as it seeks to ‘lock in’ the 
power gains made by capital over the last few decades. In doing so we have seen 
how the governmentalities, rationalities, and technologies of power that operate 
in these online settings work to influence the political behaviour of the digital 
citizen. These involve surveillance, big data techniques, and algorithmic control 
for the purpose of appropriating the political agency of the digital citizen and 
exerting control over them as a political actor – taking advantage of features of 
neo-liberal digital citizenship, including the prominence of liberal individualist 
forms of online consumer politics and the need for perpetual choice-making in 
the marketised state, encompassing the public sphere, as well as the self-
commodification that facilitates surveillance capitalism – and we can place 
these alongside the forms of control over them as an economic and social actor 
identified in previous chapters.  
 
At the core of the concept of the idealised public sphere lies the principle that 
people should be able to come together freely, without coercion, to discuss ideas 
and exchange information. This is not the case online. The use of these 
technologies of power should be understood as attempts to algorithmically 
engineer the public in order to manipulate public space, and may give 
corporations, capital, and political organisations undue influence over the 
digital citizen and the democratic process. Online public spaces are not, 
therefore, sites of uncoerced debate. Instead they are spaces in which the digital 
citizen is subjected to powerful new forms of political influence and control, 
making them coercive spaces in which the technologies of power of algorithmic 
governmentality are utilised for political ends. Through these technologies, the 
way that the contemporary internet operates leaves the digital citizen in the 
neo-liberal mould open to new forms of political control, further empowering 
corporations, capital, and the political establishment at our expense and 
continuing the decline of the public sphere. And by locating the algorithmic 
manipulation of online public space in the context of the commercial 
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surveillance regimes discussed in Chapter 3 we can understand this to be the 
product of human choices made in the pursuit of rationalities in which public 
space becomes amenable to manipulation by political forces as well as 
commodification and control by corporations. 
 
In the next chapter we will assess the challenges that the surveillance practices 
discussed in this thesis so far, including those in the public sphere, pose for data 
protection and privacy. We will also look at some of the reforms that have been 
proposed or are forthcoming, as well as the extent to which data protection and 
privacy law may allow the digital citizen, as a self-managing sovereign actor, to 
manage and thus protect their privacy and their data. 
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So far we have seen how dataveillance is employed by corporations that seek 
the commodification of life through surveillance capitalism, by the State as it 
seeks to pursue security concerns and uphold the existing neo-liberal order 
through the digital panopticon, and by political parties and campaigns who seek 
to maximise their vote and maintain their position through voter surveillance 
and microtargeting. We have set out the links between these practices to show 
how they overlap and complement each other, blurring the distinctions between 
corporate, State, and political power. And we have discussed how these 
practices remake the relationship between the digital citizen and the 
corporation, between the digital citizen and the State, and between the digital 
citizen and political organisations. In all, we’ve shown that digital citizenship in 
the neo-liberal mould opens the individual up to these new forms of 
surveillance-based control, which seek to appropriate or control the social, 
economic, and political agency of the digital citizen in pursuit of economic, 
security, and political rationalities. In this chapter, we will look at the 
restrictions imposed on these practices by privacy and data protection law, the 
rights and remedies available to digital citizens in those frameworks that allow 
them to challenge such practices, and the effectiveness of these laws in 
providing protections in the era of dataveillance. 
 
Online privacy is often thought of as being a matter of protecting our personal 
information from being seen by other people, and it is often assumed that in 
behaving properly and not disclosing too much information to others our 
privacy can be protected. But in focusing on other people we overlook the fact 
that in surveillance capitalism there is and can be no such thing as true privacy. 
Hypervisibility is central to the business model that drives the biggest players in 
the technology sector, raising questions of privacy and control of personal data. 
And hypervisibility is also central to the effectiveness of the digital panopticon, 
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both through the transfer of data between surveillance capitalism corporations 
and the security and intelligence agencies and through the State’s own data 
collection and analysis practices. Foucault wrote that “visibility is a trap”1, 
allowing the individual to be known and controlled, and while protections for 
privacy potentially offer an escape from this trap it should not be expected that 
these corporations will give up the significant profits that they can make 
through dataveillance easily, or that the State will willingly give up its ability to 
conduct mass surveillance. Indeed, when Hal Varian predicts that “By 2025, the 
current debate about privacy will seem quaint and old-fashioned ... Everyone will 
expect to be tracked and monitored, since the advantages, in terms of convenience, 
safety, and services, will be so great” 2 this should be taken as a statement of 
intent.  
 
We will first address the issues raised by dataveillance in the context of 
surveillance capitalism, discussing how the prevailing ‘notice and consent’ 
model of data protection has been rendered inadequate by big data and 
predictive analytics, and will look at whether forthcoming reforms to data 
protection law, including the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation3 (‘GDPR’), 
can adequately address these issues. We will then assess the extent to which the 
voter surveillance and microtargeting practices described in Chapter 5 will be 
permissible under GDPR and the EU’s proposed ePrivacy Regulation4, 
identifying the restrictions that will apply to such activities under that 
legislation, the obligations placed on political organisations that wish to 
microtarget voters, and the tools provided in law for voters to resist these 
practices. Finally, we will examine the compatibility of the British Government’s 
communications data retention and disclosure powers under the Investigatory 
                                                          
1 Foucault, 1991 
2 Raine and Anderson, 2014 
3 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC [2016] OJ L119/1 (‘GDPR’) 
4 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the respect for 
private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 
2002/58/EC ('Draft ePrivacy Regulation') 
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Powers Act with the ePrivacy Directive5 in light of recent decisions of the CJEU. 
These provisions, commonly known as the ‘snooper’s charter’, appear to be 
incompatible with the Directive on a number of grounds.  
 
In all, this chapter will show that pervasive dataveillance poses serious 
challenges for privacy and data protection law and that further reforms may be 
needed, but also that these laws do provide ways to restrict and to challenge 
surveillance practices and do provide some tools which may be of use to the 
digital citizen as they self-manage their privacy and seek to resist control. 
 
 
6.1 | Privacy and Data Protection in Surveillance 
Capitalism 
 
There are real challenges for privacy and data protection in surveillance 
capitalism, and new approaches may be needed. We will set out some of these 
issues and discuss some of the developing legal responses, including GDPR and 
the proposed ePrivacy Regulation, seeking to determine whether they will 
provide effective protections for the digital citizen. 
 
6.1.1 | Challenging Existing Protections 
 
The current approach to privacy and data protection is inadequate. Current and 
planned data protection legislation – such as the Data Protection Act 1998 
(‘DPA’), as well as forthcoming legislation like GDPR and the Data Protection Bill 
– is fundamentally built around a ‘notice and consent’ model. This relies on what 
Solove calls ‘privacy self-management’6, which he says “takes refuge in consent”7. 
But when data about every aspect of life is gathered on a vast scale, when 
predictive algorithmic analysis can potentially disclose a significant amount of 
                                                          
5 Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in 
the electronic communications sector [2002] OJ L201/37 (‘ePrivacy Directive’) 
6 Solove, 2013 
7 Solove, 2013, p.1880 
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private, otherwise unknown information, and when it is in the interests of 
surveillance capitalism corporations to minimise the likelihood of users 
protecting their privacy then whether adequate notice, let alone adequate 
consent, can truly be given comes into question8. 
 
Facebook serves as a typical example of how dataveillance techniques challenge 
existing models. Its data policy is relatively clear about the fact that it uses user 
data to personalise the service that it provides: 
 
“We are able to deliver our Services, personalize content, and make 
suggestions for you by using this information to understand how 
you use and interact with our Services and the people or things 
you’re connected to and interested in on and off our Services”9  
 
But it also talks extensively of ‘sharing’ user data with partners with little 
indication that this actually means selling access to data to third party 
advertisers for profit. Facebook says that in sharing user data it “work[s] with 
third party companies who help us provide and improve our Services or who use 
advertising or related products, which makes it possible to operate our companies 
and provide free services to people around the world”10, but it gives no indication 
of who these third parties are or what they might do with the data.  
 
While Facebook assures its users that none of the data that it shares with third 
parties contains personally identifiable information (the example that it gives of 
what might be shared is “25 year old female, in Madrid, who likes software 
engineering”11), we now know that even apparently anonymous data can be 
used to pinpoint an individual with a high degree of accuracy. In 2008, 
researchers were able to analyse an anonymised dataset of 500,000 Netflix 
subscribers and in doing so re-identified the profiles of known individuals, 
revealing their apparent political preferences and other potentially sensitive 
                                                          
8 See, e.g. Solove, 2013; Hull, 2015 
9 Facebook, 2016 
10 Facebook, 2016 
11 Facebook, 2016 
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information12. They found that someone who knows only a little about a given 
Netflix user was able to re-identify that user’s profile in the dataset13. Likewise, 
Sweeney demonstrated that, even with all other information discarded, 87% of 
Americans can be re-identified with a combination of just their zip code, gender, 
and date of birth, and that 53% of Americans can be re-identified with the less 
specific combination of their location more generally, gender, and date of 
birth14. And when New York City publicly released anonymised data about its 
licenced taxi drivers and the trips they had taken it took less than two hours for 
all 173 million entries to be completely de-anonymised and individuals re-
identified15. Through analysis of publicly-available paparazzi photos of 
celebrities getting in and out of taxis it was determined which celebrities had 
taken which taxis from and to where, how much they had paid, and, in some 
cases, how much they had tipped16. And in 2017 researchers demonstrated that 
web browsing data can be easily de-anonymised and individuals re-identified 
and linked with their social media profiles with a high degree of accuracy17. 
Given Facebook’s example of the information that it may share, the question 
must be asked of how many 25 year old female software engineers there 
actually are in Madrid. Each piece of information about an individual narrows 
the range of who it could be, regardless of whether a name or date of birth is 
included, so it is questionable whether apparently anonymised information 
such as this can ever be truly anonymous.  
 
Beyond this, Crawford and Schultz talk about ‘predictive privacy harms’18, 
where poorly executed analysis creates harm by inferring or predicting 
inaccurate information that impacts on an individual’s life19. This may 
particularly be an issue given the potential for algorithmic bias. But even where 
profiles are accurate there is potential for predictive privacy harm if they are 
                                                          
12 Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008, p.1 
13 Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008, p.1 
14 Sweeney, 2000 
15 Goodin, 2014 
16 Trotter, 2014 
17 Su et al, 2017; see also Hern, 01/08/2017 
18 Crawford and Schultz, 2014 
19 Crawford and Schultz, 2014, p.93 
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not used appropriately – an oft-cited real world example is of a pregnant 
teenage girl whose father, who was unaware of her pregnancy, was alerted 
when the US supermarket Target, which had determined that she was probably 
pregnant through predictive analysis of changes in her shopping habits, sent her 
vouchers for products that pregnant women and new mothers may need20. As 
the girl hadn’t told Target that she was pregnant this involves not just the 
unauthorised disclosure of personal information by Target, but also the 
discovery and unauthorised disclosure of this information by and to Target 
themselves in the first place as well as the exploitation of this information for 
corporate ends. And Facebook’s ‘people you may know’ feature, which suggests 
potential ‘friends’ to connect with on Facebook, has in the past suggested not 
just users’ therapists, but also other patients of their therapists21. Similar issues 
have been highlighted when it comes to sex workers, who may prefer to use a 
pseudonym when dealing with clients, with Facebook revealing their private 
identities to clients and raising very real safety concerns22. Facebook is also 
known to create a ‘shadow’ profile of information that users have never 
disclosed to it but which it has been able to obtain about them from other 
sources, such as other people’s contact lists and phone books, which it uses to 
suggest friends and make other ‘suggestions’. It has even in the past admitting 
to experimenting with using mobile phone location data to determine which 
people may know each other based on geographical proximity23. Given the 
potential for predictive privacy harms, it is questionable whether even users 
who read privacy notices have an informed understanding of the extent to 
which the data they are giving up may be used to reveal private information 
about them. And the potential for predictive privacy harms, as well as the 
potential for harm caused by re-identification or unauthorised disclosure of 
data, may be taken to extremes by the internet of things. IoT devices could 
gather significant amounts of data about individuals in the real world, 
potentially far beyond that obtained through the surveilling of behavioural data 
online. This may reveal much about an individual, and the potential for harm 
                                                          
20 Duhigg, 2012 
21 Tait, 2016 
22 Hill, 2017 
23 Conger, 28/06/2016 
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either through re-identification or through predictive analytics could be greatly 
amplified.  
 
As well as these issues, privacy notices themselves are often deeply problematic. 
They are often long and complex – one study estimates that it would take 244 
hours each year to read every privacy notice seen by the average digital 
citizen24 – and often obfuscate with euphemisms and legalese25. Solove observes 
that studies have repeatedly shown that most people neither read nor 
understand privacy notices26 and concludes that, in any case, given the nature of 
dataveillance and the extent to which it occurs across many different platforms, 
“even well-informed and rational individuals cannot appropriately self-manage 
their privacy”27. Acquisti et al, in their review of the literature on this topic28, 
find that there is considerable uncertainty on the part of users as to the 
consequences of giving consent to data sharing, and that their choice to consent 
or not is heavily dependent on contextual clues provided by the websites 
themselves. Yeung argues that “the primary business model through which Big 
Data is being monetised preys directly upon the susceptibility of individuals’ 
privacy behaviour to subconscious external influence, particularly the powerful 
heuristics associated with ostensibly ‘free’ services”29. As a result of this, and of 
the issues highlighted above, Yeung goes as far as to call privacy notices in the 
context of dataveillance deceptive30. As Cate and Mayer-Schönberger point out, 
the challenges posed by big data to the notice and consent can “leave individuals’ 
privacy badly exposed, as individuals are forced to make overly complex decisions 
based on limited information, while data processors can perhaps too easily point 
to the formality of notice and consent and thereby abrogate much of their 
responsibility”31.  
 
                                                          
24 McDonald and Cranor, 2008 
25 Turow, 2008, p.62 
26 Solove, 2013, pp.1884-1885 
27 Solove, 2013, p.1881 
28 Acquisti et al, 2015, 509–514 
29 Yeung, 2017, p.126 
30 Yeung, 2017, p.127 
31 Cate and Mayer-Schönberger, 2013, p.68 
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What is clear, then, is that the current model of notice and consent provides 
inadequate protections for the digital citizen. Big data practices in the context of 
surveillance capitalism expose significant flaws in this model of protection, and 
raise important questions. How can adequate notice be given when it is 
impossible to say what predictive analysis might reveal about an individual? 
How can an individual give informed consent when they can’t reasonably be 
expected to understand what they’re consenting to? The digital citizen is 
expected to protect their privacy and their personal data within a framework 
that is wholly inadequate for that purpose. Yet, as we saw in Chapter 232, neo-
liberalism, in imbuing the individual with personal responsibility for all aspects 
of their life, places responsibility for failing to fulfil their role as the active, 
informed, self-managing citizen, regardless of informational, educational, or 
structural factors that lie beyond their control. And one of the central themes of 
self-management in neo-liberal digital citizenship is management of the digital 
self, including privacy self-management. In line with this, relying on notice and 
consent despite its inadequacies places responsibility for privacy protection – 
and therefore responsibility for failures to adequately protect privacy resulting 
in privacy violations – firmly with the individual. Indeed, Fuchs goes as far as to 
call research into this ‘victimisation research’33, such is the extent that the 
individual is held responsible for privacy violations that, in truth, may be 
beyond their control. 
 
Approaches which can be more effective in the contemporary digital society are 
therefore sorely needed if we are to move beyond a model of protection which 
victimises digital citizens for failures beyond their control. As such, we turn now 





                                                          
32 Chapter 2.3 
33 Fuchs, 2011, p.146 
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6.1.2 | Protecting Privacy 
 
Recognising that existing data protection frameworks are outdated and 
potentially ineffective in the modern world, the EU introduced GDPR to update 
and reform the legal regime. Coming into force until May 2018, it attempts to 
resolve some of the issues with notice and consent and forms the basis for other 
proposed reforms to privacy and data protection frameworks such as the EU’s 
ePrivacy Regulation and the UK’s Data Protection Bill. It’s notable that GDPR 
was an initiative driven forward by a German Green Party MEP, Jan Albrecht, a 
representative from perhaps the most privacy-conscious Member State (as a 
result of German experiences under secret police from the 1930s through to the 
1980s) and of a political tradition that stands at odds with the neo-liberal 
ideology which has prevailed in many parts of the west over much of the last 
few decades. As noted in Chapter 234, while the general direction of reform over 
the last few decades in many western countries has been towards neo-
liberalisation, not all reforms have been neo-liberal in nature and they have 
often departed from that general direction. The adoption of GDPR by the EU is 
perhaps an indication of the extent to which the trend towards national-level 
neo-liberal politics may not always translate to neo-liberal reform at a 
supranational-level, where law, policy, and regulation takes into consideration 
the viewpoints and priorities of representatives from a variety of countries with 
different political cultures. 
 
GDPR sets out some limitations on the use of personal data which may on the 
face of it be relevant in terms of limiting the practices of surveillance capitalism. 
GDPR requires that personal data be processed only for “specified, explicit and 
legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible 
with those purposes”35 (a principle known as ‘purpose limitation’). It also 
requires that only data that is adequate, relevant and limited to what is 
necessary for the purpose be processed36 (‘data minimisation’), and that 
                                                          
34 Chapter 2.1.2 
35 GDPR, art.5(1)(b) 
36 GDPR, art.5(1)(c) 
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personal data be stored for no longer than is necessary for that purpose37 
(‘storage limitation’). These principles may appear to pose a problem for 
surveillance capitalism – as Edwards and Veale point out, for example, in 
Amazon’s business model data collected for sell books is repurposed to sell 
adverts for book buyers38. Surveillance capitalism corporations may also take 
issue with being unable to store personal data indefinitely, and as they seek to 
obtain as much data about individuals and their lives as possible they may 
process far more data than is necessary for the purpose being sought.  
 
GDPR also codifies the ‘right to be forgotten’ first established in the Google Spain 
case39. This allows a data subject to request that a data controller delete their 
personal data in a number of circumstances, including, inter alia, where the 
personal data is no longer necessary for the purposes for which it was collected 
and where the data subject objects to its processing40. However, the European 
Commission’s Article 29 Data Protection Working Party has issued guidance on 
the right to portability under GDPR which makes clear that information about 
an individual which has been inferred from data provided by that individual 
(such as that obtained through predictive analysis of behavioural data) does not 
‘belong’ to the data subject41 (although, as Edwards and Veale observe, this 
appears to conflict with Google Spain42). There therefore seems to be an 
ambiguity about the precise extent to which the right to be forgotten applies 
under GDPR. 
 
And GDPR potentially expands the scope of data protection by expanding the 
definition of personal data. Whereas, for example, DPA applied to data relating 
to a person who may be identified from that data (or from that data and other 
information held by or likely to come into the possession of the controller)43, 
GDPR extends the definition of personal data to cover “any information relating 
                                                          
37 GDPR, art.5(1)(e) 
38 Edwards and Veale, 2017, p.11 
39 Google Spain v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and González [2014] WLR(D) 202 
40 GDPR, art.17(1) 
41 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2016, p.8 
42 Edwards and Veale, 2017, pp.35-36 
43 Data Protection Act 1998 (‘DPA 1998’), s.1 
Privacy, Data Protection, and Online Surveillance | Chapter 6 
  
 
Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 197 
  
to an identified or identifiable natural person”, and further provides that “an 
identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in 
particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, 
location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, 
physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural 
person”44. This means that personal data now explicitly includes online 
identifiers, ‘pseudonymous’ data (that is, data which has been anonymised but 
when combined with other data can be related to an identifiable person)45, and 
a data profile of an individual which could be used to single them out46. A 
similarly extended definition of personal data is also included in the Data 
Protection Bill47. And the processing of personal data by a controller outside the 
EU but relating to profiling of behaviour which takes place inside the EU comes 
under GDPR’s remit, particularly when such profiling is “in order to take 
decisions concerning her or him or for analysing or predicting her or his personal 
preferences, behaviours and attitudes”48. A profile consisting solely of 
anonymised behavioural data relating to an indirectly identifiable individual 
located in the EU, which does not itself directly identify an individual and so 
may not have formerly been considered to be personal data under DPA, for 
example, would now come within the scope of GDPR, and would do so 
regardless of whether the data processing took place inside the EU or not. 
 
As well as extending the definition of personal data, GDPR expands the scope of 
‘special’ categories of personal data that receive protections above and beyond 
those applicable to ‘ordinary’ personal data (data falling into one of these 
categories is called ‘sensitive data’ in GDPR49 and ‘sensitive personal data’ in 
DPA50). Under GDPR, biometric data, (“personal data resulting from specific 
technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural 
characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm the unique 
                                                          
44 GDPR, art.4(1) 
45 GDPR, art.4(5) 
46 GDPR, recital 26 
47 DPB, clause 2(2)-(3) 
48 GDPR, recital 24 
49 GDPR, recital 10 
50 DPA 1998, s.2 
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identification of that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic 
data”51) and health data (“personal data related to the physical or mental health 
of a natural person, including the provision of health care services, which reveal 
information about his or her health status”52) will be considered to be sensitive 
data – as will, inter alia, data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, 
and religious beliefs, or concerning sex life or sexual orientation – and its 
processing will in most cases require explicit consent from the data subject53. 
This includes the processing of sensitive data obtained directly from data 
subjects, but information falling into any special category which is inferred from 
ordinary personal data, rather than obtained directly, as in the example of the 
pregnant teenage shopper at Target, is also considered sensitive data54, as is 
apparently ordinary personal data from which information falling into one of 
the special categories can be inferred55.  
 
Moving on, GDPR provides various grounds for the lawful processing of 
personal data. Two of these – that the data subject has consented to the 
processing56 (requiring explicit consent for sensitive data57), and that the 
processing is in the legitimate interests of the controller (which is applicable 
only to ordinary personal data)58 – may be of relevance to surveillance 
capitalism. We will deal with the legitimate interests ground first. This requires 
a balance between the legitimate interests of the data controller and the 
interests and rights of the data subject, so may not be invoked in all 
circumstances. And the Article 29 Working Party has said in the context of the 
Data Protection Directive, which precedes GDPR and provides for the same 
balancing test59,  that data controllers who “monitor the on-line or off-line 
activities of their customers, combine vast amounts of data about them from 
                                                          
51 GDPR, art.4(14) 
52 GDPR, art.4(15) 
53 GDPR, art.9 
54 Edwards and Veale, 2017, p.14 
55 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2011, p.6 
56 GDPR, art.6(a) 
57 GDPR, art.(9)(2)(a) 
58 GDPR, art.6(f) 
59 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data 95/46/EC [1995] OJ L281/31 (‘Data Protection Directive’), art7(2) 
Privacy, Data Protection, and Online Surveillance | Chapter 6 
  
 
Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 199 
  
different sources that were initially collected in other contexts and for different 
purposes, and create - and, for example, with the intermediary of data brokers, 
also trade in - complex profiles of the customers' personalities and preferences” 
without their consent are likely to present a “significant intrusion” into the 
privacy of the data subject and the controller’s legitimate interest would be 
overridden by the interest and rights of the data subject60. So it would seem that 
the legitimate interest ground for processing ordinary personal data is unlikely 
to be available to corporations engaged in the practices of surveillance 
capitalism. This leaves consent as the only ground which potentially can apply. 
 
GDPR deals with some of the issues with notice and consent directly. It provides 
that notice must be “presented in a manner which is clearly distinguishable from 
the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and 
plain language”. Notice which does not meet these requirements will be not be 
binding61. GDPR also says that in assessing whether consent is freely given, 
utmost account shall be taken of whether the provision of a service is 
conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that isn’t necessary for 
the provision of that service62. This potentially mitigates to some extent the 
problem of privacy notices being buried in excessively long documents or 
obfuscated by legalese, but does not solve the problem of data subjects being 
unable to reasonably foresee the consequences of giving consent.  
 
In order to address this issue to some degree, GDPR provides that an array of 
information must all be given to data subjects where personal data is collected 
from them and where they do not already have that information. This 
information includes, inter alia, contact details of those holding the data, the 
purposes for which the data is being processed and the legal basis for its 
processing, how long the data will be stored for, whether it will be used for 
automated decision-making (including profiling), meaningful information about 
the logic of any automated decision-making process and the significance and 
                                                          
60 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2014, p.26 
61 GDPR, art.7(2)  
62 GDPR, art.7(4)  
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potential consequences of that activity in certain cases, and information on the 
right to withdraw consent at any time63 (data processors will be obliged to 
delete personal data if the data subject withdraws consent64). The obligation to 
provide this information also extends to situations where personal data is 
inferred through profiling65. In those cases, information must be provided 
within one month of the inference occurring66 and must also detail the 
categories of personal data which have been inferred and the purposes for 
which such inferred data is to be processed67. 
 
GDPR’s requirement that data subjects be informed about the logic, significance, 
and consequences of automated decision-making, reflecting a similar but more 
limited duty under the Data Protection Directive, on the face of it appears to 
allow for individuals to have more knowledge about the analysis being 
performed with their data and about what kind of information this could reveal 
and so would seem to address some issues with algorithmic opacity. However, 
this requirement is limited to decisions that have legal or similarly significant 
effects on a data subject68, which would likely not ordinarily include the 
provision of targeted advertising69 (but may include situations where, for 
example, someone with serious financial difficulties is regularly shown ads for 
gambling, signs up for those services, and ends up in further debt70). It may be 
the case that extending this to cover decisions other than those which have legal 
or similarly significant effects would go some way towards addressing 
algorithmic opacity. Indeed, the Article 29 Working Party says that such an 
approach should be considered ‘best practice’71. But the benefit of even this is 
questionable. Wachter et al argue that what is provided for in GDPR does not 
amount to a ‘right to explanation’ of how an automated decision relating a data 
                                                          
63 GDPR, art.13 
64 GDPR, art.17 
65 GDPR, art.14 
66 GDPR, art.14(3) 
67 GDPR, art.14(1) 
68 GDPR, art.22(1) 
69 Mendoza and Bygrave, 2017; Edwards and Veale, 2017; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
2017, p.11 
70 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2017, p.11 
71 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2017, p.13 
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subject has been made72, as has been claimed73, but perhaps only a more limited 
‘right to be informed’ of the broad functionality of the decision making system in 
general74. This view is supported by the Article 29 Working Party’s guidelines, 
which also characterise the ‘right to an explanation’ as a right to be informed75. 
And Edwards and Veale warn that relying on a right to explanation may at best 
turn out to be a distraction (not least because providing a satisfactory and 
readily understandable explanation of machine learning processes may not be 
possible76) and at worst may nurture a new kind of “transparency fallacy”77, 
similar to the problems with notice and consent, as individuals are “mostly too 
time-poor, resource-poor, and lacking in the necessary expertise to meaningfully 
make use of these individual rights”78.  
 
There are major issues with the protection of data and privacy in the era of big 
data, and specifically around the model of notice and consent, but there are also 
signs of progress. New legal regimes such as GDPR may go some way towards 
giving the digital citizen more effective tools for protecting their privacy, their 
data, and themselves. While GDPR is still fundamentally built around notice and 
consent, and therefore fails to overcome all of those problems, it does provide 
some potentially valuable reforms to that regime which may go some way at 
least towards ameliorating those issues. Indeed, we will now move on to look at 
how the framework involving GDPR and the proposed ePrivacy Regulation may 
be able to limit the voter surveillance and microtargeting practices discussed in 
Chapter 5, before assessing the extent to which the existing ePrivacy Directive 
may, in light of recent decisions of the CJEU, provide a means to challenge the 




                                                          
72 Wachter et al, 2017 
73 Goodman and Flaxman, 2016 
74 Wachter et al, 2017, p.78 
75 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2017, pp.11-14, p.24 
76 Edwards and Veale, 2017, p.29 
77 Edwards and Veale, 2017, p.1 
78 Edwards and Veale, 2017, p.34 
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6.2 | Data Protection and Voter Microtargeting 
 
In the UK, political organisations79 are not allowed to advertise freely on 
television80, instead being allocated party political broadcasts slots based on 
their electoral performance81. But other political advertising, including the 
online microtargeting discussed in Chapter 5, is essentially untouched by 
advertising regulations82, and the Electoral Commission’s role in regulating non-
televisual political advertising, including microtargeting and other online 
advertising, is limited83. However, there are questions about the legality of such 
voter surveillance and microtargeting by political organisations in the UK under 
DPA. Indeed, the Information Commissioner’s Office (‘ICO’) announced in March 
2017 that it is investigating the use of data in both the 2015 general election and 
the 2016 Brexit referendum84. And in May 2017 the ICO further announced that 
it will investigate the use of these practices by UK political parties in that year’s 
general election85. It remains to be seen what conclusions the ICO will reach in 
relation to DPA, but GDPR will in May 2018 replace data protection legislation 
in each Member State, including DPA. So while the ICO is investigating voter 
surveillance and microtargeting under the existing legal regime, it is perhaps 
more relevant in terms of future activities to determine the extent to which it 
may be lawful under GDPR.  
 
To try to answer this question, we will first look at pertinent aspects of the EU’s 
proposed ePrivacy Regulation86, which will regulate online direct marketing. 
Although the Regulation is still to be finalised, it is to sit alongside and augment 
                                                          
79 Meaning here a person or organisation registered with the Electoral Commission under section 23 
of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 
80 Communications Act 2003, s.319; s.321 
81 Communications Act 2003, s.333 
82 Tambini et al, 2017, p.8 
83 Electoral Commission, 2016; while there is a reasonable argument that the Electoral Commission 
should have a greater role in regulating microtargeting, the fact that these practices are 
fundamentally grounded in the processing of personal data and make use of commercial behavioural 
targeting tools (and therefore come within the remit of data protection law) mean that the ICO is 
perhaps better placed. 
84 Doward et al, 2017 
85 Denham, 2017 
86 Draft ePrivacy Regulation 
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GDPR. We will then set out the pertinent provisions of GDPR as well as some 
relevant points from the UK’s proposed Data Protection Bill (‘DPB’), and in the 
process will discuss the extent to which these practices will be legally 
permissible under this regime and in what circumstances this will be the case. 
Although microtargeting can take place in a number of ways, including over the 
phone, via email, and through the post, we will focus here on how microtargeted 
political advertising takes place over the internet on social media sites or 
elsewhere. 
 
6.2.1 | Microtargeting and the ePrivacy Regulation 
 
We must, due to the restrictions placed on direct marketing, consider whether 
the microtargeting of voters by political organisations, either directly or 
through social media, can be considered to fall into that category of activity. DPA 
defined direct marketing as “the communication (by whatever means) of any 
advertising or marketing material which is directed to particular individuals”87, 
and the Information Tribunal found that this includes such activity by political 
parties88. The current legislation regulating direct marketing in the UK is the 
Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 200389 
(based on the proposed ePrivacy Regulation’s predecessor, the ePrivacy 
Directive90), but the Regulations only place substantive restrictions and 
requirements on direct marketing through telephone calls91, fax92, and email93 
(which, for the purposes of the Regulations, includes SMS94) and so are 
inadequate for addressing the kind of microtargeted political advertising which 
occurs online and which has developed since their adoption. However, the 
ePrivacy Regulation will replace existing legislation on this, and may extend to 
targeted advertising. Article 4 defines direct marketing as “any form of 
                                                          
87 DPA 1998, s.11 
88 Scottish National Party v Information Commissioner [2006] UKIT EA_2005_0021 
89 Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (‘2003 Regulations’) 
90 ePrivacy Directive 
91 2003 Regulations, reg.19; reg.21 
92 2003 Regulations, reg.20 
93 2003 Regulations, reg.22 
94 2003 Regulations, reg.2(1) 
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advertising, whether written or oral, sent to one or more identified or identifiable 
end-users of electronic communications services, including the use of automated 
calling and communication systems with or without human interaction, electronic 
mail, SMS, etc.”95. There are three issues to consider here – first, the meaning of 
‘advertising’; second, the meaning of ‘identified or identifiable end-user’; and, 
third, whether microtargeted political advertising is ‘sent’ to an identified or 
identifiable end-user. 
 
The first two can be quickly dealt with. The ePrivacy Regulation does not define 
‘advertising’, but its recitals state that direct marketing “should also include 
messages sent by political parties that contact natural persons via electronic 
communications services in order to promote their parties”96. While recitals are 
not binding they are essential to interpretation, so such activity by political 
organisations is likely to be considered advertising in this context. And in terms of 
the meaning of ‘identified or identifiable end-user’, the Regulation itself is again 
silent on the definition, but it imports GDPR’s definitions where relevant97. So 
‘identifiable end-user’ here would have the same definition as in GDPR – i.e. a 
person who can be identified directly or indirectly, including, but not limited to, 
by “a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one 
or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, 
cultural or social identity of that natural person”98.  
 
And microtargeted advertising, whether through social media or not, will almost 
always be sent to an individual or group of individuals who can be identified in 
some way, whether directly or indirectly, either through their name, through an 
identification number (such as a data profile ID number), through an online 
identifier (such as an IP address), through some combination of the factors 
specific to the identity of those individuals, and so on. This will be particularly 
so if individuals are microtargeted using tools such as Facebook’s Custom 
Audiences, which allows advertisers to match Facebook accounts to known 
                                                          
95 Draft ePrivacy Regulation, art.4(3)(f) 
96 Draft ePrivacy Regulation, recital 32 
97 Draft ePrivacy Regulation, art.4(1)(a) 
98 GDPR, art.4 
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individuals in their databases and target them specifically and directly. So the 
ePrivacy Regulation’s definition of direct marketing would appear to include 
microtargeted political advertising, particularly where sent through social 
media sites, as it will in most cases have been sent to an identified or 
identifiable end-user (although non-targeted political advertising would not be 
direct marketing and so would fall outside of the Regulation).  
 
In terms of substance, the ePrivacy Regulation contains restrictions on direct 
marketing. These include the need for users to opt-in to being contacted99, 
except in limited circumstances where contact details have been obtained as 
part of the sale of goods or services and are being used to make a subsequent 
offer of similar goods or services and where the recipient has been given the 
clear and distinct opportunity to opt-out100. So, whatever the legal basis for 
voter surveillance under GDPR, the actual act of contacting voters with 
microtargeted advertising will in most circumstances require the recipient to 
have opted-in to being contacted. As well as this, direct marketing must identify 
itself as such, must state who is sending it, and must inform the recipient of 
their right to withdraw their consent, in an easy manner, to receiving further 
communications101. 
 
6.2.2 | Voter Surveillance and GDPR 
 
We will now set out the relevant provisions of GDPR, and will highlight 
similarities to and differences from the DPA regime. And, while GDPR has direct 
effect in EU Member States without further enactment, and while the European 
Union (Withdrawal) Bill proposes to transfer GDPR into domestic law once the 
UK has left the EU102, the Government has proposed the new Data Protection Bill 
to complement, restrict, or otherwise clarify various provisions of GDPR. At the 
time of writing the Bill is making its way through Parliament, so is subject to 
                                                          
99 Draft ePrivacy Regulation, art.16(1) 
100 Draft ePrivacy Regulation, art.16(2) 
101 Draft ePrivacy Regulation, art.16(6) 
102 European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, clause 3 
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change, but there a few points of significance which will be noted where 
relevant. 
 
Defining Personal Data 
 
Under GDPR, personal data is “any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person”103 (with the meaning of ‘identifiable natural person’ 
as set out previously). Compared to DPA – which defined personal data as that 
from which a living person can be identified, either from that data alone or from 
that data and other data held by the controller104 – GDPR clarifies the scope of 
‘personal data’ to now explicitly include online identifiers, pseudonymous data, 
and profiles that allow an individual to be singled out or identified105. This will 
include personal data inferred from other personal data, such as through 
predictive analytics, as long as it relates to an identified or identifiable natural 
person. 
 
Data Processing Principles 
 
As with DPA, GDPR sets out several principles that apply to the processing of 
personal data106. A few are of particular relevance here. Personal data should 
only be collected for specified and explicit purposes and not processed in a 
manner incompatible with those purposes (known as ‘purpose limitation’)107. 
Such data should be adequate, relevant, and limited to what is necessary in 
relation to the purposes for which they are processed (‘data minimisation’)108. 
And personal data should be accurate and kept up to date, and every reasonable 
step must be taken to ensure that inaccurate data is erased or rectified without 
delay (‘accuracy’)109.  
 
                                                          
103 GDPR, art.4(1) 
104 DPA 1998, s.1(1) 
105 GDPR, recital 26; recital 30 
106 GDPR, art.5 GDPR 
107 GDPR, art.5(1)(b)  
108 GDPR, art.5(1)(c)  
109 GDPR, art.5(1)(d)  
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Rights of the Data Subject 
 
GDPR, like DPA, provides that where personal data is processed for direct 
marketing the data subject has the right to object to such processing110, 
explicitly including automated profiling where related to such marketing111. 
And, reflecting the position in the draft ePrivacy Regulation, GDPR provides that 
this right should be explicitly brought to the data subject’s attention and 
presented clearly and separately from any other information when the data 
subject is first contacted112. The data subject also has the right to withdraw 
consent at any time, whatever the purpose of the processing, and should be 
informed of that right when consent is requested. Withdrawing consent should 
be as easy as giving it113. Controllers will be obliged to delete personal data if 
the data subject withdraws consent114. 
 
GDPR further provides that various information must be given to data subjects 
where personal data is collected from them. This includes, inter alia, contact 
details of those holding the data, the purposes for which the data is being 
processed and the legal basis for its processing, how long the data will be stored 
for, whether it will be used for automated decision-making (including profiling) 
and meaningful information about the logic, significance, and potential 
consequences of that decision-making, and about the right to withdraw consent 
at any time115. Substantively the same information should be provided to data 
subjects when personal data relating to them is obtained from sources other 
than directly from the data subject, including where it has been inferred116. In 
these cases, the data subject should also be informed of where the data has 
come from117 and the categories of personal data concerned118. Where personal 
data hasn’t been directly obtained from the data subject, whether through 
                                                          
110 GDPR, art.21(1) 
111 GDPR, art.21(2) 
112 GDPR, art.21(4) 
113 GDPR, art.7(3)  
114 GDPR, art.17  
115 GDPR, art.13  
116 GDPR, art.14 
117 GDPR, art.14(2)(f) 
118 GDPR, art.14(1)(d) 
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inference or otherwise, the above information should be provided within one 
month of the data being obtained by the controller119. All of the required 
information should be provided to data subjects in a concise, transparent, 
intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language120. 
 
Data subjects have a variety of further rights121. These include a right of access 
to personal data, including the right to be told whether personal data 
concerning them is being processed, and a right to rectification of inaccuracies. 
They have a right to erasure of personal data (the ‘right to be forgotten’), which 
applies in a number of circumstances including, inter alia, where the personal 
data is no longer relevant to the purposes for which it was collected and where 
the data subject withdraws consent to processing. Data subjects also have right 
to the restriction of processing where the accuracy of data is disputed, and the 
right to receive personal data concerning them and to transmit that data to 
another controller (the ‘right to portability’). The data subject also has the right 
to object to processing which is undertaken in the pursuit of the controller’s 
legitimate interests, including profiling, and explicitly where data is processed 
for the purposes of direct marketing. 
 
When Personal Data Can Be Processed 
 
As in DPA, personal data under GDPR can be one of two varieties – ‘ordinary’ or 
‘sensitive’ (i.e. data which falls into one of the ‘special categories’ of personal 
data122). The special categories include data which reveals political opinions or 
religious or philosophical beliefs, which are obviously relevant to political 
campaigns, but also other categories of data which may be of use to political 
organisations including on racial or ethnic origin, trade union membership, sex 
life, and sexual orientation123. 
 
                                                          
119 GDPR, art.14(3) 
120 GDPR, art.12(1) 
121 GDPR, arts.15-19; 21 
122 GDPR, recital 10 
123 GDPR, art.9(1) 
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There are several ways that personal data could be considered sensitive. The 
first and most straightforward – reflecting the position in DPA – is where 
personal data obviously falls into one of the special categories and was collected 
directly from a voter, either by a political organisation itself or by a third party 
(which we can call ‘directly sensitive data’). This could be, for example, 
information on how someone voted at a previous election, on how they intend 
to vote at the next election, or relating to their opinion on a particular political 
issue, but could also be information falling into any other special category. The 
second, going beyond DPA, is where apparently ordinary personal data ‘reveals’ 
information which falls into a special category (‘potentially sensitive data’). This 
includes personal data which is not itself sensitive, but from which information 
falling into one of the special categories can be inferred124. The third, which also 
goes beyond DPA, relates to personal data that has been inferred. Where that 
inferred data falls into a special category – for example, if profiling infers a 
voter’s political beliefs – then that inferred data will itself be considered 
sensitive data125 (‘inferred sensitive data’), since personal data is any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable person and sensitive data is 
a subset of personal data.  
 
GDPR also sets out several conditions, not found in DPA, around obtaining valid 
consent126. These include that the controller must be able to demonstrate that 
the data subject consented to processing for the purpose being pursued. GDPR 
also states that if requests for consent are given in the context of a written 
declaration then that request must be clearly distinguishable from other parts of 
the declaration and must be made in an intelligible and easily accessible form, 
using clear and plain language, otherwise consent will not be binding. In 
assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of 
whether the provision of a service is conditional on consent to the processing of 
personal data that isn’t necessary for the provision of that service.  
 
                                                          
124 Bennett 2016, p.266; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2011, p.6 
125 GDPR, recital 60 
126 GDPR, art.7 
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Further restrictions on the processing of ordinary and sensitive personal data 
also apply. And, like DPA, GDPR contains greater restrictions on the processing 
of sensitive personal data than on ordinary personal data. We will discuss 
ordinary and sensitive personal data in turn. 
 
Ordinary Personal Data 
 
GDPR contains similar restrictions to DPA on the processing of ordinary 
personal data. As well as the principles of purpose limitation and data 
minimisation, personal data can be processed only where one of a number of 
conditions is met. These include where the data subject has consented to the 
processing, where the processing is necessary for a task carried out in the public 
interest, or where the processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate 
interests of the data controller or a third party127. GDPR says that the question 
of what can be considered to be in the public interest is to be determined by 
further EU or domestic law128. To this end, DPB says that tasks in the public 
interest in this context do not include activities by political parties129. So there 
are essentially two grounds under which the processing of ordinary data by 
political organisations will be lawful. 
 
The first is with the data subject’s consent. In this case, processing by political 
organisations will be lawful if the data was collected for specified political 
purposes and the processing otherwise complies with the requirements 
applicable to processing personal data. In practice, this means that so long as 
data is obtained either by a political organisation or by a third party with the 
consent of the data subject for political purposes then processing by a political 
organisation for those purposes will be lawful (so long as, if they obtain the data 
from a third party, they do so lawfully and meet the relevant requirements as to 
the provision of information to the data subject). But it should be noted that the 
processing of personal data for the purposes of political microtargeting may 
                                                          
127 GDPR, arts.5-7 
128 GDPR, art.6(2)-(3) 
129 DPB, clause 7 
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constitute a distinct purpose from commercial or other purposes. So social 
media sites which gather data on their users in the UK, which allow political 
organisations to make use of their microtargeted advertising systems, and 
which rely on this ground should make it clear to those users that their data is 
likely to be processed for political purposes as well as for the commercial 
purposes for which it is gathered. 
 
The second is if processing is necessary for the purposes of legitimate interests 
pursued by the data controller. Recital 47 states that direct marketing may be 
considered to be a legitimate interest130, which provides a guide to what this 
may encompass in this context. If this ground applies then ordinary data 
obtained not for political purposes (whether obtained by a political organisation 
or by a third party) could be lawfully processed by political organisations for 
the purposes of microtargeted advertising, and social media sites could process 
ordinary personal data for use in the microtargeting tools that they provide to 
political organisations. If this is indeed the case, then the GDPR right to object to 
the processing of personal data, including profiling, in the context of direct 
marketing would also apply, as would the requirements that the data subject be 
furnished with an array of information when data is collected from them or 
within one month of the data being obtained from elsewhere (including 
information on what the data is to be used for and on their right to object). 
However, the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party has said, in the context 
of the Data Protection Directive, that merely having a legitimate interest in 
processing personal data does not necessarily mean that the processing is 
lawful131. They emphasise that whether the legitimate interests ground applies 
will depend on balancing the rights of the data subject against the legitimate 
interests of the controller, a point which is carried through to GDPR132. And they 
make clear that extensive surveillance of a data subject without their consent in 
order to build up a detailed profile of them involving data from many different 
sources is likely to present a significant intrusion into the data subject’s privacy, 
                                                          
130 GDPR, recital 47 
131 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2014, p.25 
132 GDPR, art.6(1)(f) 
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in which case the legitimate interest would be overridden by the interests and 
rights of the data subject133. So while this ground may apply where political 
organisations are involved in relatively limited surveillance practices, it is not 
likely to be open to those involved in more extensive surveillance or to social 
media sites.  
 
The position set out so far is limited to ordinary personal data. Given that much 
of the information that may be of interest to political organisations is 
considered sensitive, the usefulness to political organisations of these grounds 
for processing may be somewhat limited. And whatever ground is relied on for 
processing ordinary data the ePrivacy Regulation will also apply to 
microtargeted advertising based on that data, including its requirements that 
the communications identify themselves as marketing, identify who has sent the 
communication, and inform the individual of their right to withdraw their 
consent to further communications. We now turn to the question of using 
sensitive personal data, which may be of more use. 
 
Sensitive Personal Data 
 
As with DPA, the processing of sensitive data is prohibited unless an exemption 
is met134. Most of the ten specified exemptions – such as where processing is 
necessary to protect the vital interests of a data subject who is physically or 
legally incapable of giving consent, or where processing is necessary for the 
purposes of preventative or occupational medicine – can be easily discounted so 
far as political organisations are concerned. There are in fact only four which 
may be relevant in this context. The first is that the data subject has explicitly 
consented to the processing for political purposes135; the second is that the data 
subject is a member or former member of the political organisation or is in 
regular contact with it136; the third is that processing is necessary for reasons of 
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134 GDPR, art.9(1) 
135 GDPR, art.9(2)(a) 
136 GDPR, art.9(2)(d) 
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substantial public interest137; and the fourth is that the data has been manifestly 
made public by the data subject138. We will deal with each of these in turn. 
 
The first exemption is that the data subject has explicitly consented to 
processing for political purposes. This exemption is available to political 
organisations, and, unlike the other exemptions, also to social media sites that 
process sensitive data and provide microtargeting tools to political 
organisations. Given the need for explicit consent, the need for data controllers 
to be able to demonstrate that consent has been given, and the requirements 
around requests for consent made in writing, it is difficult to see how the 
processing of inferred sensitive data could be permissible under this exemption. 
And if social media sites gather or infer information about the political beliefs of 
users, or any other sensitive data, including potentially sensitive data, and 
provide this information to political organisations for the purposes of 
microtargeted advertising, or otherwise use it in relation to the microtargeted 
advertising tools that they provide to political organisations, then this use for 
political purposes should be explicitly brought to the data subject’s attention 
and data subjects should give explicit consent to the data’s processing for that 
purpose. Further, if a political organisation is using these tools to microtarget 
voters based on ordinary personal data provided to it by the social media site 
(say, for example, targeting 25 year old married women in London on the basis 
that it believes that this demographic is likely to be receptive to its message, or 
targeting specific individuals that it has selected using its own analysis) then 
this doesn’t necessarily remove the need for an exemption to be met – it may 
simply move the point at which it is required. While the social media site will 
need to have gained consent to the processing of ordinary data for political 
purposes, in relation to the processing that led the political organisation to 
conclude that those voters would be worth targeting the political organisation 
might itself need to meet either the explicit consent exemption or one of the 
others that could apply. 
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The second exemption is that the data subject is a member or former member of 
the political organisation in question or is in regular contact with it in 
connection with its political purposes. This can only apply where processing is 
carried out in the course of the organisation’s legitimate activities, and provided 
the data is not disclosed to a third party without the subject’s consent. As 
discussed previously, ‘legitimate interests’ include direct marketing, so, 
assuming that ‘interests’ and ‘activities’ are two sides of the same coin, 
‘legitimate activities’ seems to permit political parties to process the sensitive 
data of members or former members for microtargeting. But for individuals 
who do not fall into that category it’s unclear what it means for a political 
organisation to have ‘regular contact’ with them in connection with its political 
purposes, and there is no case law on the meaning of the same language in 
either DPA or the Data Protection Directive. But the ICO says, in relation to the 
same wording in DPA, that ‘regular’ does not necessarily mean ‘frequent’, and 
that the exemption will apply where an organisation is providing activities or 
support to the same individuals on an ongoing basis, even if some only contact 
the organisation once139. If this standard is applied similarly in GDPR then it 
seems likely that this exemption will not be available in most cases. 
 
The third exemption is that processing is necessary for reasons of substantial 
public interest. This only applies where the processing is done on the basis of 
EU or domestic law, is proportionate, and respects the essence of the right to 
data protection and provides appropriate safeguards. It’s worth noting that 
recital 56 states that “Where in the course of electoral activities, the operation of 
the democratic system in a Member State requires that political parties compile 
personal data on people's political opinions, the processing of such data may be 
permitted for reasons of public interest, provided that appropriate safeguards are 
established”140. As noted previously, while recitals aren’t binding they are 
essential to interpretation, yet despite the same wording having been used in 
the recitals to the Data Protection Directive141 it is not clear what ‘in the course 
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141 Data Protection Directive, recital 36 
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of electoral activities’ means here142 (whether it means a formal election 
campaign or campaigning more generally), or what it means for the ‘operation 
of the democratic system’ to ‘require’ a political party to compile personal data 
on political opinions. And, again, there appears to be no case law which more 
precisely defines these expressions. 
 
However, we can note that this exemption is applicable only on the basis of EU 
or domestic law143. To this end, DPB establishes that the substantial public 
interest exemption only applies in the UK to the extent permitted therein144. 
Accordingly, under DPB this exemption will only be available where the data 
controller has a ‘policy document’ in place145. Policy documents are to set out 
the data controller’s procedures for securing compliance with the data 
processing principles and to set out their policies relating to the retention and 
erasure of the data held, and should include an indication of how long personal 
data is likely to be retained146. And, under DPB, political organisations will be 
permitted to process sensitive data revealing political opinion where necessary 
for their political activities (explicitly including campaigning, fund-raising, and 
political surveys) without obtaining explicit consent from the data subject, 
provided doing so isn’t likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress 
to a person and provided the data subject hasn’t given written notice requesting 
the organisation cease processing147. This exemption would presumably also 
cover the processing of potentially and inferred sensitive data. 
 
The fourth exemption applies in cases where the data has manifestly been made 
public by the data subject. The wording ‘made public by the data subject’ 
implies that a positive act on the part of the data subject in making the data 
public is required in order for the exemption to apply. This would include data 
on publicly accessible registers, websites, forums, or public social media 
                                                          
142 Bennett, 2016, p.267 
143 GDPR, art.9(2)(g) 
144 DPB, clause 9 
145 DPB, Sch.1, para.5 
146 DPB, Sch.1, para.30 
147 DPB, Sch.1, para.17 
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profiles148. So the processing of sensitive data scraped from sources such as 
these would be permissible under this exemption. 
 
The substantial public interest exemption appears to be the strongest available 
to a political organisation that wishes to process sensitive personal data for its 
own surveillance and microtargeting operations. But it should always be borne 
in mind that even where an exemption is relied upon the ePrivacy Regulation 
will in most cases require that the recipient of political emails or microtargeted 
advertising has consented to being contacted, and will likely require 
microtargeted advertising to identify itself as marketing, to identify who has 
sent the advertising, and to inform the recipient of their right to withdraw 
consent to future contact (the latter of which is also provided for in GDPR). And, 
of course, under any exemption political organisations will be required to 
inform data subjects that they are processing sensitive data relating to them, 
and will be required to provide information about a variety of things, including, 
but not limited to, about the purposes for which data is being processed and 
about the right to object to the processing. Additionally, where the data hasn’t 
been obtained directly from the data subject, such as where it has been inferred, 
obtained from a third party, or scraped from social media sites, the data subject 
will need to be informed about the source of the data and the categories of 
sensitive data involved.  
 
6.2.3 | The Legal Framework in Practice 
 
It appears that neither the draft ePrivacy Regulation nor GDPR in principle 
prevent political organisations from themselves processing personal data in 
order to microtarget voters, as long as the applicable restrictions and 
obligations are complied with. 
 
Where processing ordinary data for political purposes, political organisations 
and social media sites which provide microtargeting tools will in many cases be 
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able to rely on either the consent ground (provided the requirements around 
consent have been complied with) or, for more limited surveillance practices, 
the legitimate interests ground. But ordinary personal data does not include 
data falling into any of the special categories, many of which will be useful to 
political organisations. So the processing of ordinary data may not in practice be 
of much benefit to political organisations. For the processing of sensitive data, 
including potentially sensitive data, political organisations may find the explicit 
consent and substantial public interest exemptions to be the most useful. But 
they may also in more limited circumstances be able to rely on the exemptions 
for members, former members, and individuals with whom they are in regular 
contact, as well as the exemption for data manifestly made public. And social 
media sites which provide microtargeting tools to political organisations are 
likely to only be able to rely on the explicit consent exemption, so should make 
clear to users that their data is to be used for political purposes and obtain 
explicit consent to that activity. If a consent-based ground for processing is 
relied on then the request for consent will need to have been presented clearly, 
in an easily intelligible form, and distinct from any other text, and the fact of 
consent having been granted will need to be demonstrable. And whatever the 
legal basis for processing, organisations will also need to comply with the data 
processing principles, including purpose limitation, data minimisation, and 
accuracy. 
 
Where personal data is being processed by political organisations, whatever the 
legal basis for the processing, those organisations will need to provide a variety 
of information to data subjects. If they have obtained the data directly from data 
subjects then this information will need to be provided at the time, and if the 
data is obtained from other sources – either from a third party or through 
inference – then they will need to provide the same information to data subjects 
within one month, as well as additional information on the categories of data 
being processed, on the purpose of the processing, and on the data subject’s 
right to object to further processing. And where microtargeted advertising is 
sent to end-users – which in most case will only be permissible with the consent 
of the recipient – the communications will need to identify themselves as direct 
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marketing, will need to identify the sender of the communication, and will need 
to inform the recipient of their right to withdraw their consent to further 
contact.  
 
And voters have further rights in relation to these practices. Above all, they have 
the right to withdraw consent to processing where it was granted, and the right 
to object to the further processing of data relating to them which is done on the 
basis of another ground or exemption. They also have the right to be told 
whether political organisations are processing data concerning them, the right 
of access to the data being processed, the right to correct inaccuracies, and the 
right to require that data relating to them is erased where it is no longer 
relevant to the purposes for which it was collected, where consent to its 
processing has been withdrawn, or where the data subject has objected to 
processing (the ‘right to be forgotten’).  
 
In all, the framework to be established by GDPR and the draft ePrivacy 
Regulation restricts the ability of political organisations to undertake voter 
surveillance and microtargeting, whether directly themselves or making use of 
the tools provide by social media sites. It also places obligations on political 
organisations and on those social media sites to limit the purposes for which 
they use data, to provide information to voters who are being surveilled, and, in 
most cases, to gain consent from voters to being contacted with political emails 
or microtargeted advertising. And the rights of data subjects in theory provide 
ways for voters to resist the forms of control represented by voter surveillance 
and microtargeting, which seek to adopt the algorithmic governmentality of 
surveillance capitalism for political ends and thus to appropriate the agency of 
the digital citizen as a political actor for the benefit of political organisations. 
However, given that GDPR does not come into force until May 2018, and given 
that neither the ePrivacy Regulation nor DPB have yet been finalised and are 
therefore subject to change, whether in practice this framework will have the 
effect of limiting these voter surveillance and microtargeting practices and 
empowering the digital citizen remains to be seen. 
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6.3 | Challenging the Digital Panopticon 
 
We saw in Chapter 4 how the State’s online surveillance activities have created 
a digital panopticon, in which everyone who participates in the digital world is 
rendered visible, watchable, and potentially subject to control. Providing a legal 
basis for this, the Investigatory Powers Act149 (‘IPA’) received Royal Assent in 
November 2016. IPA was hailed by the Government as bringing the UK’s 
surveillance framework into the 21st Century and better allowing security and 
intelligence agencies (‘SIAs’) to combat terrorism and serious crime150.  
 
IPA does represent something of an improvement in that it replaces patchwork 
of frameworks – which included, among others, the Telecommunications Act 
1984, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, and an array of 
practices of uncertain or questionable legal basis – with one piece of legislation 
which puts these practices on an identifiable legal footing with some limitations 
on their undertaking and which contains a relatively coherent oversight regime 
in the form of the Judicial Commissioners. But IPA itself raises a range of 
concerns, with its progress through Parliament marked by sustained opposition 
from civil liberties groups as well as pointed criticism from Parliament’s 
committees. For example, the Intelligence and Security Committee criticised the 
draft Bill’s lack of emphasis on privacy151, described the approach towards 
examination of communications data as “inconsistent and largely 
incomprehensible”152, and concluded that the draft Bill was “handicapped from 
the outset”153 in terms of its ability to provide a clear and comprehensive 
framework governing surveillance powers. The Joint Committee on the draft Bill 
criticised it extensively154, opining that it was likely incompatible with ECHR155 
and failed to provide effective safeguards156 and making over 80 
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recommendations for changes (most of which were not taken up when the Bill 
itself was published less than a month after the Committee’s report was 
published). The House of Commons Science and Technology Committee said the 
draft Bill caused “confusion”157, highlighted “widespread doubts over the 
definition, not to mention the definability”158 of key terms, raised concerns over 
the difficulty of separating metadata from content data159, and warned that the 
Bill risked undermining the UK’s technology sector160. 
 
While these provide a background to IPA in terms of the debate which occurred 
over the adequacy of the Bill as a comprehensive legal framework for state 
surveillance and highlight with the Bill (many of which were not remedied in 
the final Act), our focus here is on the ability of the law to provide an effective 
challenge to one of the most controversial aspects of IPA – the bulk 
communications data retention and disclosure framework in Parts 3 and 4. This 
establishes a legal regime in which the internet history of everyone in the UK 
can potentially be captured, stored, and disclosed to public authorities – 
including police and SIAs, but also a range of other public bodies – upon request, 
with such requests requiring the approval of neither the Home Secretary nor a 
judge. Taking the data retention and disclosure provisions of IPA in the context 
of two recent decisions of the CJEU relating to the ePrivacy Directive which 
addressed previous communications data retention frameworks, we will look at 
how EU law standards provide opportunities for challenging the digital 
panopticon. We will first distil the requirements set by the CJEU, and will then 
proceed to examine IPA’s framework for compatibility with those requirements 
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6.3.1 | Digital Rights Ireland and Watson 
 
Between 2009 and 2014, Internet Service Providers (‘ISPs’) served notice by the 
Home Secretary161 were required to store some communications data for 12 
months162 under the Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009 (‘the 2009 
Regulations’), pursuant to the Data Retention Directive163 (‘DRD’). This involved 
retaining metadata164 rather than the content of communications. In 2014, the 
CJEU found in Digital Rights Ireland165 (‘DRI’) that DRD was incompatible with 
Articles 7 (respect for private and family life, including privacy of 
communications166) and 8 (protection of personal data167) of the EU’s Charter of 
Fundamental Rights168 (‘the Charter’). As a result, the Data Retention and 
Investigatory Powers Act169 (‘DRIPA’) was quickly passed in order to pre-empt 
challenges to the 2009 Regulations based on DRI. The High Court subsequently 
followed DRI to find that section 1 DRIPA was incompatible with the Charter 
and the Government was given until April 2016 before it would be disapplied170. 
The Court of Appeal indicated that it was minded to disagree with the High 
Court but referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling for clarification171. In 
December 2016 the CJEU in Watson172 confirmed the incompatibility of DRIPA-
style retention (in any case, DRIPA was subject to a sunset clause meaning that 
it would be automatically repealed on 31st December 2016173 – this was the 
impetus behind IPA). DRI and Watson together provide the requirements in EU 
                                                          
161 Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009 (‘2009 Regulations’), reg.10  
162 2009 Regulations, regs.4-5 
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127  
166 Charter of Fundamental Rights, art.7 
167 Charter of Fundamental Rights, art.8 
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law to which IPA must conform both in terms of the retention of 
communications data and in terms of access to retained data. 
 
DRI considered the validity of DRD in relation to Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter 
read alongside Article 52(1), which states that for interferences with Charter 
rights to be potentially justifiable they must respect the essence of those 
rights174. The CJEU held that legislation permitting the retention only of 
metadata and requiring measures be adopted to protect the security and 
integrity of retained data does not adversely affect the essence of Articles 7 and 
8, respectively, and so constitutes a potentially justifiable interference with 
those rights175. According to DRI, retention may be justified provided it satisfies 
an objective of general interest176 (such as, but not necessarily limited to, 
fighting serious crime or terrorism177), and is limited to what is strictly 
necessary to pursue the objective178. Access to retained data for the purpose of 
fighting crime should be limited only to offences determined by objective 
criteria to be sufficiently serious to justify the interference with Articles 7 and 
8179. Access should also be subject to prior review by a court or independent 
administrative body180. 
 
Watson addressed the question of the compliance of bulk data retention with 
the ePrivacy Directive, read alongside Articles 7, 8, and 52(1) of the Charter181. 
In doing so the CJEU drew the purposes for which data may be retained 
narrower than in DRI to include only national security, defence, public 
security182, and serious crime183. The court also went much further than DRI in 
finding that in order to be proportionate retention must be an exception rather 
than the rule184, as well as being limited to what is strictly necessary for the 
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purpose being sought185. Watson also addressed the question of requirements 
for access to retained data186. The court found that the purposes for which 
retained data can be accessed must genuinely and strictly correspond to the 
same purposes for which it can be retained187. In order to be proportionate, 
access to retained data must be limited to what is strictly necessary188. In order 
to ensure that this is the case, access must normally be subject to prior review 
by a court or an independent administrative body189. Further, persons whose 
data has been accessed should be notified as soon as doing so would not 
jeopardise an investigation190.  
 
Seven requirements can broadly be distilled from DRI and Watson that IPA must 
satisfy. The first four relate to retention under Part 4. These are that retained 
data must exclude content, that ISPs must be required to ensure the security 
and integrity of retained data, that the purpose being sought by retention can 
only extend to national security, defence, public security, and fighting serious 
crime, and that retention must be proportionate with data retained as an 
exception rather than as the rule and only to the extent strictly necessary for the 
purpose being sought. The final three relate to obtaining data under Part 3. 
These are that access to data must be only for a purpose genuinely and strictly 
corresponding to those for which it can be retained, that in order to be 
proportionate data can be accessed only to the extent strictly necessary, and 
that there are required safeguards and oversight mechanisms. 
 
6.3.2 | Communications Data Retention under IPA 
 
Part 4 IPA provides for the bulk retention of communications data. ISPs who 
have been served a retention notice are required to retain all relevant 
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communications data covered by the retention notice sent from devices 
connected to their network for a maximum of 12 months191.  
 
The Nature of Retained Data  
 
DRI established that legislation permitting the acquisition of knowledge of the 
content of a communication would be contrary to the essence of Article 7 of the 
Charter and thus unjustifiable192. Retention must therefore not include the 
content of communications in order to be a potentially justifiable interference 
with Article 7.  
 
The data that ISPs may be required to retain under IPA is ‘relevant 
communications data’193. This is defined as a subset of communications data 
that identifies the sender or recipient of a communication; the time or duration 
of a communication; the type, method, pattern, or fact of communication; the 
system from, to, or through which a communication is transmitted; or the 
location of any such system194. Communications data includes certain types of 
entity data and events data, on one hand, and explicitly excludes the content of 
communications, on the other195. As communications data excludes content, the 
first step in determining whether retention is in fact contrary to the essence of 
Article 7 is to look at how IPA defines content. 
 
Under IPA content in this context is any element of a communication, or data 
attached to or associated with a communication, which reveals anything that 
might reasonably be considered to be the meaning of that communication196. 
This does not include any meaning arising from the mere fact of the 
communication having occurred or from data relating to the transmission of the 
communication. This may be compared with the definition of relevant 
communications data under DRIPA, which excludes data revealing the content 
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of a communication197, rather than the meaning. It seems that in replacing 
DRIPA Parliament has chosen not to carry over a definition that excludes 
content generally from communications data, instead providing one that 
excludes only the meaning of a communication. However, it is not clear 
precisely what the ‘meaning’ of a communication extends to. It is also not clear 
that data revealing the meaning of a communication is the same as data 
providing knowledge of its content. It is quite conceivable that there could be 
elements of a communication that provide knowledge of its content, and so 
would be impermissible to retain per DRI, but do not reveal its meaning and so 
would not be considered to be content for the purposes of IPA. This could be, for 
example, a telephone number conveyed in the body of an email (i.e. providing 
knowledge of some of the content), but not text surrounding it that relates to it 
and provides context (i.e. revealing the meaning of the email).  
 
It is not clear that all data providing knowledge of the content of a 
communication is explicitly not communications data. So it is necessary to look 
at what is explicitly included in order to determine whether or not retention 
under IPA interferes with the essence of Article 7 of the Charter. Entity data is 
that which is about an entity (a person or a thing198) or an association between 
an entity and a telecommunication system (a system for transmitting 
communications electronically199) or telecommunications service (a service 
providing access to or use of a telecommunication system200) and which 
identifies or describes the entity201. Events data is that which describes an event 
on, in, or by means of a telecommunication system and consisting of one or 
more entities engaging in a specific activity at a specific time202. The kinds of 
entity data or events data that may be considered to be communications data 
include, inter alia, data held by an ISP about a customer and relating to a service 
provided to them, data included as part of a communication for the purposes of 
the system by which it is being communicated, and data which is held by an ISP 
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about the architecture of a telecommunication system and is not about a specific 
person203. In this a telephone number in the body of an email would not be 
events data or entity data and so, while perhaps not content for the purposes of 
IPA, it would not be considered to be communications data and could not be 
retained. Communications data therefore appears to include only metadata – 
relating to the functioning of telecommunication systems, the provision of 
telecommunications services, and the transmission of communications – rather 
than data which would provide knowledge of the content of a communication. 
As relevant communications data is a subset of communications data, it is also 
limited to metadata. Retention of metadata is not contrary to the essence of 
Article 7 and is therefore capable of being justified provided it is for permitted 
purposes and is proportionate to those purposes. 
 
The Security of Retained Data 
 
DRI held that legislation providing for bulk data retention must set out rules for 
protecting the data retained by ISPs. These must require a high level of 
protection and security be applied to the data and require the data to be 
irreversibly destroyed at the end of the retention period204. They should also 
require retained data to be kept within the EU, and compliance must be subject 
to review by an independent authority as per Article 8 of the Charter205. Watson 
restated these four requirements206.  
 
IPA requires that ISPs must destroy data once its retention is no longer 
authorised under Part 4, provided its retention isn’t otherwise authorised by 
law207. Destruction may take place at monthly or shorter intervals as appear to 
the ISP to be reasonably practicable208. The Information Commissioner must 
review ISPs’ compliance with requirements under Part 4 relating to the 
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integrity, security, or destruction of retained data209. To that extent IPA meets 
the requirements of DRI and Watson. However, in terms of the level of 
protection applied to retained data and the requirement data be kept in the EU, 
IPA is not in compliance. 
 
Section 92 IPA covers the integrity and security of data retained by ISPs. 
Retained data is required to be “of the same integrity, and subject to at least the 
same security and protection”210 as data on the system from which it is derived. 
The storage and processing of that data is regulated by the Privacy and 
Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003211. Regulation 5 
thereof requires that ISPs take “appropriate”212 technical and organisational 
measures, which must at least ensure that data can be accessed only by 
authorised personnel (a requirement repeated in IPA213) for legally authorised 
purposes214. It also requires that data must be protected against “accidental or 
unlawful destruction, accidental loss or alteration, and unauthorised or 
unlawful storage, processing, access or disclosure”215 (again a requirement 
repeated in IPA216). Regulation 5(4) defines ‘appropriate’ in this context. A 
measure is appropriate where, taking into account the state of technological 
developments and the cost of implementation, it is proportionate to the risks 
being safeguarded against217. However, DRI requires that when securing 
retained data ISPs are to ensure a particularly high level of protection and 
security without regard to economic considerations218. As such, the requirement 
that ISPs secure retained data with the same security and protection as data on 
the system from which it is derived does not meet the standard set by the CJEU. 
Further, IPA does not require that data retained by ISPs be kept within the EU. 
The Data Protection Act 1998 places restrictions on the transfer of personal 
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data to countries outside the EEA219, which would include relevant 
communications data insofar as it permits the individual to whom the data 
relates to be identified220. But Watson says that the legislation permitting 
retention must itself provide for retained data to be kept within the EU221. This 
means that relying on other legislation, such as the Data Protection Act, is not 
permissible. 
 
As IPA fails to meet these requirements, the storage of retained data by ISPs 
provided for by IPA constitutes an unjustifiable interference with Article 8 of 
the Charter. 
 
Purposes for Which Data May be Retained 
 
Watson held that data retention is only permissible for a limited number of 
purposes as permitted by the ePrivacy Directive read in conjunction with 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. Article 5(1) of the ePrivacy Directive says that as 
a general rule a user’s data may not be stored by another person without the 
consent of that user222. This is subject to exceptions permitted by Article 15(1) 
of that directive (explicitly including data retention) for various purpose 
including to safeguard national security, defence, and public security, and for 
fighting crime223. Acknowledging that the interference with Articles 7 and 8 of 
the Charter posed by bulk data retention is “very far-reaching and…particularly 
serious”224, Watson held that in terms of fighting crime only the purpose of 
fighting serious crime is a permissible exception225. 
 
Section 87(1) IPA provides that retention notices may require an ISP to retain 
relevant communications data for one of the purposes set out in section 
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61(7)226. While these purposes include national security and fighting crime227, 
this is not limited only to serious crime. Further, section 61(7) sets out a variety 
of other purposes including, among others, protecting public health, assessing 
or collecting any taxes or duties payable to government departments, 
preventing death or injury, assisting investigations into alleged miscarriages of 
justice, assisting in identifying someone who is deceased or otherwise unable to 
identify themselves, and the regulation of financial services markets228. 
Accordingly, the purposes for which data can be required to be retained under 
IPA go beyond those which are permitted by Watson. 
 
Proportionality of Data Retention 
 
The principle of proportionality requires that limitations on Articles 7 and 8 of 
the Charter are permitted only so far as they are strictly necessary229. As such, 
DRI and Watson both set out requirements that must be met in order for a 
retention regime to be strictly necessary and thus proportionate. 
 
DRI requires that retention legislation provides clear and precise rules 
governing the scope and application of interferences with Charter rights230, and 
established two grounds for determining the strict necessity of data retention. 
The first is that retention cannot cover all persons, all means of electronic 
communication, and all communications data without any differentiation, 
limitation or exception and cannot cover people for whom there is no evidence 
capable of suggesting that they have a link, even indirectly or remotely, with 
serious crime231. Additionally, retention must include safeguards for data 
subject to professional confidentiality, and must require a relationship between 
the data being retained and a threat to public security232. In particular, the latter 
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means that retention should be limited to a particular time period, geographical 
location, or circle of people likely to be involved in serious crime, or to people 
for whom the retention of their data could contribute to fighting serious crime. 
The second ground is that the period of time for which data is to be retained 
should distinguish between types of data based on their possible usefulness233. 
The length of the retention period should be based on objective criteria to 
ensure that it is limited to what is strictly necessary234.  
 
Watson found that “general and indiscriminate retention”235 as the rule rather 
than the exception236, covering all users without differentiation, limitation, or 
exception according to the objective pursued237, and not requiring any 
particular relationship between the data to be retained and the purpose of 
retention238, “exceeds the limits of what is strictly necessary and cannot be 
considered to be justified, within a democratic society”239. The requirement that 
retention must be an exception rather than the rule goes beyond the limits 
established in DRI, which permitted such bulk retention provided the required 
limitations and exceptions were clearly set out. Watson says that legislation 
must place retention itself as an exception to the general rule set out in Article 5 
of the ePrivacy Directive. As such, and while the judgment says that targeted 
retention is permissible provided it is limited to what is strictly necessary240, the 
result of Watson is that bulk data retention can never be considered to be 
strictly necessary and thus can never be proportionate.  
 
IPA fails to meet the proportionality requirements of either DRI or Watson. 
Retention notices may be tailored to an extent, including by requiring that only 
data which meets a certain description241 or is from a certain time period242 is 
                                                          
233 DRI [2015] QB 127 at [63] 
234 DRI [2015] QB 127 at [64] 
235 Watson [2017] 2 WLR 1289 at [97] 
236 Watson [2017] 2 WLR 1289 at [104] 
237 Watson [2017] 2 WLR 1289 at [105] 
238 Watson [2017] 2 WLR 1289 at [106] 
239 Watson [2017] 2 WLR 1289 at [107] 
240 Watson [2017] 2 WLR 1289 at [109]-[111] 
241 IPA 2016, s.87(2)(b) 
242 IPA 2016, s.87(2)(c) 
Privacy, Data Protection, and Online Surveillance | Chapter 6 
  
 
Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 231 
  
retained. But section 87 does allow for ISPs to be required to retain “all data”243 
indiscriminately, without differentiation, limitation, or exception, and without 
clear safeguards for data subject to professional confidentiality. Further, section 
87 does not require any relationship between data to be retained and the 
purpose being pursued or any link between that data and a threat to public 
security. Nor does it require the retention period, while limited to a maximum of 
12 months244, to be determined based on objective criteria and limited to what 
is strictly necessary. Finally, section 87 does not set out clear and precise rules 
on the scope and application of retention. Instead the Secretary of State can 
issue notices containing “other requirements, or restrictions, in relation to the 
retention of data”245 and making “different provision for different purposes”246. 
As such, section 87 does not provide only for retention that is justified as a 
strictly necessary and therefore proportionate interference with Articles 7 and 
8 of the Charter as per DRI. Perhaps most significantly, IPA allows for bulk 
retention as the rule rather than the exception, exceeding the limits of what can 
be considered strictly necessary, and so cannot be proportionate as per Watson. 
 
6.3.3 | Access to Communications Data 
 
Part 3 IPA provides for the disclosure of communications data to relevant public 
authorities upon request247. Relevant public authorities include those public 
authorities listed in Schedule 4248 as well as local authorities249. 
 
Purposes for Which Data May be Obtained 
 
Watson determined that the purposes for which communications data may be 
accessed must “genuinely and strictly”250 correspond to one of those established 
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by Article 15(1) of the ePrivacy Directive read alongside Articles 7 and 8 of the 
Charter, namely national security, defence, public security, and fighting serious 
crime.  
 
DRI requires that ‘serious crime’ be defined by objective criteria251. In IPA this is 
defined as offences where an individual with no previous convictions could 
reasonably be expected to be imprisoned for three years or more, or those that 
involve violence, result in substantial financial gain, or involve a large number of 
people acting together for a common purpose252, satisfying DRI’s requirement. 
 
However, communications data can be obtained in the pursuit of several 
purposes beyond those permitted by Watson. These include, among others, for 
protecting public health, for assessing or collecting any taxes or duties payable 
to government departments, for preventing death or injury, and for assisting 
investigations into alleged miscarriages of justice253. This does not satisfy the 
requirement in Watson limiting the purposes for which communications data 
can be obtained. 
 
Proportionality of Disclosure 
 
As with retention, Watson holds that access to data must not exceed the limits of 
what is strictly necessary in order to be proportionate254. In particular, this 
means that legislation must provide clear and precise rules indicating in what 
circumstances and under which conditions data may be obtained for permitted 
purposes255. Legislation must provide that access normally be granted only to 
the data of individuals suspected of serious criminality (those suspected of 
planning, committing, having committed, or being implicated in a serious 
crime)256.  
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In terms of the circumstances in which communications data can be accessed 
under IPA, this can only be for use in a specific investigation or operation257. 
Some communications data takes the form of Internet Connection Records 
(‘ICRs’). These are defined in section 62(7) as the subset of communications 
data generated or processed by an ISP in the process of supplying an internet 
connection to a customer that identifies, or assists in identifying, the online 
service that is being used via that connection (which could be a particular 
website, email service, messaging service, etc.)258. Disclosure of communications 
data other than ICRs is not limited only to that concerning individuals suspected 
of any criminality, let alone serious criminality. 
 
Several conditions apply to obtaining ICRs that do not apply to obtaining other 
communications data. Local authorities may not obtain ICRs in order to access 
data that can only be obtained through ICRs259. For public authorities that are 
not local authorities, ICRs may only be disclosed where one of three conditions 
is met260. The first is that it is necessary to identify unknown persons or devices 
using a known internet service, but this is not limited to individuals suspected 
of serious criminality261. The second relates to obtaining data for purposes other 
than fighting crime262. The third, which does relate to the purpose of fighting 
crime, is that obtaining an ICR is necessary either to determine which service is 
being used, when it is being used, and how it is being used by a person or device 
whose identity is known, or to determine where or when a known person or 
device is accessing or running software which involves making available or 
acquiring material whose possession is a crime263. However, this third condition 
is not limited only to the purpose of fighting serious crime, but also to ‘other 
relevant crime’264. As such, ICR disclosure is also not limited only to those of 
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individuals who are suspected of serious criminality, and is therefore not 
limited only to what is strictly necessary.  
 
The communications data disclosure framework established by IPA does not 
therefore provide for a proportionate interference with fundamental rights. 
 
Safeguards and Oversight 
 
Both DRI and Watson require that requests for access normally be subject to 
prior review by a court or an independent administrative body265. This is to 
ensure that access to communications data is limited to what is strictly 
necessary. Watson further required that persons whose data has been accessed 
be notified once it is possible to do so without jeopardising an investigation266. 
IPA does not provide for individuals whose data has been disclosed to be 
notified.  
 
Requests from local authorities for disclosure of communications data require 
the approval of a judge267, and so meet the required standard. But requests for 
data from public authorities other than local authorities can normally be 
authorised by senior officers within the requesting authority without requiring 
approval by a judge268 (although the approval of a Judicial Commissioner is 
required for authorisations that would identify a journalistic source269). Senior 
officers may not normally grant authorisations for investigations they are 
working on270, and there are certain procedural requirements271. And before a 
senior officer within a relevant public authority can approve a request they 
must normally consult a Single Point of Contact (‘SPoC’), an individual within 
the authority responsible for advising others internally on requests272. SPoCs 
                                                          
265 DRI [2015] QB 127 at [62]; Watson [2017] 2 WLR 1289 at [120] 
266 Watson [2017] 2 WLR 1289 at [121] 
267 IPA 2016, s.75 
268 IPA 2016, ss.61-66 
269 IPA 2016, s.77 
270 IPA 2016, s.63 
271 IPA 2016, s.64 
272 IPA 2016, s.76 
Privacy, Data Protection, and Online Surveillance | Chapter 6 
  
 
Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 235 
  
advise on issues including the lawfulness of proposed authorisations, whether it 
is reasonably practicable to obtain the data sought, and any cost implications of 
a request273.  
 
In order to determine whether in terms of public authorities other than local 
authorities the approval regime satisfies the requirements of Watson it is 
necessary at this point to attempt to determine what the CJEU may mean by 
‘independent’ in this context. The CJEU has previously discussed this274 in 
relation to the requirement for independent oversight of compliance with the 
Data Protection Directive275. In that instance the court concluded that 
‘independent’ normally means “a status which ensures that the body concerned 
can act completely freely, without taking any instructions or being put under 
any pressure”276. In its view supervisory authorities “must act objectively and 
impartially. For that purpose, they must remain free from any external 
influence”277. The CJEU went on to say that this “precludes not only any 
influence exercised by the supervised bodies, but also any directions or any 
other external influence, whether direct or indirect, which could call into 
question the performance by those authorities of their task”278. Independence in 
the context of supervision of data protection, relevant to both the ePrivacy 
Directive and to Article 8 of the Charter and thus to access to retained data 
under IPA, appears to require both objectivity and impartiality, and, to that end, 
freedom from any external influence. The Communications Data Draft Code of 
Practice says that SPoCs provide “objective judgement”279, but the code does not 
require SPoCs to act impartially. The code also states that senior officers shall 
take account of the SPoC’s advice in assessing the necessity of an 
authorisation280. SPoCs do not, however, have the power to block requests and 
are themselves permitted to authorise requests if they are also senior officers281. 
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As such, it seems that in relation to public authorities other than local 
authorities the framework is not compatible with the requirements established 
in DRI and Watson that access to communications data be subject to 
independent prior review. 
 
Part 3 IPA therefore does not provide the safeguards required to ensure that 
access to communications data is limited to what is strictly necessary and 
therefore proportionate to the purpose being sought. 
 
6.3.4 | Locating the Investigatory Powers Act 
 
Bulk communications data retention was a feature of the State surveillance 
regimes exposed by Edward Snowden, and IPA is the digital panopticon 
enshrined in law. Rather than establishing a surveillance regime that balances 
privacy and security concerns, targets those suspected of serious crimes rather 
than the whole population, and gives due consideration to oversight and 
accountability issues, the Act gives legal approval to the new technologies of 
power of the digital panopticon. The digital panopticon renders us all visible, 
and, as discussed previously282, panoptic uncertainty – the knowledge that at 
any point in time you could be being watched and the uncertainty of never 
knowing for sure whether you are or not which results from the “asymmetrical 
gaze”283 – is enough to regulate behaviour and is key to the effectiveness of the 
panopticon284. This imbalance of knowledge created by the imbalance of 
visibility leads to an imbalance of power between the watched and the watcher 
inherent in all surveillance, and through the surveillance of our online lives in 
the digital panopticon formalised in law by IPA this imbalance is writ large.  
 
However, as we have seen, there are serious issues with the compatibility of the 
communications data retention and disclosure framework established under 
IPA with EU law. While retention does appear to be limited to metadata, Parts 3 
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and 4 IPA do not meet other requirements established by the CJEU. IPA does not 
require a particularly high level of protection be applied to retained data or that 
it be kept within the EU. Retention notices can be issued in pursuit of a range of 
purposes other than those permitted. Retention is indiscriminate and is the rule 
rather than the exception. The length of the retention period is not objectively 
determined and limited to what is strictly necessary. IPA does not provide clear 
and precise rules governing the scope and application of retention. Retained 
data can be accessed for a variety of purposes other than those permitted. 
Access is not limited to data of individuals suspected of serious criminality. 
Finally, the oversight regime does not provide for independent prior review or 
for individuals whose data has been accessed to be notified when appropriate. 
Parts 3 and 4 IPA are therefore an unjustifiable interference with Article 15(1) 
of the ePrivacy Directive read alongside Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. EU law 
privacy and data protection standards thus offer a potential route to challenging 
IPA on a number of grounds. Indeed, in June 2017 Liberty was given permission 
to contest the compatibility of the communications data retention provisions of 
IPA with the requirements of EU law285. 
 
 
6.4 | Conclusion 
 
In this chapter have seen that online surveillance poses serious challenges for 
privacy and data protection law, and that while reform is under way this does 
not go far enough. However, we have also seen that these laws do provide 
restrictions, do provide some tools to limit and challenge surveillance, and may 
be of some use to digital citizens in attempting to resist the overlapping forms of 
corporate, State, and political control to which they are exposed online. What is 
clear is that the ‘notice and consent’ model of privacy protection no longer 
works. While GDPR does reform this model to some degree, there is an extent to 
which this is simply papering over the cracks. Notice and consent, despite being 
a failed model, is still the foundation of GDPR, so further reform is necessary if 
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data protection law is to be an effective protection for the rights of the digital 
citizen. 
 
That said, GDPR and existing protections are still of use. GDPR, along with the 
proposed ePrivacy Directive, may limit some surveillance and microtargeting 
practices by political organisations. The obligations that they impose on political 
organisations to provide a wealth of information to data subjects, including 
clearly setting out their rights and how they can be exercised, and the means 
that they provide for voters to resist these practices by exercising those rights, 
including to object to the processing of personal data and to withdraw consent 
to being targeted with advertising, may go some way towards empowering 
voters. And the existing ePrivacy Directive, alongside the rights to privacy and 
data protection established in the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and the 
requirements established by the CJEU, provides a means for challenging some 
aspects of the digital panopticon. In particular, the communications data 
retention and disclosure provisions of the Investigatory Powers Act, which are 
commonly known as the ‘snooper’s charter’, seem to be incompatible with these 
requirements in a number of ways, and are therefore incompatible with EU law. 
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Beginning as an academic research project in the 1960s, the internet has come 
to transform global society. But it has also brought new forms of control, 
primarily based around the surveillance of the big data produced as people go 
about their lives in the digital world. Surveillance is data collection for the 
purpose of influencing or managing the behaviour of those whose data has been 
gathered1, and has long been a part of human society. Emerging in the digital 
world, dataveillance (as understood in this thesis) is a variety of surveillance 
that involves the surveillance of people using digital information management 
systems2. Dataveillance involves datafication, the process of turning everyday 
life into quantified data for use in those systems3, and this thesis discusses 
dataveillance regimes of two varieties and their impact on the digital citizen. 
The first, employed by corporations and made use of by political organisations, 
involves predictive algorithmic analysis of big datasets describing the datafied 
lives and behaviours of tens or hundreds of millions of people in order to 
identify correlations and patterns and so infer information about individuals 
and predict future behaviour. Once predicted, attempts can be made to 
influence behaviour in the way desired through the highly personalised and 
dynamic form of behavioural nudging4 called ‘hypernudge’5. This is panspectric 
dataveillance, or dataveillance involving data describing the behaviour of a 
spectrum of millions of people that seeks to pre-empt their behaviour6. The 
second form of dataveillance discussed in this thesis is panoptic in nature, in 
this case involving the gathering of as much information about people’s digital 
lives as possible so as to make them permanently visible to the State’s security 
                                                          
1 Lyon, 2001 
2 Clarke, 1988; Degli Esposti, 2014; see Chapter 1.3 
3 Mayer-Schoenberger and Cukier, 2013 
4 Thaler and Sunstein, 2008 
5 Yeung, 2017a 
6 Palmås, 2011 
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and intelligence agencies. In this, the digital citizen can potentially be observed 
at any time, but can never know whether at any given time they are actually 
being observed or not. In theory, this is enough to regulate their behaviour, as 
they will need to behave acceptably at all times in case they are being observed 
at any time7. We can recognise both of these forms of dataveillance as examples 
of algorithmic regulation, which is any form of regulatory governance system 
involving algorithmic decision making8. These forms of dataveillance, facilitated 
by the datafication of our everyday lives as they become increasingly digital, 
have become key forms of control in the digital world, used by corporations, the 
State, and political organisations to influence the behaviour of the digital citizen 
to their benefit. 
 
Due to the ever-increasing importance of the internet in contemporary society 
and the extensive use of dataveillance in this way it is important to understand 
these dataveillance regimes, how they work, and the effect that they have on the 
relationship between those who use the internet and the corporations, the State, 
and political organisations who undertake dataveillance. So as to do this, a 
governmentality framework allows us to move beyond governance theories in 
order to examine power and control in three components – its rationality (the 
“ways of rendering reality thinkable in such a way that it was amenable to 
calculation and programming”9), its technologies for translating that rationality 
into reality (the techniques and strategies “imbued with aspirations for the 
shaping of conduct in the hope of producing certain desired effects and averting 
certain undesired events”10), and its subject (the person over whom power is 
being exercised). Following from Weber11, Dyrberg12, Savoie13, and others14, we 
can understand power as the capacity to perform a certain act or to bring about 
a change in behaviour, or the performance of certain behaviour, in another. This 
                                                          
7 Foucault, 1991 
8 Yeung, 2017b 
9 Miller and Rose, 2008, p.15 
10 Rose, 1999, p.52  
11 Weber, 1978, p.55 
12 Dyrberg, 1997, p.135 
13 Savoie, 2010, p.4 
14 Morriss, 1987, p.19; p.37, quoting Foucault, 2004b 
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necessarily involves a desired outcome on the part of those exercising power (a 
rationality), someone over whom power is being exercised (a subject), and a 
means by which to bring that desired outcome into reality by using some kind of 
strategy or technique (a technology of power) to effect a power interaction 
between those exercising power and those over whom it is being exercised (a 
process called ‘translation’15). A governmentality analysis means that we can 
understand why power is being exercised, how it is being exercised, and what 
effect it has on those over whom it is being exercised. This allows us to 
understand the relationship that a power interaction creates between those 
who are exercising power and those over whom it is being exercised. 
 
In undertaking this analysis this thesis has made several original contributions 
to knowledge, as follows: 
 
1. The dataveillance-based business model of the dominant corporations in 
the digital world, identified as surveillance capitalism by Zuboff16, has 
been contextualised within surveillance literature and for the first time 
connected with the algorithmic governmentality described by Rouvroy17. 
In this, datafication through surveillance, hypervisibility through 
algorithmic analysis, and behavioural modification through 
hypernudging18, have for the first time been located within algorithmic 
governmentality as it is employed in surveillance capitalism19.  
 
2. The new role for the digital citizen in surveillance capitalism as a 
produsumer has been identified for the first time, and, building on the 
analysis provided by Fuchs20 and on Lazzarato’s concept of immaterial 
labour21, their work in producing behavioural data has been recognised 
                                                          
15 Rose and Miller, 1992, p.48 
16 Zuboff, 2015 
17 Rouvroy, 2013; See Chapter 3.1 
18 Yeung, 2017a 
19 see Chapter 3.1.2 
20 Fuchs, 2011 
21 Lazzarato, 1996 
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as produsumption22. Produsumption differs from prosumption in that 
prosumption involves work through the production and consumption of 
content where the content itself is what generates surplus value23, 
whereas produsumption involves work through the generation of 
behavioural data, which in surveillance capitalism is what generates 
surplus value (what Zuboff calls ‘behavioural surplus’24), as a result of 
the production and consumption of content (which in surveillance 
capitalism is usually available for free in order to draw in users who will 
then produce valuable behavioural data). Produsumption also departs 
from Marxian analyses of capitalism in that produsumption involves both 
productive labour and a new form of consumptive labour, by which 
surplus-generating work is done through consumption of content 
without the intention to produce what is produced which is required of 
labour in Marxian analyses25. 
 
3. The online surveillance programmes undertaken by GCHQ and the NSA 
have for the first time been identified as a digital panopticon, employing 
a new technology of power of algorithmic panoptic uncertainty26. In this 
new technology of power, the algorithmic opacity discussed by Burrell27, 
Danaher28, and Pasquale29 and the predictive power of algorithms when 
put to use in analysing big datasets means that not only can the digital 
citizen in the digital panopticon not know when they are being watched 
(which in a panopticon is what generates panoptic uncertainty, its 
primary control mechanism), they also can’t know how they are being 
watched or what knowledge about them and their lives has been 
algorithmically generated through the predictive analysis of the big data 
describing their lives and those of millions of others. In the digital 
                                                          
22 See Chapter 3.2.1 
23 See, e.g., Ritzer, 2015; see also Toffler, 1980 
24 Zuboff, 2016 
25 Marx, 1990, p.284; Fuchs, 2017, p.68; Jeon, 2011, p.199 
26 See Chapter 4.1.2 
27 Burrell, 2016 
28 Danaher, 2016 
29 Pasquale, 2015 
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panopticon, smart machines don’t just informate, as Zuboff puts it30, but 
act as informers, disclosing otherwise unknown information and 
elevating the new technology of power of algorithmic panoptic 
uncertainty above the uncertainty that acts as the control mechanism of 
a panopticon in the offline world.  
 
4. The incompatibility of the communications data retention and disclosure 
regime in Parts 3 and 4 of the Investigatory Powers Act31 (commonly 
known as the ‘snooper’s charter’), a key aspect of the digital panopticon, 
with the ePrivacy Directive32 in light of the CJEU’s decisions in Digital 
Rights Ireland33 and Watson34 has been established for the first time35. 
This data retention regime potentially requires ISPs in the UK to record a 
variety of information relating to every communication sent by every 
device connected to their network, to store this information for up to one 
year, and to disclose this information to a variety of public authorities, 
including police and security and intelligence agencies but also many 
others, upon request, without requiring the approval of either the Home 
Secretary or a judge. This regime is incompatible with EU law on a 
number of grounds, including, inter alia, that retention as the rule rather 
than the exception is indiscriminate and does not distinguish between 
those suspected of serious crime and others; that the length of the 
retention period is not limited to what is strictly necessary; that access to 
retained data can be for purposes other than fighting serious crime; and 
that there is no prior external review of requests for access to retained 
data. 
 
                                                          
30 Zuboff, 1988 
31 Investigatory Powers Act 2016 Pt.3; Pt.4 
32 Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in 
the electronic communications sector [2002] OJ L201/37 (‘ePrivacy Directive’) 
33 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources [2015] QB 
127 
34 Tele2 Sverige AB v Post-och telestyrelsen, Secretary of State for the Home Department v Tom 
Watson and others [2017] 2 WLR 1289 
35 See Chapter 6.3 
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5. The voter surveillance and microtargeting practices undertaken by 
political organisations have also been located in a governmentality 
framework for the first time, and contextualised within other 
dataveillance regimes so as to show how the algorithmic 
governmentality of surveillance capitalism is repurposed for political 
ends36. The impact of the forthcoming General Data Protection 
Regulation37 (‘GDPR’) and the proposed ePrivacy Regulation38 on these 
practices has also been assessed, providing, also for the first time, a legal 
analysis of the obligations that GDPR and the ePrivacy Regulation will 
place on political organisations that surveil voters as well as the 
surveillance capitalism corporations that provide microtargeting tools to 
them39. 
 
Beyond these original contributions to knowledge, this thesis has more 
generally given a governmentality-based account of how the relationship 
between the digital citizen and corporations, the State, and political 
organisations is remade in the digital world, with pervasive dataveillance by 
corporations in surveillance capitalism feeding into extensive dataveillance by 
the State in the digital panopticon and also into the voter surveillance and 
microtargeting practices undertaken by political organisations. These are three 
separate but interrelated and overlapping dataveillance regimes, each operating 
differently, being undertaken for different reasons, and with different effects on 
the digital citizen, but resulting in the blurring of the lines between and 
blending together of corporate, State, and political power, as together they 
remake the relationship between the digital citizen and society. Ultimately, all 
three of these dataveillance regimes rely on informational asymmetries and 
thus the imbalances of knowledge inherent in all surveillance, amplified by 
                                                          
36 See Chapter 5.2 
37 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC [2016] OJ L119/1 (‘GDPR’) 
38 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the respect 
for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing 
Directive 2002/58/EC ('Draft ePrivacy Regulation') 
39 See Chapter 6.2 
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predictive algorithmic analysis of big datasets, creating imbalances of power 
and therefore facilitating the control of the digital citizen according to the 
rationalities pursued in each regime. Through this, surveillance capitalism and 
voter surveillance and microtargeting appropriate the agency of the digital 
citizen as a social, economic, and political actor and direct it towards corporate 
and political ends, while the digital panopticon renders the digital citizen a 
passive subject of surveillance as the State pursues security in the existing 
order. 
 
Following from Foucault40, we can understand the state as more than the formal 
institutions of Government or the State. We can recognise it as a regime of 
multiple governmentalities of the formal State, business, and civil society, an 
abstraction of the network of power relations that construct it. In this thesis we 
have identified, discussed, and contextualised the new dataveillance-based 
governmentalities that exist to make up the UK’s network of power relations in 
the digital world, and the role of the digital citizen within. As such, we can 
recognise that the UK is emerging as a surveillance state, characterised by the 
prevalence of data-producing ICTs as a result of the digital transformation of 
society and consisting of a regime of multiple dataveillance-based 
governmentalities. In this emerging surveillance state the digital citizen takes 
on new roles, in new relationships with corporations, the State, and politics, to 
their detriment. 
 
As we saw in Chapter 3, surveillance capitalism renders the digital citizen as 
both a produsumer and a commodity, through the datafication of their lives and 
their behaviour as a data profile – a ‘data double’41 that stands in for the 
individual – and the sale of access to that profile on the advertising market. This 
facilitates their exploitation, as their work done as a produsumer generates 
surplus value for the corporation, and thus their vast profits, without 
recompense either for the produsumer’s loss of control over their productive 
                                                          
40 Jessop, 2007, p36 – translating Foucault, 2004b, p.79 
41 Heggarty and Ericson, 2000, p.613 
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and creative activity42 or for their loss of control of the surplus stemming from 
its informational and cultural content. Through algorithmic governmentality 
surveillance capitalism also involves the appropriation of the sovereignty of the 
individual as a consumer, in theory the key principle in neo-liberalism43, so that 
it can be directed in such a way as to be profitable to the corporation. Through 
hypernudging, with its high degree of personalisation and continual 
experimentation, corporations learn how best to influence the digital citizen’s 
behaviour so as to direct it in the way desired. The digital citizen’s agency as the 
sovereign actor in neo-liberalism is thus appropriated, and in selling the 
commodified produsumer as a data profile on the advertising market the 
corporation also sells access to the digital citizen’s vulnerabilities, determined 
through experimentation in hypernudging, and the powerful tools for taking 
advantage of them, in effect selling that agency itself to advertisers. In 
surveillance capitalism, in short, the digital citizen is broken down to their 
constituent parts through datafication and predictive analysis44 and 
reconstructed as an exploitable, manipulable commodity. 
 
And in Chapter 4 we saw how the digital citizen becomes a passive subject of 
surveillance in the digital panopticon. Where past mass surveillance regimes 
needed to actively involve the populace in their own surveillance by recruiting 
informers, in the digital panopticon the access that security and intelligence 
agencies have to data through interceptors on internet backbone cables, from 
data provided to them by surveillance capitalism corporations, through the 
backdoors that they have placed in hardware, software, and networking 
equipment, and from other sources, means that they have unprecedented access 
to a wealth of information about the lives and behaviours of hundreds of 
millions of people. In the digital panopticon, the relationship of trust between 
the State and the citizen that underpins the presumption of innocence45 is 
replaced with one characterised by undue suspicion, with the digital citizen cast 
as a potential criminal and potential evidence against them gathered, analysed, 
                                                          
42 Andrejevic, 2011, p.284 
43 Fellner and Spash, 2014 
44 Deleuze, 1992, p.7 
45 Hadjimatheou, 2013, p.5; see also Nance, 1994; and Campbell, 2010  
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and stored. The chilling effect of the digital panopticon on freedom of 
expression, which has repeatedly been empirically demonstrated46, potentially 
reduces the willingness of people to seek out information on or put forward 
ideas that may be thought of as being subversive, extreme, or outside the 
mainstream, and may particularly affect women and young people, who have 
historically not often had their voices heard. In the digital panopticon, two of the 
fundamental norms of democratic society that exist for the benefit of the citizen 
– the presumption of innocence and freedom of expression – are eroded, and 
the digital citizen finds themselves cast as a potential criminal who may be 
unwilling to engage with ideas that challenge the status quo. 
 
Through the voter surveillance and microtargeting practices discussed in 
Chapter 5 the agency of the digital citizen as a political actor is appropriated and 
directed in the pursuit of the objectives of political organisations. And the 
asymmetries in access to extensive voter surveillance between wealthy political 
organisations and others, as well as the same asymmetry in access to the 
powerful behavioural modification tools with which to microtarget voters that 
are available through surveillance capitalism, increases the influence of capital 
in the electoral process, reinforcing the power gains made by capital through 
the disciplinary neo-liberal revolution47, and potentially entrench the political 
establishment to the detriment of new parties, campaigns, and candidates. 
These new dataveillance-based forms of political control degrade the online 
public sphere, which in its idealised Habermasian conception should be a space 
in which citizens can come together and engage in critical public debate free 
from coercion48. As such, as well as being commodified and exploited in 
surveillance capitalism, with their social and economic agency directed in 
pursuit of the goals of corporations, the digital citizen as a political actor 
becomes subject to powerful new behavioural modification tools as political 
organisations seek electoral success. 
 
                                                          
46 Mathews and Tucker, 2015; Stoycheff, 2016; Penney, 2016; Penney, 2017 
47 Gill, 2000, p.6 
48 Habermas, 1989; Poster, 1995 
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These changes are facilitated by the neo-liberal nature of digital citizenship as it 
has emerged in the UK, as we saw in Chapter 2. The governmentality of e-
government has encouraged the digital citizen to interact with the digitalised 
State, facilitating neo-liberal rationalities of the stripped back, smaller state 
while bringing the locus of government into people’s homes and encouraging 
individuals to interact with the digital world. And the digital citizen engages 
with consumer forms of online politics as an active citizen, engaged in choice-
making between an array of commodified issues and political causes and 
making use of largely individualist forms of participation49. Microtargeted 
political advertising takes advantage of this by placing commodified issues and 
political points before voters using carefully crafted messages targeted at voters 
who the political organisation predicts using algorithmic analysis will be most 
open to its message, and in doing so attempts to appropriate the agency of the 
active digital citizen as a political actor to try to ensure that their choice-making 
is directed in the way desired by the political organisation itself. The digital 
citizen is also engaged in the individualist self-management required in neo-
liberal citizenship50. This manifests in two ways. The first is digital management 
of the physical self through self-tracking apps and devices, which generate a 
wealth of data on the individual’s life and behaviour that can be used in 
surveillance capitalism. The second is managing the digital self. This involves 
privacy self-management51, or the need to actively manage privacy and security 
online. Individuals adopt a variety of strategies to limit disclosure of 
information to others, and this forms part of online identity performance52, 
whereby the digital citizen actively constructs and performs the version of 
themselves that they wish to present online. The nature of this identity 
performance is in part directed by the surveillance capitalism corporations who 
run the sites on which this takes place, with an emphasis on different aspects of 
identity on different sites (Facebook prioritises social interaction and personal 
relationships, for example, while LinkedIn focuses on professional and 
employment). This is an aspect of the self-commodification expected in the 
                                                          
49 Dahlberg, 2001 
50 Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2001; Bauman 2007, pp.58-59 
51 Solove, 2013 
52 van Zoonen, 2013 – see, e.g., Goffman, 1956; Butler, 1988; Schwartz and Halegoua, 2015 
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consumer society53, and forms part of the datafication of the digital citizen and 
thus their commodification as a data profile on the advertising market, the 
appropriation of their social and through hypernudging economic agency, and, 
ultimately, their exploitation. 
 
The neo-liberal nature of digital citizenship means that the digital citizen is held 
responsible for failing to act out the idealised neo-liberal role of the sovereign 
actor personally responsible for pursuing their own self-interest54 – if, for 
example, they become subject to forms of power that direct their agency away 
from the pursuit of that self-interest and towards the interests of corporations 
or political organisations. This places the responsibility for their 
commodification, their exploitation, the appropriation of their agency, and 
ultimately their control firmly onto their shoulders. This neo-liberal nature of 
digital citizenship also means that they are responsible for failing to protect 
their privacy and their data through the current model of ‘notice and consent’, 
despite the role of surveillance, big data, and predictive analytics in 
undermining that model of protection, as we saw in Chapter 6. Individuals can 
be re-identified from apparently anonymised datasets55, and poorly executed 
predictive analytics raises the possibility of potential privacy harms56. Even 
where analysis is accurate, the potential for algorithmic analysis of big datasets 
to reveal otherwise unknown information means that it’s questionable whether 
effective notice and consent can truly be given57. Beyond this, privacy notices 
are often excessively long58 and expressed in obfuscating legalese59, and 
requests for consent often may themselves be considered to be deceptive60. 
GDPR will reform this to an extent, and provides some potentially useful tools 
for the individual to protect their data as well as placing some extra obligations 
on data controllers and processors, but as it is still fundamentally grounded in a 
                                                          
53 Bauman, 2007, pp.5-6 
54 Harvey, 2005, p.68 
55 Sweeney, 2000; Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008; Su et al, 2017 
56 Crawford and Schultz, 2014 
57 Solove, 2013 
58 McDonald and Cranor, 2008 
59 Turow, 2008, p.62 
60 Yeung, 2017a 
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notice and consent model of protection it can’t possibly overcome all of that 
model’s problem. As a result, GDPR, while representing significant progress, is 
imperfect, and future statutory interventions will likely be needed in order to 
provide for effective legal protections for individuals beyond notice and consent 
(although questions of what form that should take are outside of the scope of 
this thesis). However, once outside of the EU the willingness of the British 
Government to take legislative measures to limit the practices of surveillance 
capitalism corporations may be somewhat limited given the reliance of British 
SIAs on the data gathered and analysed by those corporations. But existing 
privacy and data protection laws do provide a means to counteract some of the 
practices discussed in this thesis. As seen previously, GDPR and the proposed 
ePrivacy Regulation may impose limitations on the voter surveillance and 
microtargeting practices undertaken by political organisations, while the 
existing ePrivacy Directive provides grounds on which to challenge the legal 
basis for key aspects of the digital panopticon. 
 
This analysis undertaken in this thesis, while building on empirical research at 
points, has been largely theoretical, and has been limited to identifying and 
examining dataveillance regimes and their effect on the digital citizen rather 
than on discussing solutions to some of the issues that have been raised along 
the way. As such, there are opportunities for further research of an empirical 
nature, as well as for the further research into some of the legal issues and 
development of some of the theoretical concepts expressed herein. The internet 
of things, which may grow to play a more prominent role in the surveillance 
practices discussed herein, provides some of these opportunities. Public 
perceptions of IoT surveillance as it increasingly moves into public spaces and 
people’s homes is an important area of investigation, as are the challenges of 
ensuring that IoT devices comply with privacy and data protection law, 
particularly the forthcoming GDPR and ePrivacy Regulation. Some of the issues 
with legal compliance for IoT devices relate to their operation in environments 
where more than one person is interacting with them, or where children are 
likely to interact with them, and centre on how they can provide a service while 
avoiding unauthorised disclosure of personal data to someone other than the 
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data subject and can respect the limitations that apply to the processing of 
personal data related to children. The effective facilitation of data subject rights 
and protection of personal data as it moves through interconnected IoT devices 
and systems also poses a significant challenge which requires much work from a 
tech-legal viewpoint.  While surveillance capitalism is the internet’s dominant 
business model, other approaches may be possible which do not involve 
pervasive and extensive surveillance of user behaviour and which do not 
facilitate the associate practices discussed in this thesis but do allow for the 
provision of similar services. What these alternative approaches may be is a rich 
area for further research. And as GDPR is still built around a failed ‘notice and 
consent’ model of protection, questions of how legal frameworks for privacy 
and data protection should be constructed in future, while already being 
discussed by some61, are an area for significant further research. There are also 
opportunities for further research into public perceptions of State surveillance, 
the effect of State surveillance on the presumption of innocence, and on the legal 
basis for State surveillance practices and their compatibility with GDPR, the 
proposed ePrivacy Regulation, ECHR, and other instruments. As well as this, 
State surveillance regimes beyond the UK, such as Ireland’s proposed data 
retention framework, are areas of interest, as are State surveillance systems 
implemented in more authoritarian states, such as the technologically advanced 
systems operating in China. There will also be a need for further research into 
whether GDPR and the ePrivacy Regulation, once they come into force, in 
practice place limitations on the voter surveillance and microtargeting 
undertaken by political organisations, and, if so, how effective these limitations 
are. 
 
As a result of this analysis, this thesis has shown that the extensive dataveillance 
practices undertaken by corporations, the State, and political organisations, 
facilitated by the neo-liberal nature of digital citizenship, have remade the 
relationship between the digital citizen and the state to the detriment of the 
digital citizen. In this emerging surveillance state, the digital citizen takes on 
                                                          
61 See, for example, Cate and Mayer-Schoenberger, 2013; Cate et al, 2014; Mantelero and Viciago, 
2015; Dean et al, 2016; Mittelstadt, 2017; Taylor et al, 2017 
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new roles, as a produsumer in surveillance capitalism and as a passive subject 
of surveillance in the digital panopticon. The digital citizen becomes 
commodified as a data profile to be bought and sold on the advertising market, 
they are exploited as a produsumer of valuable behavioural data, and their 
agency as a social, economic, and political actor is appropriated by corporations 
and political organisations and directed towards corporate and political ends. 
Fundamental norms that exist to protect the citizen and underpin democratic 
society are eroded, the influence of capital in the electoral process is potentially 
increased, the public sphere is degraded through new forms of coercion, and 
legal protections for privacy and data protection are undermined. This thesis 
has proposed new concepts where necessary to account for these changes, and 
for the first time has provided a comprehensive governmentality-based account 










David Davis and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] 
EWHC 2092 (Admin), [2015] WLR(D) 318 
 
Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural 
Resources (C-293/12) EU:C:2014:238, [2015] QB 127 
 
European Commission v Germany (C-518/07) EU:C:2010:125, [2010] 3 CMLR 2  
 
Google Spain v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and González (c-
131/12) ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, [2014] WLR(D) 202 
 
In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litigation 5:12-md-02314-EJD (N.D. Cal. Jun. 
30, 2017) 
 
Liberty (The National Council of Civil Liberties) and others v Government 
Communications Headquarters and others [2014] UKIPTrib 13_77-H 
 
Liberty (The National Council of Civil Liberties) and others v The Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and others [2015] UKIPTrib 13_77-
H 
 
Privacy International v Foreign Secretary and others [2016] UKIPTrib 15_110-CH 
 
Romanian Constitutional Court Decision no 1258 from 8 October 2009 
 
S and Marper v United Kingdom [2008] ECHR 1581 
 
Scottish National Party v Information Commissioner [2006] UKIT EA_2005_0021 
 
Tele2 Sverige AB v Post-och telestyrelsen, Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v Tom Watson and others (C-203/15, C-698/15) EU:C:2016:970, 
[2017] 2 WLR. 1289 
 
Roman Zakharov v Russia [2008] ECHR 964 
 





Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 254 
  
Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy (C-
73/07) EU:C:2008:727, [2010] All ER (EC) 213 
 
Volker und Markus Schecke GbR v Land Hessen (C-92/09) EU:C:2010:662, [2012] 
All ER (EC) 127 
 





Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/391 
 
Communications Act 2003 
 
Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 
 
Data Protection Act 1998 
 
Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
95/46/EC [1995] OJ L281/31) 
 
Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 
 
Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/859) 
 
Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 
 
Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention of data 
generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available 
electronic communications services or of public communications networks and 
amending Directive 2002/58/EC [2006] OJ L105/54) 
 
Draft ePrivacy Regulation (Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council concerning the respect for private life and the 






Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 255 
  
ePrivacy Directive (Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications 
sector [2002] OJ L201/37) 
 
European Convention on Human Rights 1950 
 
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill (HC Bill 5, 2017-19) 
 
General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC [2016] OJ L119/1) 
 
Intelligence Services Act 1994 
 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016 
 
Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 
 
Police Act 1997 
 
Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (SI 
2003/2426) 
 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
 
Telecommunications Act 1984 
 
UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Paris 
 
 
Official Publications, Reports, etc. 
 
Anderson, D., Report of the Bulk Powers Review, Cm 9326, August 2016 
 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Advice paper on special categories of 
data (“sensitive data”), April 2011 
 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of 
legitimate interests of the data controller under Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC, 





Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 256 
  
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on the right to data 
portability, 16/EN WP 242, 13/06/2016 
 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 01/2017 on the Proposed 
Regulation for the ePrivacy Regulation (2002/58/EC), 17/EN WP 247, 
04/04/2017 
 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on Automated individual 
decision-making and Profiling for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679, 17/EN 
WP 251, 03/10/2017 
 
European Parliament, “DRAFT REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council concerning the respect for private life 
and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing 
Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications)”, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 
09/06/2017 
 




Home Office, Operational Case for the Retention of Internet Connection Records, 
04/11/2015 
 
Home Office, Communications Data Draft Code of Practice, Autumn 2016 
 
House of Commons Hansard, 15/07/2014, Vol. 584, Col. 704 
 
House of Lords Hansard, 11/11/2014, Vol. 757, No. 56, Col. WA24 
 
House of Commons, Science and Technology Committee, Investigatory Powers 





House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, “Investigatory Powers 
Bill: Technology issues - oral evidence”, HC Paper 573-i, 10/11/2015 
 
House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, “Surveillance: Citizens and 





Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 257 
  
 
House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, “Surveillance: Citizens and 
the State”, Volume II: Evidence, The Stationary Office, 2009, Session 2008/09, HL 
Paper 18-II 
 
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, “Report on the draft 
Investigatory Powers Bill”, HC Paper 795, 09/02/2016 
 
Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, Report, The Stationary 




United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank 





Acquisti, A., Brandimarte, L, and Lowenstein, G., “Privacy and human behaviour 
in the age of information”, Science, Vol. 347, Issue 6221, 30 January 2015, 
pp.509-514 
 
Andrejevic, M., “Surveillance and Alienation in the Online Economy”, 
Surveillance & Society, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2011, pp.270-287 
 
Andrejevic, M., “Exploitation in the Data Mine”, in Fuchs, C., Boersma, K., 
Albrechtslund, and Sandoval, M. (Eds.), Internet and Surveillance: The Challenges 
of Web 2.0 and Social Media, 2012, New York: Routledge, pp.71-88 
 
Andrejevic, A. and Gates, K. (Eds.), "Big Data Surveillance [special issue]", 
Surveillance & Society, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2014 
 
Angwin, J., “Spy Agency Drowns in Useless Data, Impeding Work, Former 




Anstead, N., “Data-driven campaigning in the 2015 UK general election”, The 





Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 258 
  
Anwer, J, “Users worried about privacy free to leave Facebook, WhatsApp: 




Arvidsson, A., “Brands: a critical perspective”, Journal of Consumer Culture, Vol. 
5, No. 2, 2005, pp.235-258 
 
Ayres, A., Super Crunchers: How Anything Can be Predicted, 2008, John Murray 
Publishers 
 
Aviram, A., “Revealed: Bristol’s police and mass mobile phone surveillance”, The 
Bristol Cable, 10/10/2016 [https://thebristolcable.org/2016/10/imsi] 
 
Bajaj, K., “Cyberspace: Post-Snowden”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2014, 
pp.582-583 
 
Baker, P. M. A., Bricout, J. C., Moon, N. W., Coughlan, B., and Pater, J., 
“Communities of participation: A comparison of disability and aging identified 
groups on Facebook and LinkedIn”, Telematics and Informatics, Vol 30, 2013, 
pp.22-34 
 
Balkin, J. M., “Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society”, New York University Law Review, Vol. 
79, No. 1, April 2004 
 
Ball, J., Borger, J., and Greenwald, G, “Revealed: how US and UK spy agencies 




Ballard, A. O., Hillygus, D. S., and Konitzer, T., “Campaigning Online: Web Display 
Ads in the 2012 Presidential Campaign”, Political Science & Politics, Vol. 49, No. 
3, July 2016, pp.414-419 
 
Barber, B., “Which Technology in Which Democracy?” in Jenkins, H. and 
Thorburn, D. (Eds.), Democracy and the New Media, 2003, Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press 
 
Barry, A., Osbourne, T., and Rose, N., Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, 





Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 259 
  
 
Bartsch, M. and Dienlin, T., “Control your Facebook: An analysis of online 
privacy literacy”, Computers in Human Behaviour, Vol. 56, 2016, pp.147-154 
 
Bauman, Z., Consuming Life, 2007, Polity Press 
 
Bauman, Z., Bigo, D., Esteves, P., Guild, E., Jabri, V., Lyon, D., and Walker, R.B.J., 
“After Snowden: Rethinking the Impact of Surveillance”, International Political 
Sociology, Vol 8, 2014 
 
BBC News, Mass snooping fake mobile towers ‘uncovered in UK’, 10/06/2015 
[http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-33076527] 
 
Beck, U. and Beck-Gernsheim, E., Individualization: Institutionalized 
Individualism and Its Social and Political Consequences, 2001, Sage Publications 
 
Bennett, C., “The politics of privacy and the privacy of politics: Parties, elections 
and voter surveillance in Western democracies”, First Monday, Vol. 18, No. 8. 
2013 
 
Bennett, C. J., “Voter databases, micro-targeting, and data protection law: can 
political parties campaign in Europe as they do in North America?”, 
International Data Privacy Law, Vol. 6, No. 6, 2016 
 
Bennett, C. J., Clement, A., and Milberry, K. (Eds.), "Cyber-Surveillance in 
Everyday Life [special issue]", Surveillance & Society, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2012 
 
Beer, D., “The social power of algorithms”, Information, Communication & 
Society, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2017, pp.1-13 
 
Bent, O., Dey, P., Weldemariam, K., and Mohinia, M. K, “Modeling user behaviour 
data in systems of engagement”, Future Generation Computer Systems, Vol. 68, 
2017, pp.456-464 
 
Bentham, J., The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 4 (Panopticon, Constitution, 
Colonies, Codification), 1843 
 
Besley, T., “Digitized Youth: constructing identities in the creative knowledge 
economy”, Policy Futures in Education, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2010, pp.126-141 
 






Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 260 
  




Big Brother Watch, “Big Brother Watch and Others v UK at the European Court 




Bimber, B., “Digital Media in the Obama Campaigns of 2008 and 2012: 
Adaptation to the Personalized Communication Environment”, Journal of 
Information Technology & Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2014, pp.130-150 
 
Birchall, C., "Shareveillance: Subjectivity between open and closed data", Big 
Data & Society, 2016 
 
Boas, T., and Gans-Morse, J., “Neoliberalism: from New Liberal philosophy to 
Anti-Liberal Slogan”, Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol 44, 
No 2, 2009 
 
Bockman, J., “The origins of neoliberalism between Soviet socialism and 
Western capitalism: “A galaxy without borders””, Theory and Society, Vol 36, No 
4, Aug 2007, pp.343-371 
 
Bockman, J., “Neoliberalism”, Contexts, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2013 
 
Bond, R. M., Fariss, C. J., Jones, J. J., Kramer, A. D. I., Marlow, C., Settle, J. E., and 
Fowler, J H., “A 61-million-person experiment in social influence and political 
mobilization”, Nature, Vol. 489, September 2012, pp.295-298 
 
Borwick, T., “Winning against the odds”, Kanto Systems: Case Studies 
[https://www.kan.to/case-studies]  
 
Brady, H. E., “Political Participation”, in Robinson, J. P., Shaver, P. R., and 
Wrightsman, L. S. (Eds.), Measures of Political Attitudes, 1999, San Diego, CA: 
Academic Press, pp.737-801 
 
Brennetot, “The geographical and ethical origins of neoliberalism: The Walter 
Lipmann Colloquium and the foundations of a new geopolitical order”, Political 
Geography, Vol 49, 2015 
 










Brodkin, J., “Websites can keep ignoring “Do Not Track” requests after FCC 
ruling”, ArsTechnica, 11/06/2015 [https://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2015/11/fcc-wont-force-websites-to-honor-do-not-track-requests] 
 
Brodkin, J., “Google and Facebook lobbyists try to stop new online privacy 








Bryant, B., “VICE News Investigation Finds Signs of Secret Phone Surveillance 




Bucher, T., “Want to be on top? Algorithmic power and the threat of invisibility 
on Facebook”, New Media & Society, Vol. 14, No. 7, 2012, pp.1164-1180 
 
Bucher, T., “The algorithmic imaginary: exploring the ordinary affects of 
Facebook algorithms”, Information, Communication and Society, Vol. 20, No. 1, 
2017, pp.30-44 
 
Burchell, G., “Pecular interests: civil society and governing ‘The system of 
natural liberty’”, in Burchell, G., Gordon, C., and Miller, P. (Eds.), The Foucault 
Effect: Studies in governmentality, 1992, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
 
Burrell, J., “How the machine ‘thinks’: Understanding opacity in machine 
learning algorithms”, Big Data & Society, January-June 2016, pp.1-12 
 
Burris, S., Kempa, M., and Shearing, C., “Changes in Governance: A Cross-
Disciplinary Review of Currrent Scholarship”, Akron Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 1, 
2008 
 
Butler, J., “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution”, Theatre Journal, Vol. 40, 





Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 262 
  
Callon, M. and Latour, B., “Unscrewing the Big Leviathan: How Actors Macro-
Structure Reality and How Sociologist Help Them To Do So”, in Knorr-Cetina, K. 
and Cicouvel, A.V. (Eds.), Advances in Social Theory and Methodology: Towards 
an Integration of Micro and Macro-Sociology, 1981, Boston, pp. 277-303 
 
Cambridge Analytica, The CA Advantage [https://ca-political.com/ca-advantage] 
 
Campbell, L, “A rights-­­based analysis of DNA retention: ‘non-­­conviction’ 
databases and the liberal state”, Criminal Law Review, Vol.12, 2010, pp.889-906 
 
Carty, A., “Marxism and International Law: Perspectives for the American 
(twenty-first) Century?” in Susan Marks (ed), International Law on the Left: 
Reexamining Marxist Legacies, 2008, p.170 
 




Cate, F. H., and Mayer-Schönberger, V., “Notice and consent in a world of Big 
Data”, International Data Privacy Law, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2013, pp.67-73 
 
Chadwick, A. and Stromer-Galley, J., “Digital Media, Power, and Democracy in 
Parties and Election Campaigns: Party Decline or Party Renewal?”, The 
International Journal of Press/Politics, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2016, pp.283-293 
 
Charitsis, V., “Prosuming (the) self”, Ephemera, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2016, pp.37-59 
 
Chin, A. and Klinefelter, A., “Differential Privacy as a Response to the Re-
identification Threat: The Facebook Advertiser Case Study”, North Carolina Law 
Review, Vol. 90, No. 5, 2012, pp.1418-1455 
 
Chomsky, N., Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order, 1999, New York 
 




Clarke, J., “Consumerism and the remaking of state-citizen relationships”, Paper 







Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 263 
  
Clarke, R., “Information Technology and Dataveillance”, Communications of the 
ACM, Vol. 31, No. 5, 1988, pp.498-512 
 
Collier, S. J., “Topologies of Power - Foucault’s Analysis of Political Government 
beyond ‘Governmentality’”, Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 26, No. 6, 2009, pp. 
78–108 
 
Confessore, N. and Hakim, D., “Data Firm Says ‘Secret Sauce’ Aided Trump; Many 




Conger, K., “Facebook says it’s not making friend suggestions based on your 




Conger, K., “What Apple’s differential privacy means for your data and the future 
of machine learning”, TechCrunch, 14/06/2017 
[https://techcrunch.com/2016/06/14/differential-privacy] 
 
Connolly, D., “A Little History of the World Wide Web”, World Wide Web 
Consortium, 2000, [https://www.w3.org/History.html] 
 




Corbett, S. and Walker, A., “The Big Society: Back to the Future”, The Political 
Quaterly, Vol. 83, No. 3, July-September 2012 
 
Cormode, G. and Balachander, K., “Key differences between Web 1.0 and Web 
2.0”, First Monday, Vol. 13, No. 6, 2008 
 
Crawford, K., and Schultz, J. M., “Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework 
to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms”, Boston College Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 
93, 2014, p.93-128 
 
Cummings, D., “On the referendum #20: the campaign, physics and data science 
– Vote Leave’s ‘Voter Intention Collection System’ (VICS) now available for all”, 














Dahlberg, L., “Computer-Mediated Communication and the Public Sphere: A 
Critical Analysis”, Journal of Computer-mediated Communication, Vol. 7, No. 1, 
2001a 
 
Dahlberg, L., “The Internet and Democratic Discourse: Exploring The Prospects 
of Online Deliberative Forums Extending the Public Sphere”, Information, 
Communication & Society, Vol 4, No. 4, 2001, pp.615-633 
 
Dahlgren, P., “Reconfiguring civic culture in the new media milieu” in Corner, J. 
and Pels, D. (Eds), Media and political style: Essays on representation and civic 
culture, 2003, pp.151-170, London: Sage 
 
Dahlgren, P., “The Internet, Public Spheres, and Political Communication: 
Dispersion and Deliberation”, Political Communication, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2005, 
pp.147-162 
 
Danaher, J., “The Threat of Algocracy: Reality, Resistance and Accommodation”, 
Philosophy and Technology, Vol. 29, 2016, pp.245-268 
 
Davies, H.., “Ted Cruz using firm that harvested data on millions of unwitting 




Davis, K., “Tensions of identity in a networked era: Young people’s perspectives 
on the risks and rewards of online self-expression”, New Media & Society, Vol. 
14, No. 4, 2011, pp.634-651 
 
Dean, M., Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, 1999, Sage 
Publications 
 
Degli Esposti, S., “When big data meets dataveillance: the hidden side of 
analytics”, Surveillance & Society, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2014, pp.209-225 
 





Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 265 
  
 
Deleuze, G., “Postscript on the Societies of Control”, October, Vol. 59, Winter 
1992, pp.3-7 
 
Deloitte, “State of the smart: Consumer and business usage patterns”, Global 




Democracy Now, Vindication for Snowden? Obama Panel Backs Major Curbs on 




Denham, E., “The Information Commissioner opens a formal investigation into 
the use of data analytics for political purposes”, The Information Commissioner’s 





Dennison, L., Morrison, L., Conway, G., and Yardley, L., ”Opportunities and 
challenges for smartphone applications in supporting health behaviour change”, 
Journal of International Medical Research, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2013 
 
Denman, J. and McDonald, P., “Unemployment statistics from 1881 to the 





Diakopoulos, N., “Algorithmic Accountability Reporting: On the Investigation of 
Black Boxes”, Tow Center for Digital Journalism: A Tow/Knight Brief, Columbia 
Journalism School. 2013 [https://towcenter.org/research/algorithmic-
accountability-on-the-investigation-of-black-boxes-2] 
 
DiResta, R., “There are bots. Look around.”, RibbonFarm, 23/05/2017 
[https://www.ribbonfarm.com/2017/05/23/there-are-bots-look-around] 
 
Doward, J., Cadwalladr, C., and Gibbs, A., “Watchdog to launch inquiry into 






Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 266 
  
 
Duff, R. A., “Who Must Presume Whom to be Innocent of What?”, Netherlands 
Journal of Legal Philosophy, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2013, pp. 170-192. 
 
Duhigg, C., “How Companies Learn Your Secrets”, New York Times, 16/02/2012 
[http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html] 
 
Dwork, C., McSherry, F., Nissim, K., and Smith, A., “Calibrating Noise to 
Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis”, TCC 2006: Theory of Cryptography, 2006, 
pp.265-284 
 
Dyer-Wytheford, N., Cyber-Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High 
Technology Capitalism, 1999, University of Illinois Press 
 
Dyer-Wytheford, N., Cyber-Proletariat: Global Labour in the Digital Vortex, 2015, 
Pluto Press 
 
Dyrberg, T. B., The Circular Structure of Power: Politics, Identity, Community, 
1997, New York 
 





Edwards, L. and Veale, M., “Slave to the Algorithm? Why a ‘right to an 




Erlingson, U., Pihur, V., and Korolova, A., “RAPPOR: Randomized Aggregatable 
Privacy-Preserving Ordinal Response”, Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference 
on Computer and Communications Security, ACM, 2014 
[https://research.google.com/pubs/pub42852.html] 
 
Facebook, Data Policy, 29/09/2016 
[https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy] 
 
Facebook Business, Success Story: The Conservative Party 
[https://www.facebook.com/business/success/conservative-party] 
 





Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 267 
  
 
Fakhoury, R. and Aubert, B., “Citizenship, trust, and behavioural intentions to 
use public e-services: The case of Lebanon”, International Journal of Information 
Management, Vol. 35, 2015, pp. 346-351 
 
Farivar, C., “County sheriff has used stingray over 300 times with no warrant”, 




Farrell, G., The 'Mere Irish' and the Colonisation of Ulster, 1570-1641, 2017, 
Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Fellner, W. and Spash, C. L., The Illusion of Consumer Sovereignty in Economic and 
Neoliberal Thought, 2014 
 




Flood, J., The Fires: How a Computer Formula, Big Ideas, and the Best of Intentions 
Burned Down New York City-And Determined the Future of Cities, 2011, 
Riverhead Books 
 
Forrest, C., “Android nears 88% global market share, but Apple still makes more 




Fortune, Biggest Employers 
[http://fortune.com/fortune500/list/filtered?sortBy=employees&first500] 
 
Foucault, M., Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-
1977, 1980, New York: Pantheon Books 
 
Foucault, M., “Technologies of the self”, in Martin, L. Gutman, H., and Hutton, P. 
(Eds.), Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, 1988, London: 
Tavistock, pp.16-49 
 
Foucault, M., The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, 1990, Penguin  
 





Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 268 
  
 
Foucault, M., “About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Two 
Lectures at Dartmouth”, Political Theory, Vol. 21, No. 2, May 1993, pp. 198-227 
 
Foucault, M., Securite´, territoire, population. Cours au College de France, 1977 e 
1978, 2004a, Paris 
 
Foucault, M.,Naissance de la biopolitique. Cours au College de France, 1978 e 
1979, 2004b, Paris 
 
Friedman, M., Capitalism and Freedom, 1962, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press 
 
Friedman, M., and Friedman, R., Two Lucky People: Memoirs, 2nd ed., 1998, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
 
Fuchs, C., “A Contribution to the Critique of the Political Economy of Google”, 
Fast Capitalism, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2011 
 
Fuchs, C., “Political Economy and Surveillance Theory”, Critical Sociology, Vol. 
39, No. 5, 2012, pp.671-687 
 
Fuchs, C., “Social Media and the Public Sphere”, tripleC, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2014, 
pp.57-101 
 
Fuchs, C., “The Information Economy and the Labor Theory of Value”, 
International Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2017, pp.65-89 
 
Fuchs, C., Boersma, K., Albrechtslund, and Sandoval, M. (Eds.), Internet and 
Surveillance: The Challenges of Web 2.0 and Social Media, 2012, New York: 
Routledge 
 
Galetta, A., “The changing nature of the presumption of innocence in today's 
surveillance societies: rewrite human rights or regulate the use of surveillance 
technologies?”, European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2013 
 
Galič, M., Timan, T., and Koops, B., “Bentham, Deleuze and Beyond: An Overview 
of Surveillance Theories from the Panopticon to Participation”, Philosophy & 
Technology, Vol. 30, No. 9, 2017, pp.9-37 
 
Gallagher, R., “From Radio to Porn, British Spies Track Web Users’ Online 









Gallagher, R., “Airport Police Demanded an Activist’s Passwords. He Refused. 




Gao, G., “What Americans think about NSA surveillance, national security and 




Geiger, R. S., “Does Habermas Understand the Internet? The Algorithmic 
Construction of the Blogo/Public Sphere”, gnovis: a journal of communication, 
culture, and technology, Issue 10, Vol. 1, 2009 
 
Gerlitz, C., and Helmond, A., “The like economy: Social buttons and the data-
intensive web”, New Media & Society, Vol. 15, No. 8, 2013, pp.1348-1365 
 
Gill, S., The Global Panopticon, 1995 
 
Gill, S., “The Constitution of Global Capitalism”, International Studies Association 
Annual Convention, Los Angeles, Vol. 15, 2000, pp.1-20 
 
Gill, S., Power and Resistance in the New World Order, 2nd ed., 2008, New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Gillespie, T., “The Relevance of Algorithms” in Gillespie, T., Boczkowski, P. J., and 
Foot, K. A. (Eds.), Media Technologies: Essays on Communication, Materiality, and 
Society, 2014, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp.167-193 
 
Giritli Nygren, K., “e-Governmentality: On Electronic Administration in Local 
Government”, Electronic Journal of e-Government, Vol. 7, Issue 1, 2009, pp. 55-64 
 
Goldman, E., “The Ten Most Important Section 230 Rulings”, Tulane Journal of 
Technology & Intellectual Property, Vol. 20, 2017 
 
Goldman, L., “Statistics and the Science of Society in Early Victorian Britain; An 
Intellectual Context for the General Register Office”, Social History of Medicine, 





Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 270 
  
Goodin, D., “Poorly anonymized logs reveal NYC cab drivers’ detailed 




Goodin, D., “NSA-leaking Shadow Brokers just dumped its most damaging 




Glaesar, E. L., and Shleifer, A., “The Rise of the Regulatory State”, Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2003, pp.401-425 
 
Goffman, E., The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 1956, Edinburgh: 
University of Edinburgh 
 
Goodman, B. and Flaxman, S., “European Union regulations on algorithmic 
decision-making and a “right to explanation””, AI Magazine, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2016 
 
Goodyear, V. A., Kerner, C., and Quennerstedt,M., “Young people’s use of 
wearable health lifestyle technologies; surveillance, self-surveillance and 
resistance”, Sport, Education and Society, 2017 
 




Google, SOPA/PIPA, 18/01/2012 [https://www.google.com/doodles/sopa-pipa] 
 
Google, Re: Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other 




Gordon, C., “Governmental Rationality: An Introduction”, in Burchell, G., Gordon, 
C. and Miller, P. (Eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, 1991, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
 
Goss, J., “‘We Know Who You Are and We Know Where You Live’: The 
Instrumental Rationality of Geodemographic Systems”, Economic Geography, 





Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 271 
  
Graham, T., Jackson, D., and Wright, S., “‘We need to get together and make 
ourselves heard’: everyday online spaces as incubators of political action”, 
Information, Communication & Society, 2015 
 




Greenwald, G. and MacAskill, E., “NSA Prism program taps in to user data of 
Apple, Google and others”, The Guardian, 07/06/2013 
[http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data] 
 
Greenwald, G., MacAskill, E., Poitras, L., Ackerman, S., and Rushe, D., “Microsoft 




Groll, E., “’Shadow Brokers’ Claim to be Selling NSA Malware, in What Could Be 




Gwynne, A., “Theresa May called a snap election, but we in Labour had Snapchat. 




Habermas, J., The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Trans. Burger, 
T., 1989, Cambridge, MA; MIT Press 
 
Habermas, J., “Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still 
Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical 
Research”, Communication Theory, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2006, pp.411-426 
 
Hadjimatheou, K., “Surveillance, the moral presumption of innocence, the right 
to be free from criminal stigmatisation and trust”, Surveillance: Ethical Issues, 
Legal Limitations, and Efficiency, SURVEILLE, European University Institute, 
2013 
 
Hadjimatheou, K, “Surveillance Technologies, Wrongful Criminalisation, and the 






Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 272 
  




Halvais, A., Search Engine Society, 2009, Cambridge: Polity Press 
 
Hansard Society, Audit of Political Engagement 10: The 2013 Report, 2013 
 
Hansard Society, Audit of Political Engagement 14: The 2017 Report, 2017 
 
Harvey, D., A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 2005, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
 
Hay, C., Why We Hate Politics, 2007, Cambridge: Polity Press 
 




Hayek, F., The Road to Serfdom, 2nd ed., 2001, Routledge 
 
Healey, N., Britain’s Economic Miracle: Myth or Reality?, 2002, Routledge 
 
Heggarty, K. D. and Ericson, R. V., “The surveillant assemblage”, The British 
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 51, No. 4., 2000, pp.605-622 
 
Hendrix, J. and Carroll, D., “Confronting a Nightmare for Democracy: Personal 




Hern, A., “’Anonymous’ browsing data can be easily exposed, researchers 




Heyer, P., and Crowley, D., “Introduction”, in Innis, H. A., The Bias of 
Communication, 1989, Toronto: University of Toronto Press  
 











Hewitt, M., “New Labour, Human Nature, and Welfare Reform”, in Sykes, R., 
Bochel, C., and Ellison, N. (Eds.), Social Policy Review: Developments and Debates: 
2000-2001 No.13¸ 2001, Policy Press 
 
Heyer, P., and Crowley, D., “Introduction”, in Innis, H. A., The Bias of 
Communication, 1989, Toronto: University of Toronto Press  
 
Hill, K., “How Facebook Outs Sex Workers”, Gizmodo, 11/10/2017 
[https://gizmodo.com/how-facebook-outs-sex-workers-1818861596] 
 
Hill, R., K., “What an Algorithm Is”, Philosophy and Technology, Vol. 29, No. 35, 
2016, pp.35-59 
 
Hintz, A., and Brown, I., “Enabling Digital Citizenship? The Reshaping of 
Surveillance Policy After Snowden”, International Journal of Communication, Vol. 
11, 2017, pp.782-801 
 
Hintz, A., Dencik, L, and Wahl-Jorgensen, K., “Digital Citizenship and Surveillance 
Society”, International Journal of Communications, Vol. 11, 2017, pp.731-739 
 




Hofacker, C. F., Malthouse, E. C., and Sultan, F., “Big data and consumer 
behaviour: imminent opportunities”, Journal of Consumer Marketing, Vol. 33, 
Issue 2, 2016, pp.89-97 
 
Hood, C., “A Public Management for all Seasons?”, Public Administration, Vol. 69, 
Issue 1, March 1991, pp. 3-19 
 
Howard, P. N. and Kreiss, D., “Political parties and voter privacy: Australia, 
Canada, the United Kingdom, and United States in comparative perspective”, 
First Monday, Vol. 15, No. 12, 2010 
 
Hughes, S. S., “US Domestic Surveillance after 9/11: An Analysis of the Chilling 
Effect on First Amendment Rights in Cases Filed against the Terrorist 






Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 274 
  
Hull, G., “Successful failure: what Foucault can teach us about privacy self-
management in a world of Facebook and big data”, Ethics and Information 
Technology, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2015, pp.89-101 
 
Information Commissioner’s Office, The exemption from registration for ‘not-for-




Innis, H. A., The Bias of Communication, 1989, Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press 
 
Isin, E., and Ruppert, E., Being Digital Citizens, 2015, Maryland: Rowman & 
Littlefield 
 




Jeon, H., “The Value and Price of Information Commodities: an Assessment of the 
South Korean Controversy”, in Zarembka, P. and Desai, R. (Eds.), Revitalizing 
Marxist Theory for Today's Capitalism, 2011, Emerald Books, pp.191-222 
 
Jessop, B., “Hollowing out the 'nation-state' and multilevel governance” in 
Kennett, P. (Ed.), A Handbook Of Comparative Social Policy, 2004, Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004, pp. 11-25 
 
Jessop, B., “From micro-powers to governmentality: Foucault’s work on 
statehood, state formation, statecraft and state power”, Political Geography, Vol. 
26, 2007, pp. 34-40 
 




Johnson-Williams, E., “ISC comes down hard on Investigatory Powers Bill”, Open 
Rights Group, 09/02/2016, [https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2016/isc-
comes-down-hard-on-investigatory-powers-bill] 
 
Jones, J. J., Bond, R. M., Bakshy, E., Eckles, D., and Foweler, J. H., “Social influence 
and political mobilization: further evidence from a randomized experiment in 





Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 275 
  
Jones, M., An Introduction to Politcal Geography Space, Place, and Politics, 2007, 
New York: Routledge 
 
Juniper Research, AD BLOCKING TO COST PUBLISHERS $27BN IN LOST 




Just, N., and Latzer, M., “Governance by algorithms: reality construction by 
algorithmic selection on the Internet”, Media, Culture & Society, Vol. 39, No. 2, 
2017, pp.238-258 
 
Kadidal, S., “NSA Surveillance: The Implications for Civil Liberties”, I/S: A Journal 
of Law & Policy for the Information Society, Vol. 10, Issue 1, Spring 2014, pp.433-
479 
 
Kahneman, D., Thinking, Fast and Slow, 2012, Penguin 
 
Kaplan, J., “Improving Enforcement and Transparency of Ads on Facebook”, 




Katz, J., “Birth of a Digital Nation”, Wired, 01/04/1997 
[https://www.wired.com/1997/04/netizen-3] 
 
Kearney, R., Modern Movements in European Philosophy: Phenomenology, Critical 
Theory, Structuralism, 1994, Manchester: Manchester University Press 
 
Keay, D., “Aids, education and the year 2000!”, Woman’s Own, 31/10/1987, pp.1-
45 
 
Kennett, P. A., “Global Perspectives on Governance”, in Osborne, S. (Ed.), The 
New Public Governance. Emerging Perspectives on the Theory and Practice of 
Public Governance, (pp. 19-35), 2010, Routledge 
 
Kimmons, R., “Social Networking Sites, Literacy, and the Authentic Identity 
Problem”, TechTrends, Vol. 58, No. 2, 2014, pp.93-98 
 
Kitchin, R., The Data Revolution: Big Data, Open Data, Data Infrastructures & 





Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 276 
  
Kitchin, R., “Thinking critically about and researching algorithms”, Information, 
Communication & Society, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2017, pp.14-29 
 
Kitchin, R. and Lauriault, T. P., “Towards critical data studies: Charting and 
unpacking data assemblages and their work”, The Programmable City Working 
Paper 2, 2014 
 
Klauser, F. R. and Albrechtslund, A., "From self-tracking  to  smart  urban  
infrastructures: Towards an interdisciplinary research agenda on Big Data", 
Surveillance & Society, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2014, pp.273-286 
 
Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, 2007, Penguin 
 
Kreiss, D., “Yes We Can (Profile You): A Brief Primer on Campaigns and Political 
Data”, Stanford Law Review Online, Vol. 64, 2012 
 
Kosinki, M., Stillwell, D., and Graepel, T., “Private traits and attributes are 
predictable from digital records of human behavior”, PNAS, Vol. 110, No. 15, 
April 2013, pp.5802-5804 
 
Kotz, D., The Rise and Fall of Neoliberal Capitalism, 2015, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press 
  
Kramer, N. C. and Haferkamp, N., “Online self-presentation: Balancing privacy 
concerns and impression construction on social networking sites” in Trepte, S. 
and Reinecke, L. (Eds.), Privacy Online: Perspectives on privacy and self-disclosure 
in the social web, 2011, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp.127-142 
 
Krasnova, H., Spiekermann, S., Koroleva, K., and Hildebrand, T., “Online social 
networks: why we disclose”, Journal of Information Technology, 2010, Vol. 25, 
pp.109-125 
 
Landau, S., “Making Sense from Snowden: What’s Significant in the NSA 
Surveillance Revelations”, IEEE Security and Privacy Magazine, Vol. 11, No. 4, 
July 2013, pp.54-63 
 
Langley, P. and Leyshon, A., “Platform capitalism: The intermediation and 
capitalisation of digital economic circulation”, Finance & Society, Vol. 3, No. 1, 
2017 
 
Lankton, N. K., McKnight, D. H., and Tripp, J. F., “Facebook privacy management 
strategies: A cluster analysis of user privacy behaviors”, Computers in Human 




Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 277 
  
 




Layard, R. and Nickell, S., “The Thatcher Miracle?”, The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 79, No. 2, May 1989, pp. 215-219 
 
Lazzarato, M.. "Immaterial labor”, Radical thought in Italy: A potential politics, 
1996, pp.133-47. 
 
Lazzarato, M., “Neoliberalism in Action: Inequality, Insecurity and the 
Reconstitution of the Social”, Theory, Culture and Society, Vol. 26, No. 6, 2009, 
pp.109-133 
 
Leiner, B. M., Cerf, V. G., Clark, D. D., Kahn, R. E., Kleinrock, L., Lynch, D. C., Postel, 




Lemke, T., “‘The birth of bio-politics’: Michel Foucault’s lecture at the Collège de 
France on neo-liberal governmentality”, Economy and Society, Vol. 30, No. 2, May 
2001, pp. 190-207 
 
Lepri, B., Staiano, J., Sangokoya, D., Letouzé, E., and Oliver, N., "The Tyranny of 
Data? The Bright and Dark Sides of Data-Driven Decision-Making for Social 
Good” in Cerquitelli, T., Quercia, D., and Pasquale, F. (Eds), Transparent Data 
Mining for Big and Small Data, 2007, Springer, pp.3-24 
 
Levin, S., “Facebook told advertisers it can identify teens feeling 'insecure' and 




Liberty, Liberty’s briefing on Part 6 of the Investigatory Powers Bill for Committee 
Stage in the House of Commons, April 2016 
 








Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 278 
  
Light, J. S., From Warfare to Welfare: Defense Intellectuals and Urban Problems in 
Cold War America, 2005, John Hopkins University Press 
 
Lightfoot, G., and Wisnieski, T. P., “Information asymmetry and power in a 
surveillance society”, Information and Organization”, Vol. 24, 2014, pp.214-235 
 
Linden, G., Smith, B., and York, J., “Amazon.com Recommendations: Item-to-Item 
Collaborative Filtering”, IEEE Internet Computing, January/February 2003, 
pp.76-80 
 
Lupton, D., “Quantifying the body: monitoring and measuring health in the age 
of mHealth technologies”, Critical Public Health, Vol. 23, No. 4, 2013, pp.393-403 
 
Lupton, D., “Self-tracking Modes: Reflexive Self-Monitoring and Data Practices”, 
Paper for the ‘Imminent Citzenships: Personhood and Identity Politics in the 
Informatic Age’ workshop, ANU, Canberra, 27/08/2014 
[http://ssrn.com/abstract=2483549] 
 
Lupton, D., “Quantified sex: a critical analysis of sexual and reproductive self-
tracking using apps”, Culture, Health & Sexuality, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2015, pp.440-
453 
 
Lupton, D., “The diverse domains of quantified selves: self-tracking modes and 
dataveillance”, Economy and Society, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2016, pp.101-122 
 
Lyon, D., Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society, 1994: University of 
Minnesota Press 
 
Lyon, D., Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life, 2001, Milton Keynes: 
Open University Press 
 
Lyon, D., Surveillance Studies: An Overview, 2007, Polity Press 
 
MacAskill, E., “Edward Snowden, NSA files source: 'If they want to get you, in 




MacAskill, E., Borger, J., and Greenwald, G., “The National Security Agency: 







Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 279 
  
Madden, M., Lenhard, A., Cortesi, S., Gasser, U., Duggan, M., Smith, A., and Beaton, 
M., “Teens, Social Media, and Privacy”, Pew Research Center, 21/05/2013 
 
Mahon, B., Knowledge is Power: A Short History of Official Data Collection in the 
UK, 2009, Office of National Statistics 
 
Majone, G., “From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and 
Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance”, Journal of Public Policy, 
Vol. 17, 1997, pp. 139-167 
 
Mandese, J., “Ad Groups Petition Consumer Internet Privacy Rules, Call Opt-In 




Mantelero, A., “Social Control, Transparency, and Participation in the Big Data 
World”, Journal of Internet Law, April 2014, pp.23-29 
 
Manzerolle, V., and Smeltzer, S., “Consumer Databases and the Commercial 
Mediation of Identity: a medium theory analysis”, Surveillance & Society, Vol. 8, 
No. 3, 2011, pp.323-337 
 




Marx, K., A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 1859 
 
Marx, K., Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1, 1990, Penguin Classics  
 
Mayer-Schoenberger, V., and Cukier, K., Big Data: A Revolution That Will 
Transform How We Live, Work, and Think, 2013, London: John Murray 
Publishers 
 
McDonald, A. M., and Cranor, L. F., “The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies”, ISJLP, 
Vol. 4, 2008, pp.543-58 
 
Mendelson, A. and Papacharissi, Z., “Look at us: collective narcissism in college 
student Facebook photo galleries” in Papacharissi, Z (Ed.), A Networked Self: 






Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 280 
  
Mendoza, I. and Bygrave, L. A., “The Right Not to Be Subject to Automated 
Decisions Based on Profiling”, in Synodinou, T., Jougleux, P., Markou, C., and 
Prastitou, T. (Eds.), EU Internet Law: Regulation and Enforcement, 2017, 
Springer International Publishing 
 
Milaj, J., and Bonnici, J. P. M., “Unwitting subjects of surveillance and the 
presumption of innocence”, Computer Law & Security Review, Vol. 30, 2014, 
pp.419-428 
 
Miller, P. and Rose, N., “Governing economic life”, Economy and Society, Vol. 19, 
No. 1, 1990, pp.1-31 
 
Miller, P. and Rose, N., Governing the Present: Administering Economic, Social and 
Personal Life, 2008, Polity Press 
 
Moll, R., Pieschl, S., and Bromme, R., “Competent or clueless? Users’ knowledge 
and misconceptions about their online privacy management”, Computers in 
Human Behaviour, Vol. 41, 2014, pp.212-219 
 
Montano, J. P., “’Dycheyn and Hegeying’: The Material Culture of the Tudor 
Plantations in Ireland”, in Bateman, F. and Pilkington, L. (Eds.), Studies in Settler 
Colonialism: Politics, Identity and Culture, 2011, Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Morison, J., “Gov 2.0: Towards a User Generated State?”, Modern Law Review, 
Vol. 73, No.4, 2010, pp.551-577 
 
Morozov, E., To Save Everything, Click Here: Technology, Solutionism, and the 
Urge to Fix Problems that Don’t Exist, 2013, Allen Lane 
 
Morriss, P., Power: A Philosophical Analysis, 1987, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press 
 
Mossberger, K., Tolbert, C., and McNeal, R., Digital Citizenship: The Internet, 
Society, and Participation, 2008, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
 
Murgia, M., “UK-US pact will force big tech companies to hand over data”, 
Financial Times, 21/10/2017 [https://www.ft.com/content/09153a74-b5bc-
11e7-aa26-bb002965bce8] 
 
Nance, D., A., “Civility and the Burden of Proof”, Harvard Journal of Law and 





Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 281 
  
Narayanan, A., and Shmatikov, V., “Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse 
Datasets”, Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 
2008, pp.111-125 
 
Noelle-Neumann, E., “The Spiral of Silence: A Theory of Public Opinion”, Journal 
of Communication, Vol. 24, Issue 2, June 1974, pp.43-51 
 
Nosko, A., Wood, E., Molema, S., “All about me: Disclosure in online social 
networking profiles: the case of FACEBOOK”, Computers in Human Behaviour, 
Vol. 23, Issue 3, 2010, pp.406-418 
 




Office for National Statistics, Statistical Bulletin: Internet access – households and 





Olma, S. “Never mind the sharing economy: here’s platform capitalism”, Institute 




Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T., Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial 
Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector, 1992, Perseus Books 
 
O’Mahony, L. F., O’Mahony, D., Hickey, R., Moral Rhetoric and the Criminalisation 
of Squatting: Vulnerable Demons?, 2015, Routledge 
 
O’Reilly, L, “Google, Microsoft, and Amazon are paying AdBlock Plus huge fees to 




O’Reilly, L., “The Race Is On to Challenge Google-Facebook ‘Duopoly’ in Digital 







Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 282 
  




Osborne, A., “Margaret Thatcher: one policy that led to more than 50 companies 





Ostry, J. D., Loungani, P., Furceri, D., “Neoliberalism: Oversold?”, Finance & 
Development, Vol. 53, No. 2, June 2016 
[https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2016/06/ostry.htm]  
 
Owen, T., Disruptive Power: The Crisis of the State in the Digital Age, 2015: 
Oxford 
 




Palladino, V., “Amazon’s Echo Look takes selfies for you, makes clothing 




Palmås, K., “Predicting What You’ll Do Tomorrow: Panspectric Surveillance and 
the Contemporary Corporation”, Surveillance & Society, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2011, 
pp.338-354 
 
Panagopoulos, C., “All about that base: Changing campaign strategies in U.S. 
Presidential elections”, Party Politics, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2015, pp.179-190 
 
Papacharissi, Z., “The virtual sphere: the internet as a public sphere”, New Media 
& Society, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2002, pp.9-27 
 
Pasquale, F., The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money 
and Information, 2015, Harvard Free Press 
 
Pasquale, F., “Two Narratives of Platform Capitalism”, Yale Law & Policy Review, 





Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 283 
  




Pentland, A., “Reality Mining of Mobile Communications: Toward a New Deal on 
Data”, in Dutta, S., and Mia, I., The Global Information Technology Report 2008-
2009: Mobility in a Networked World, 2009 
 
Penney, J., “Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and Wikipedia Use”, Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal, 2016 
 
Penney, J., “Internet Surveillance, Regulation, and Chilling Effects Online: A 
Comparative Case Study”, Internet Policy Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2017 
 
Perlroth, N. and Sanger, D. E., “Hackers Hit Dozens of Countries Exploiting Stolen 




Persily, N., “Can Democracy Survive the Internet?”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 
28, No. 2, April 2017, pp.65-76 
 
Petersen, S., “Loser Generated Content: From Participation to Exploitation”, First 
Monday, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2008  
 
Popper, B., “Google announces over 2 billion monthly active devices on 




Porter, Z. and Simpson, B., “Preparing to introduce personal health budgets”, 
Nursing Management, Vol. 20, No. 6, 2013, pp.18-23 
 
Poster, M., CyberDemocracy: Internet and the Public Sphere, 1995, University of 
California 
 
Powell, J. and Steel, R., “Policy, Governmentality, and Governance”, Journal of 
Administration and Governance, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2012 
 
Pressman, A., “Here’s How Intel Is Finally Getting Back On Track With Moore’s 






Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 284 
  
Privacy International, “Documents obtained by Privacy International show that 





Raento, M. and Oulasvirta, A., “Designing for privacy and self-presentation in 
social awareness”, Personal and Ubiquitous Computing, Vol. 12, 2008, pp.527-
542 
 
Raine, L., and Anderson, J., “Above and Beyond Responses: Part 1”, The Future of 








Ranchordas, S., “Digital Agoras: Democratic Legitimacy, Online Participation and 
Uber's Petitions “, The Theory and Practice of Legislation, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2017, 
pp.31-54 
 
Ranzini, G. and Hoek, E., “To you who (I think) are listening: Imaginary audience 
and impression management on Facebook”, Computers in Human Behaviour, Vol. 
75, 2017, pp.228-235 
 
Rasmussen, T., “Internet and the Political Public Sphere”, Sociology Compass, Vol. 
8, No. 12, 2014, pp.1315-1329 
 
Rheingold, H., The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier, 
1993 
 
Rhodes, R. A. W., Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, 
Reflexivity and Accountability, 1997, Open University 
 
Reigeluth, T., “Why data is not enough: Digital traces as control of self and self-
control”, Surveillance & Society, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2014, pp.243-354 
 
Rich, E. and Miah, A., “Mobile, wearable and ingestible health technologies: 






Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 285 
  
Ritzer, G., “Prosumer Capitalism”, The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 56, 2015, 
pp.413-445 
 
Rose, N. and Miller, P., “Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of 
Government”, British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 43, No. 2, 1992, pp. 172-205 
 
Rose, N., Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought, 1999, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
 
Rosenberg, J. and Egbert, N., “Online Impression Management: Personality 
Traits and Concerns for Secondary Goals as Predictors of Self-Presentation 
Tactics on Facebook”, Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, Vol. 17, No. 
1, 2011 
 








Rouvroy, A. and Berns, T., “Algorithmic Governmentality and Prospects of 
Emancipation”, Réseaux, Vol. 1, No. 177, 2013, pp.163-196   
 
Rouvroy, A., “Algorithmic governmentality: a passion for the real and the 
exhaustion of the virtual”, Transmediale – All Watched Over by Algorithms, 
Berlin, 29/01/2015 
 




Rushe, D., “Yahoo $250,000 daily fine over NSA data refusal was set to double 




Rustin-Paschal, N., “Online Behavioral Advertising and Deceptive Campaign 






Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 286 
  
Sachs, J., What I did in Russia, 14/03/2012 [http://jeffsachs.org/2012/03/what-
i-did-in-russia] 
 
Savoie, D. J., Power: Where Is It?, 2010, McGill-Queen's 
 





Seifert, D., “Google restores ad blocker for Samsung browser to the Play Store”, 




Schou, J. and Hjelholt, M., “Digitalizing the welfare state: citizenship discourses 
in Danish digitalization strategies from 2002 to 2015”, Critical Policy Studies, 
2017 
 




Schwarz, M., “FACEBOOK FAILED TO PROTECT 30 MILLION USERS FROM 





Schwartz, R. and Halegoua, G. R., “The spatial self: Location-based identity 
performance on social media”, New Media & Society, Vol. 17, No. 10, 2015, 
pp.1643-1660 
 
Scott, J. C., “Everyday Forms of Resistance”, Copenhagen Papers, No. 4, 1989, 
pp.33-62 
 
Scott, J. C., Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts, 1990, New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press 
 
Shilton, K., “Participatory Personal Data: An Emerging Research Challenge for 
the Information Sciences”, Journal of the American Society for Information 





Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 287 
  
Shore, C. and Wright, S., Anthropology of Policy: Perspectives on Governance and 
Power, 1997, European Association of Social Anthropologists 
 
Siroker, D., “How Obama Raised $60 Million by Running a Simple Experiment”, 
Optimizely Blog, 29/11/2010 [https://blog.optimizely.com/2010/11/29/how-
obama-raised-60-million-by-running-a-simple-experiment] 
 
Silcock, R., “What is e-Government?”, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 54, 2001, pp.88-
101 
 
Smith, G., “Back doors, black boxes and #IPAct technical capability regulations”, 




Smythe, D. W, “On the Audience Commodity and its Work”, in Durham, M. and 
Kellner, D. (Eds.), Media and Cultural Studies: Keyworks. 2001, Malden: Blackwell 
Publishing 
 
Snyder, M., “Self-monitoring of expressive behaviour”, Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, Vol. 30, 1974, pp.526-537 
 
Solon, O., “You are Facebook's product, not customer”, Wired, 21/09/2011 
[https://www.wired.co.uk/article/doug-rushkoff-hello-etsy] 
 
Solove, D., “Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma”, Harvard Law 
Review, Vol. 126, Issue 7, May 2013, pp.1880-1903 
 
Song, C., Qu, Z., Blumm, N., and Barabási, A., “Limits of predictability in human 
mobility”, Science, Vol. 327, 19/02/2010, pp.1018-1021 
 
Sparrow, A., “WhatsApp must be accessible to authorities, says Amber Rudd”, 





Srnicek, N., Platform Capitalism, 2016, Polity Press 
 







Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 288 
  
Statista, Market share of Android in the United Kingdom (UK) from July 2011 to 
July 2016, 2016 [https://www.statista.com/statistics/271240/android-market-
share-in-the-united-kingdom-uk] 
 
Stole, D., Hooghe, M., and Micheletti, M., “Politics in the Super-Market: Political 
Consumerism as a Form of Political Participation”, International Political Science 
Review, Vol. 26, No. 3, July 2005, pp.245-269 
 
Storey, G., Reisman, D., Mayer, J., and Narayanan, A., The Future of Ad Blocking: 
An Analytical Framework and New Techniques, 24/05/2017 
[https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.08568] 
 
Stoycheff, E., “Under Surveillance: Examining Facebook’s Spiral of Silence Effects 
in the Wake of NSA Internet Monitoring”, Journalism & Mass Communication 
Quarterly, Vol. 93, No. 2, 2016, pp.296-311 
 





Stole, D., Hooghe, M., and Micheletti, M., “Politics in the Super-Market: Political 
Consumerism as a Form of Political Participation”, International Political Science 
Review, Vol. 26, No. 3, July 2005, pp.245-269 
 
Stubbs, P., “Stretching Concepts Too Far? Multi-Level Governance, Policy 
Transfer and the Politics of Scale in South East Europe”, Southeast European 
Politics, Vol. 6, No. 2, November 2005, pp. 66 – 87 
 
Stutzman, F., Capra, R., and Thompson, J., “Factos mediating disclosure in social 
network sites”, Computers in Human Behaviour, Vol. 27, 2011, pp.590-598 
 
Su, J., Shukla, A., Goel, S., and Narayanan, A., “De-anonymizing Web Browsing 
Data with Social Networks”, Proceedings of the 26th International Conference on 
World Wide Web, April 2017, pp.1261-1269 
 
Sweeney, L., “Simple Demographics Often Identify People”, Data Privacy 
Working Paper 3, Carnegie Mellon University, 2000 
 
Tait, A., “People you may know: is Facebook’s friend-finding algorithm putting 






Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 289 
  
 
Tambini, D., Labo, S., Goodman, E., and Moore, M., “The new political 
campaigning”, Media policy brief 19, LSE Media Policy Project, 2017 
 
Tang, J., Korolova, A., Bai, X., Wang, X., and Wang, X., “Privacy Loss in Apple’s 
Implementation of Differential Privacy on MacOS 10.12”, Arxiv e-Prints, 2017 
[https://arxiv.org/abs/1709.02753] 
 
Taylor, S. P. J., “Domesday Book and Anglo-Norman Governance”, Transactions 
of the Royal Historical Society, Vol. 25, No. 19, 1975, pp.175-193 
 
Teorell, J., Torcal, M., and Montero, J. R., “Political Participation: Mapping the 
Terrain”, in van Deth, J W., Montero, J. R., and Westholm, A. (Eds.), Citizenship 
and Involvement in European Democracies: A Comparative Analysis, 2007, 
London: Routledge, pp.334-357 
 
Terranova, T., “Free Labor: Producing Culture for the Digital Economy”, Social 
Text, Vol. 18, No. 2, Summer 2000, pp.33-58 
 
Thaler, R., and Sunstein, C., Nudge, 2008, London: Penguin Books 
 
Thrift, N. J.. “Pass it on: towards a political economy of propensity”, Emotion, 
Space and Society, Vol.1, No.2. 2008, pp. 83-96 
 
Toffler, A., The Third Wave, 1980, New York: Morrow 
 












Tufekci, Z., “Engineering the public: Big data, surveillance, and computational 






Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 290 
  
Tufekci, Z., "Algorithmic Harms Beyond Facebook and Google: Emergent 
Challenges of Computational Agency", Journal on Telecommunications and High 
Technology Law, 2015, pp.203-218 
 
Turow, J., Niche Envy: Marketing Discrimination in the Digital Age, 2008, MIT 
Press 
 
Turow, J., The Daily You: How the New Advertising Industry Is Defining Your 
Identity and Your Worth, 2012, Connecticut: Yale University Press 
 
Vaidhyanathan, S. and Bulock, C., “Knowledge and Dignity in the Era of ‘Big 
Data’”, The Serials Librarian, Vol. 66, Nos. 1-4, 2014, pp.49-64 
 
van Brakel, R., and De Hert, P, “Policing, surveillance and law in a pre-crime 
society: Understanding the consequences of technology based strategies”, 
Journal of Police Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2011, pp.163-192 
 
van Dijck, J., “’You have one identity’: performing the self on Facebook and 
LinkedIn”, Media, Culture & Society, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2013, pp.199-215 
 
van Dijck, J., “Datafication, dataism and dataveillance: Big Data between 
scientific paradigm and ideology”, Surveillance & Society, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2014, 
pp.197-208 
 
van Schaik, P., Jansen, J., Onibokun, J., Camp, J., and Kusev, P., “Security and 
privacy in online social networking: Risk perception and precautionary 
behaviour”, Computers in Human Behaviour, Vol. 78, 2018, pp.283-297 
 
van Zoonen, L., “From identity to identification: fixating the fragmented self”, 
Media, Culture & Society, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2013, pp.44-51 
 
Varian, H, “Computer Mediated Transactions”, American Economic Review, Vol. 
100, May 2010, pp.1-10 
 
Varian, H., “Beyond Big Data”, Business Economics, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2014, pp.27-31 
 
Verba, S., and Nie, N. H., Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social 
Equality, 1987, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press  
 
Villa, D. R., “Postmodernism and the Public Sphere”, American Political Science 





Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 291 
  





Vinthagen, S. and Johansson, A., “’Everyday resistance’: exploration of a concept 
and its theories”, Resistance Studies Magazine, Vol. 1, 2013 
 
Voigt, P. and von dem Bussche, A., The EU General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR): A Practical Guide, 2017, Springer International Publishing, p.113 
 
Wachter, S., Mittelstadt, B., and Floridi, L., “Why a Right to Explanation of 
Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection 
Regulation”, International Data Privacy Law, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2017, pp.76-99 
 
Weber, M., Economy and Society: an Outline of Interpretative Sociology, 1978, 
Berkeley 
 
Weber, S., The Internet: Transforming Power of Technology, 2003, Chelsea House 
Publishers 
 
Whittaker, J., “Why I Left Google”, Medium, 05/04/2015 
[https://medium.com/@docjamesw/why-i-left-google-c170e6165f2a] 
 
Wiegand, T., “There is Only One Presumption of Innocence”, Netherlands Journal 
of Legal Philosophy, Vol. 42, 2013, p.196 
 
Wilkinson, R., and Pickett, K., “Margaret Thatcher made Britain a less, not more, 




Williams, C. B. and Gulati, G., J., “Digital Advertising Expenditures in the 2016 
Presidential Election”, Social Science Computer Review, 2017, pp.1-16 
 
Williams, R. W., “Politics and Self in the Age of Digital Re(pro)ducibility”, Fast 
Capitalism, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2005 
 
Williamson, J., “What Washington Means by Policy Reform”, in Williamson, J. 
(Ed.), Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?, 1990 
 





Big Data, Surveillance, and the Digital Citizen 292 
  
Woodward, B., Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987, 1987: New York 
 
World Wide Web Foundation, History of the Web 
[https://webfoundation.org/about/vision/history-of-the-web] 
  
Yeung, K., “‘Hypernudge’: Big Data as a mode of regulation by design”, 
Information, Communication & Society, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2017a, pp.118-136 
 
Yeung, K., “Algorithmic Regulation: A Critical Interrogation”, Regulation & 
Governance, 2017b 
 
Yildiz, M., “E-government research: Reviewing the literature, limitations, and 
ways forward”, Government Information Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 3, March 2007, 
pp. 646-665 
 
Zittrain, J., “Engineering an Election”, Harvard Law Review Forum, No. 127, 2014  
 
Zlatolas, L. N., Welzer, T., Heričko, M., Hölbl, M., “Privacy antecedents for SNS 
self-disclosure: The case of Facebook”, Computers in Human Behaviour, Vol. 45, 
2015, pp.158-167  
 
Zuboff, S., The Psychological and Organizational Implications of Computer-
Mediated Work, 1981: Center for Information Systems Research, MIT 
 
Zuboff, S., In The Age Of The Smart Machine: The Future of Work and Power, 
1988, New York 
 
Zuboff, S., “Big other: surveillance capitalism and the prospects of an 
information civilization”, Journal of Information and Technology, Vol. 30, 2015, 
pp.75-89 
 









Zwick, D., “DEFENDING THE RIGHT LINES OF DIVISION: Ritzer’s Prosumer 
Capitalism in the Age of Commercial Customer Surveillance and Big Data”, The 
Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 56, 2015, pp.484-498 
